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Başlık: “Cehennemin Azgın Köpekleri”: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda İsyan, Yeniçeriler, Din 
ve Meşruiyet 
 
Bu çalışma, on sekizinci yüzyıldan ocağın kaldırılmasına kadar uzanan sürede patlak 
veren yeniçeri isyanlarının teknik aşamalarını irdelemektedir. Ayrıca, isyancılarla saray 
arasındaki meşruiyet mücadelesi, çalışmamızın bir diğer konu başlığıdır. Başkentte patlak 
veren dört büyük isyan bir arada değerlendirilerek, Osmanlı isyanlarının karakteristik 
özelliklerine ve isyanlarda izlenilen meşruiyet pratiklerine ışık tutulması hedeflenmiştir. 
Çalışmamızda kullandığımız metot dâhilinde, 1703, 1730, 1807 ve 1826 isyanlarını konu alan 
yazma eserler karşılaştırılmış, müelliflerin, eserlerini oluşturdukları süreçteki niyetleri ve 
getirmiş oldukları yorumlara odaklanılmıştır. Argümanların devamlılığını gözlemlemek için, 
1703 ve 1730 isyanları ile 1807 ve 1826 isyanları iki ayrı grupta incelenmiştir.  
1703 ve 1730 isyanlarının ortak noktası, isyancıların kendi çıkarları doğrultusunda 
padişaha yakın olan ve rakiplerini bu sayede eleyen politik kişilikleri hedef almalarıdır. 
Bunun sonucunda, tecrit edilen gruplar, eski mevki ya da ayrıcalıklarını yeniden kazanmak 
için isyancılara destek vermiştir. 1807 ve 1826 isyanlarında ise, isyancılar, politik kişilikleri 
değil, belli bir kurumu hedeflemişlerdir. Bu isyanlarda, saray ve isyancılar arasında daha 
katmerli bir meşruiyet mücadelesi yaşanmıştır. Çalışmamızda bu dört isyanın seçilmesinin 
nedeni, olayların karakteristik özelliklerinin benzeşmesidir. İsyanlarda izlenilen ortak adımlar 
ve meşruiyet süreçleri bu doğrultuda incelenmiştir. Ayrıca, isyanlar karşılaştırılarak, farklı 
vakalarda izlenilen meşruiyet süreçlerindeki –eğer var ise- değişimler ve bu değişimlerin 
müelliflerin eserlerinde öne sürdükleri argümanlar üzerindeki etkileri değerlendirilmiştir. 
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Title: “The Furious Dogs of Hell”: Rebellion, Janissaries and Religion in Sultanic 
Legitimisation in the Ottoman Empire 
 
 
This study aims to discuss the technical procedures of the janissary-led or involved 
rebellions, legitimisation patterns and the role of religious discourse as a tool of legitimization 
from the eighteenth century to the abolishment of the janissaries. The starting point of our 
study is the legitimisation issue in the abolishment of the janissaries. However, in the light of 
four mainstream rebellions we aimed to discuss the particularities of the rebellions against the 
Ottoman administration. 
The method of our analysis is to focus on the inter-textual dialogues of the 
contemporary authors, their authorial intentions and interpretations in composing the 
narratives of the 1703, 1730, 1807 and 1826 rebellions and the factors, forming the reasoning 
of the contemporary authors. As for the continuity of the arguments, it would be safe to 
categorize the rebellion of 1703 and 1730 as one group and 1807 and 1826 as another group. 
The common point of the rebellions in the first group is that the rebels had targeted certain 
political figures that dominantly excluded their political rivals out of the competition. Hence, 
these groups realigned under the cause of the rebels to reclaim their standing or privileges. 
Concerning the rebellions in the second group, their opposition was against an institution. The 
power struggle among the different parties concentrated on the manner of establishment of 
this new and western institution. Thus, the legitimisation battle within the rebellions of 1807 
and 1826 have more complex and sophisticated structure as both sides asserted legitimacy 
which depended on different reasoning. 
A common motive for selecting these rebellions is that similar characteristics of the 
events and practices allow us to gain a deeper insight into the legitimisation process of the 
events. By following such a comparative method, we also aim to observe if there was a 
change in the legitimisation practices of different events which depended on different factors. 
And if there are some changes, which of these factors had influenced the contemporary 
authors to develop their arguments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The idea of studying the religion‟s role as a tool of legitimisation is actually the 
outcome of my research on Gülzar-ı Fütuhat by Şirvanlı Fatih Efendi which was written in 
the aftermath of abolishment of the Janissaries. In the treatise, the author vigorously 
advocates the policy of Sultan Mahmud II regarding the abolishment of the Janissaries on 
religious context. Striking and horrific descriptions towards the Janissaries, such as naming 
them “the furious dogs of hell” drew my attention to the legitimacy arguments that were 
asserted by the author. These arguments can be considered as one of the key features of 
understanding the patterns of legitimisation which was constituted by the contemporary 
authors and the factors which affected the author‟s reasoning of the events. 
The abolishment of the Janissaries was not merely a military change. Rather it 
triggered further changes in the economic, political, social and administrative structures of 
the Empire.1 Indeed, the eradication of such a social phenomenon which had organic 
connections to politics, economy and military needed to be justified. Consequently, an 
illustration of the Janissaries as an “enemy of the state and religion” was a necessity for the 
Porte. However, during the following process, the negative depiction of the Janissaries has 
become more than illustration of “the enemy of the state and religion”. 
Even after the abolishment of the Janissaries, the Porte continued to use the same 
depiction of the Janissaries that was installed after the “auspicious event”. According to an 
article which was published in Takvim-i Vekayi in 1833, the Janissaries had risen from 
their graves in Tırnova, Bulgaria.2 Moreover, it was even claimed that Sultan Mahmud II 
had ordered the destruction the Janissary grave stones.3 These examples demonstrate that 
from the scope of the Porte, apart from being labelled as the enemy of the state and 
religion, the Janissaries were also represented as misanthropes. What kind of assertion 
could label the traditional corps of the Empire as misanthropes in such short time? 
                                                          
1 Fatma Sel Turhan, “Abolishment of Janissary Army and its Reflections”, Unpublished MA dissertation, Boğaziçi 
University, (Istanbul 2004). 
2   Edhem Eldem, “Yeniçeri Mezartaşları Kitabı Vesilesiyle Yeniçeri Taşları ve Tarih Üzerine”, Toplumsal Tarih vol.188, 
(Istanbul 2009), 16-17. 
3   Ibid., 12-23. 
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The depiction of the Janissaries as “the enemy of the state and religion” shall be 
considered as an effort of legitimizing the order and policy of the Sultan which aimed to 
enhance the influence of the central authority on the military. Starting from this point, the 
main purpose of our study is to reveal the legitimisation practices over mainstream 
Janissary-led, involved rebellions and to formulise the technical procedures which were 
followed by the rebels and the Porte during the rebellions. In addition, the role of religion 
as a tool of legitimisation is another focal point which is being discussed within this 
context. To achieve this purpose, the case study of the Janissaries abolishment itself would 
be insufficient. Hence, it is necessary for us to have an insight on the legitimacy dynamics 
and patterns of other cases. Thus, the mainstream rebellions of the eighteenth century, 
involving the abolishment of the Janissaries are observed in our study to constitute a 
comparative analysis which aims to re-construct the arguments in the contemporary 
sources.  
The method of our analysis is to focus on the inter-textual dialogues of the 
contemporary authors, their authorial intentions and interpretations in composing the 
narratives of the 1703, 1730, 1807 and 1826 rebellions and the factors which affected the 
reasoning of the contemporary authors. A common motive for selecting these rebellions is 
that similar characteristics of the events and practices allow us to gain a deeper insight into 
the legitimisation process of the events. By following such a comparative method, we also 
aim to observe if there was a change in the legitimisation practices of different events 
which depended on different factors. And if there are some changes, which of these factors 
had influenced the contemporary authors to develop their arguments. 
According to Hakan Karateke, the legitimacy is a form of belief ascribed as a 
distinctive feature by the subjects to those in power.4 Hence, the rulers had to justify their 
own government which depended on certain concepts of legitimisation.5 “Justice” and 
“Divine Order” are considered as the most effective concepts to produce legitimacy for the 
ruler.6 The legitimacy signifies an inherited or gained right of ruling. It implies ultimate 
                                                          
4   Hakan Karateke, Legitimizing the Order: The Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power ed. Hakan T. Karateke, Marius 
Reinkowski, (Boston: Brill, 2005), 1. 
5   Ibid., 3. 
6   Referring to the order of the state and the universe,  Ibid., 5. 
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acceptance of those who were living under the regime of the ruler. The domains were 
subjected to unquestionable obedience. Nevertheless, the degree of obedience was 
according to the legitimacy of the regime. Hence, the task of the authority was to construct 
and maintain loyalty to its legitimacy.7 
According to the Ottoman concepts of justice, maintaining the “world order” was 
the main task of the ruler, as well as with ensuring justice. As the Ottoman rulers had the 
power of making law, they positioned themselves as the very source of the law.8 When the 
Sultan became “unjust” and “oppressive”, he failed to fulfil his principle task of 
maintaining the order of the State, therefore the subjects were encouraged to organise acts 
against him.9 The basic principle of the rebels in legitimizing their cause to rebel, depended 
on this lawful right of taking act against the “unjust” and “oppressive” ruler. However, the 
process of legitimizing the antagonist cause embodied very complex structure of practices 
and interpretations which depended on the authority of the ruler and the influence of the 
rebels. This is the basic principle that was underlined in evaluating the arguments. As it 
will be repeated on different occasions, I believe that political realism prevailed over 
religious idealism in the aftermath of the events. 
At this point, it would be necessary to emphasise that, this study is not an attempt to 
decide whether the rebellions were legitimate or not.  Revealing the reasons behind the 
abolishment of the Janissaries, as well other rebellions, or the question of if the Janissaries 
were “corrupt” are beyond the scope of this study. Neither the discussion of social and 
political developments which led to the abolishment of the Janissaries, nor the re-
construction of the chronology of the events are among the main purposes of this study. 
Criticism of mainstream historiography is also beyond our scope. Even though, this study 
focuses on the power struggle between different social, political and military elements, it 
offers very little about the very nature of such struggle and economical, political and social 
reasons of the events. 
                                                          
7   Hakan T. Karateke “Legitimizing the Ottoman Sultanate: A Framework for Historical Analysis”, Legitimizing the 
Order: The Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power ed. Hakan T. Karateke, Marius Reinkowski, (Boston: Brill, 2005),  15. 
8   Ibid., 38. Ali Şafak, “Mezheblerarası Mukâyeseli İslâm Ceza Hukuku” (Erzurum: 1977), 178-185, Khaled M. Abou El 
Fadl, “The Islamic Law of the Rebellion” Unpublished PhD Thesis submitted to University of Chicago, (Chicago, 1999),  
40-53, 130-157, Khaled El Fadl, “Rebellion and Violence in Islam” (Boston, 2001), 32-62. 
9   Ibid..38, Halil Inalcık, “Adâletnâmeler”, Belgeler Dergisi vol.2 (Istanbul 1965), 86. 
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The term “rebel” is referred to as the sum of elements which opposed the Porte. 
“The rebels” consisted of elements among the society such as the townspeople and the 
Esnaf, the military; primarily the Janissaries, the Ulema, and some members of political 
fractions. In each case, there was a sudden shifting in the alignment of these elements due 
to their own interests. These changes in the alignment of the rebels actually signify that 
there was a power struggle between the different groups. After events reached to a certain 
threshold, such as elimination of the ruling cadres and the deposition of the Sultan, some of 
the participant elements sought ways to compromise with the new government. These 
manoeuvres actually changed the course of the events and the nature of legitimisation 
practices. Such changes are important for our purposes since the majority of the sources 
were written in the time of the prevailing party. 
The very nature of the term “rebellion” defined as it was in Islamic law is “an act 
against the authority of the ruler”. In broader context, our approach to the rebellions 
concentrates on the legitimisation battle between the Sultan and the rebels. According to 
Khaled El Fadl: 
“…rebellion could be an act of passive non compliance with the orders of those in power, 
or on the other hand, it could be an act of armed insurrection. A rebellion could take the 
form of a counter culture that seeks an alternative mode of social expression, or it could 
take form of an assassination attempt against a famous religious or political figure. But 
beyond the issue of the means or form that a rebellion may take, there is also the issue of 
the target of the rebellion. A rebellion could be directed against a social or political 
institution. Alternatively, it could be directed against the religious authority of the „Ulama‟ 
(the jurists) or the idea of God. Often it is very difficult to distinguish between one form of 
rebellion from another. For instance, it is not always possible to distinguish between 
heresy, treason, sedition, revolt, and an act of political opposition.”10 
Thus, the events which had occurred in 1826 and resulted with the abolishment of the 
Janissaries were also considered as a “rebellion” which was suppressed by the Sultan. 
                                                          
10   Khaled El Fadl, “Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law”, (Cabridge: Cambridge Press, 2004),  4. 
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As for the continuity of the arguments, it would be safe to categorise the rebellion 
of 1703 and 1730 as one group and 1807 and 1826 as another group. The common point of 
the rebellions in the first group is that the rebels had targeted certain political figures that 
dominantly excluded their political rivals out of competition. Hence,these groups realigned 
under the cause of the rebels to reclaim their positions or privileges. And as for the 
rebellions in second group, their target was an institution. The power struggle among the 
different parties concentrated on the establishment of this new and western institution. 
Thus, the legitimisation battle regarding the rebellions of 1807 and 1826 have more 
complex and sophisticated structure as both sides asserted legitimacy which depended on 
different reasoning. For that reason, the first two chapters and last two chapters can be 
considered as one group to be compared. 
The sources that were used in this study are the published primary sources. The 
transliterated palace chronicles, special event chronicles and treatises were heavily relied 
on as well as with material of the secondary literature for this study. In every chapter a 
brief chronology of the events was given to understand the nature of the shifting in the 
alignment of different groups. In addition, there is a part of “The Chronicles” in each 
chapter to introduce the contemporary sources which are used in each chapter. 
The first chapter deals with the rebellion of 1703 that is also known as “the Edirne 
Incident”. The first part of this chapter is an introduction which discusses the reasons of the 
rebellion. In addition, there is a short survey of selected secondary literature to underline 
the interpretations of the canonical works on the 1703 rebellion. The following part of 
“Illuminating the Power Struggle” is a discussion of the view of the contemporary sources 
regarding certain elements of the rebellion. In the following three parts, in order to 
understand the dynamics and reasoning of the palace-centred view, the roles of the 
military, the Ulema, and the condition of Şeyülislam Feyzullah in the narration of the 
events and the roles that were affiliated to these elements, are discussed in a comparative 
manner. Hence, observing the legitimisation battle between the Porte and the rebels and the 
affect of the prevailed group on the narration of events is the main purpose of the first 
chapter. 
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The second chapter deals with the rebellion of 1730. It would be useful to underline 
that for our purposes, the focal point of this chapter is the arguments of the contemporary 
sources rather than illuminating the affect of the Tulip Age on them. Indeed, the Tulip Age 
had affected the reasoning of the contemporary authors and the rebels‟ assertions which 
articulated to the main concepts of justice. But this study offers very little about the context 
of the rebels‟ assertions which were related to the Tulip Age, which is actually a particular 
field of study on its own.  
Although there is a short discussion regarding the relationship between the 
rebellion of 1730 and the Tulip Age, this chapter offers nothing specific about the social 
transformation which had occurred Ottoman society between 1718 and 1730. Due their 
lifestyle, the rebels had labelled the palace elites as being morally corrupt. “The Moral 
Corruption” argument in the contemporary sources is related to the changes on 
consumption patterns in the Tulip Age. However the focus here is on how the rebels used 
this argument in different stages of the rebellion to achieve their ultimate goal rather than 
the content of it.  
The first part of the second chapter is an introduction to underline these 
aforementioned conditions and a discussion on the relationship between the Tulip Age and 
the rebellion of 1730. The same method of analysis which is used in the first chapter is 
applied to the sections of “The Cause of Justice: The Rebels and the Ulema” and “Damat 
Ibrahim Paşa as Scapegoat of the 1730 Rebellion”. The conclusion is a comparative 
discussion of the rebellions of 1703 and 1730 to reveal if there were similar or different 
concepts of legitimisation performed. Furthermore, this part is also introduces the technical 
procedures of the rebellions which was followed by the rebels in both events. 
The third and fourth chapters deal with the cases of the rebellion of 1807 and 1826. 
The aim of the third chapter is to focus on the legitimisation battle between the Porte and 
the antagonists over the New Order implications. The part of “The Edirne Incident of 
1806” aimed to reveal how and why the Porte initiated its propaganda regarding the 
legitimacy of the New Order policy, particularly the New Army. The religious context of 
the legitimatization battle between the Porte and the antagonists is discussed in the 
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following part. Two different interpretations regarding the legitimacy of the New Order are 
our focal point.   
The next two following parts is an analysis of the Porte‟s official propaganda texts 
which had been written by a military specialist “Koca Sekbanbaşi” and a religious leader 
among the Ulema, Ubeydullah Kuşmani. “The Creation of the Enemy of State and 
Religion” and “Fezleke of Kuşmani” parts are devoted to the interpretations of Kuşmani 
regarding the rebellion of 1807.These two parts are very important to our study which aims 
to construct the argument which labelled the Janissaries as the enemy of the state and 
religion. The interpretations of Kuşmani will be inherited by the grandees of Sultan 
Mahmud II and constitute the official legitimisation basis for the abolishment of the 
Janissaries. In order to follow the continuity of the arguments of Kuşmani and the authors 
who supported the view of the Porte in abolishment of the Janissaries, there is no 
conclusion part to specifically summarize the discussion in the third chapter.11 
Fourth chapter starts with Mahmud II‟s efforts to consolidate his power on the 
provincial elements, central government and the military. The following parts deal with the 
final struggle between the Porte and the Janissaries, and the Porte‟s means of producing 
legitimacy over the abolishment of the janissaries. “The Furious Dogs of Hell: The 
Janissaries and the Loyalists in the Rebellion of 1826” is an evaluation of the fictional 
image of the Janissaries that was created after the abolishment of the corps. 
In conclusion, I intended to reveal that the rebels applied certain basic procedures 
that gave rise to the Ottoman rebellions. To a certain extent, there may be a consciousness 
or even tradition of a rebellion which developed from preceding successful attempts. To 
legitimize the abolishment of the Janissaries, the Porte had illustrated the image of the 
Sultan as a “renovator of the Order” and the janissaries as “the enemy of state and 
religion”. These images were based on Ubeydullah Kuşmani‟s interpretations on the 
legitimacy of the New Order and the rebellion of 1807. Hence, the policy which Selim III 
                                                          
11   Apart from Ubeydullah Kuşmani, the narratives of other contemporary authors are not included on our analyze. On 
critical of the contemporary sources which dealt with the rebellion of 1807 see Aysel Yıldız Danacı, “Vaka-yı Selimiyye 
or the Selimiyye Incident: A Study of the May 1807 Rebellion”, Unpublished PhD Dissertation to Sabancı University, 
Istanbul 2008, 10-60. 
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had pursued for the issue of legitimacy of New Order was adopted by his successor for 
further attempts. Perhaps it even affected the changes in concepts of legitimisation in the 
“Caliph” Sultan image during the Tanzimat Era. 
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CHAPTER 1 
“THE EDIRNE INCIDENT”: THE REBELLION OF 1703 
 
Rebellion against “the Traitors” 
Beginning with the protest of Cebecis (the armourers), the rebellion of 1703 
displays an opposition to the rebel coalition which consisted of elements among the 
military, namely the Ulema and the Esnaf (the artisans) against Sultan Mustafa II and his 
tutor Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi. The dichotomy between the Porte in Edirne, and the 
rebels in Istanbul, had brought the Empire to the verge of civil war. This aligned the 
Ulema, Janissaries and Esnaf, Cebecis with the united anti-Feyzullah Efendi power who 
centred under their cause and formed an alternative government in Istanbul. 
Each group of the rebel coalition had its own interests for joining the rebellion. 
There was a pragmatic relationship amongst the rebel coalition, especially between the 
Military and Ulema. The military needed the support of the Ulema, because without their 
support it would have been impossible for them to appeal the townspeople of Istanbul and 
give legitimacy to their cause. The Ulema joined the rebellion as the Military had offered 
them an opportunity to return to their previous positions. As the most obscure participant 
of the rebellion, the Esnaf‟s goal was simply to hold on to their most valued customers, 
namely the palace elites. The continuity of their fragile alliance was based on their shared 
interests, as any prevailing group eliminated the other within this power struggle. 
In order to legitimize their claims, each sides (the Rebels and the Porte) developed 
different religious-intellectual arguments. This chapter aims to discuss the legitimisation 
arguments of the 1703 rebellion in the contemporary sources. In addition, the 
legitimisation practices which were performed by the rebels in different stages of the 
rebellion will be discussed within this framework. Another concern of this chapter is to 
reveal how the palace-centred view illustrated an image of “the rebel”. 
Among the major studies which dealt with the rebellion of 1703, Sara Follet 
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Meserby12 focuses on personal myth of Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi. As the content of 
Meserby‟s work is beyond the scope of this study, it would be necessary for us to pay 
attention to the studies of Rif‟at Abou-El-Haj13 and Annemarike Stremmelaar14 who had 
focused on different dimensions of the 1703 rebellion. El-Haj, claims that the rebellion of 
1703 doesn‟t represent a conflict of classes or corporate. Rather, it demonstrates an 
internal struggle between different factions (pashaholds) that affiliated to the Ottoman 
politics.15 
There were two main reasons behind the rebellion:  
- Elevation of Feyzullah Efendi to the post of Şeyhülislam.  
- The transfer of the court centre from Istanbul to Edirne.16  
According to him, by the end of Golden Age there were critical changes made to 
the political formation of the Empire. These changes affected the function of the Devşirme 
Institute, which had been devised to protect the Sultan‟s absolute authority. The grand 
viziers and pashas, in both the central and the local administration, and in the high-ranking 
members of the military, were the graduates of the Devşirme. As the expansion of the 
Empire halted, there was less need for military arm and hence the Devşirme graduates. The 
alternative source of the Porte was the grandees of vizier and pasha households for the 
administration. Thus, it was important for these pashaholds to assign their own men to the 
key positions of the administration and for the military to keep their power.17   
On the eve of the rebellion, Şeyülislam Feyzullah Efendi was the most powerful 
                                                          
12  Sara Follet Meserby, “Feyzullah Efendi: An Ottoman Şeyhülislam”, Unpublished Phd Dissertation, University of 
Michigan, (Michigan: 1969). See also Michael Nizri, “The Memoirs of Şeyülislam Feyzullah Efendi”, in: “Many Ways of 
Speaking about the Self. Middle Eastern Ego-Documents in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish (14th–20th Century) ed. Ralf 
Elger and Yavuz Köse, (Berlin: Harrasowitz Verlag, 2010),  27-37.  Tahir Sevinç, “1703 Edirne Vakası”, Unpublished 
Phd Disstertation, Isparta University, (Isparta: 2004). 
13  Rif‟at Abou-El-Haj, “The 1703 Rebellion and the Structure of Ottoman Politics”, (Istanbul: Nederlands Historisch-
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political figure of the Empire. Abou El-Haj argues that each of these “factions” which 
joined the rebellion on the side of the rebels had immediate and longstanding grievances 
with Feyzullah Efendi. Thus, the opposition to the Porte over the condition of Feyzullah 
Efendi prepared a basis for the rebel allegiance. In particular, the members of Ulema 
whose career paths were blockaded by the nepotism of Feyzullah Efendi joined the 
rebellion to reclaim their previous positions. The struggle between the Ulema and 
Feyzullah Efendi was considered by Abou-El-Haj as another episode of an ongoing clash 
between pasha holds, which had existed since the time of previous ruler Mehmed IV and 
who was deposed by one of his rebelling viziers.18 
In addition, Abou-El-Haj pays attention to Mustafa II‟s efforts on adopting the role 
of “gazi-Sultan” early in his reign. The Sultan himself led the army on military campaigns 
which was actually a role of the grand vizier at that time. Abou-El-Haj evaluated the policy 
of Mustafa II as an attempt of consolidation of his absolute authority on the administration 
and the military and the pasha holds. In the meantime, his mentor Feyzullah Efendi 
became the most powerful figure of Ottoman politics. Nevertheless, this policy failed due 
to the military defeat of Zenta and the signing of the treaty of Karlowitz in 1699. Mustafa 
II became less visible in political and military issues, and transferred to the court centre in 
Edirne where he enjoyed daily pleasures. Abou-El-Haj interprets this move as a manoeuvre 
of Feyzullah Efendi to isolate the Sultan from the disfranchised crowd of members of the 
Ulema and other resented groups. The rebellion of 1703 was considered by the Ulema and 
other disfranchised groups as an opportunity of the increasingly overwhelming Feyzullah 
Efendi to reach their immediate goals.19 
On one hand, Annemarike Stremmelaar denies the interpretation of Abou-El-Haj 
which positions the 1703 rebellion as an outcome of internal power struggle. She asserts 
that “the Edirne Incident” was a popular rebellion against the Sultan who had failed to 
perform his duties as ruler. Her analysis is based on the assertion of Şerif Mardin who 
claims that the Ottoman rebellions revealed a tacit agreement; a sort of social contract 
                                                                                                                                                                                
17  Ibid. 7-9. 
18  Rif‟at Abou-El-Haj, “The 1703 Rebellion and the Structure of Ottoman Politics”, 9-10. 
19  Ibid., 11. 
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between the Sultan and his subjects which determined the legitimacy of the ruler on a 
social basis. The subjects had taken the initiative to restore the order when they felt that the 
Sultan had become an incapable ruler.20  
Stremmelaar tries to reveal whether there was a social contract between the Sultan 
and his subjects, including the nature of the principles that the Sultan had to observe, or if 
he was willing to keep his throne over the rebellion of 1703. She evaluated that the ideal 
ruler has to be just and accessible to his subjects. Thus, she concludes the protest of 
Cebecis in the early stages of the rebellion as an attempt to negotiate with the Sultan. In the 
further stages of the rebellion, the authority and legitimacy of the Sultan were questioned 
when he failed to meet the demands of the rebels. Thus, she considered the 1703 rebellion 
was legitimate over the Ottoman concepts of justice as the Sultan had violated the tacit 
social contract.21  
This approach may be applied to the case of 1703 rebellion but interpretations of 
Stremmelaar regarding the existence of a tacit social contract would raise new questions.  
The majority of the contemporary sources did not offer a comprehensive analysis of the 
events and the identities of the rebels remain uncovered.22 The palace-centred chroniclers 
established a pattern which portrayed an image of a victimized Sultan surrounded by 
incompetent people. In this pattern, the rebels were depicted as “riffraff” that were 
remotely controlled by other figures behind the curtain. The only role that was assigned to 
the rebels in this pattern was of bringing mischief and disorder. Hence, the restoration of 
the order had been completed by the punishment of the rebels. On the other hand, the 
rebel-centred view painted the rebels as “the restorers of the order” over religious-juridical 
assertions which underlined the Sultan‟s incapability of ruling.23  
Both, the palace and the rebel centred-view had concentrated on the restoration of 
the order in the narration of the events. But in the end, the focal point of the narrations was 
the political changes in the Empire. Indeed, the Ottoman society questioned the capability 
                                                          
20  Annemarike Stremmelaar, “Justice and Revenge in the Ottoman Rebellion of 1703”, 2-8. 
21  Ibid., 6-7. 
22  Rif‟at Abou-El-Haj, “The 1703 Rebellion and the Structure of Ottoman Politics”, 5. 
23  Annemarike Stremmelaar, “Justice and Revenge in the Ottoman Rebellion of 1703”, 172-173. 
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of Feyzullah Efendi and the Sultan. However considering the interests of each group who 
participated in the rebellion, it is hard to determine whether or not their reaction was 
against the capability of the ruler. In my opinion, the rebels used the Ottoman concept of 
justice as a tool to reach to their immediate aims. The championing of justice or the 
protection of the Muslim territory only fulfilled the pretext for their actions. In next parts, 
we will focus on the palace centred-view and its pattern to reveal the factors which 
affected the narration of the events. By following such method, we aim to understand the 
nature of legitimate practices and its functions in the narrative of the contemporary authors. 
The Incident 
The Incident started with the protest of the Cebecis who were set to embark on a 
campaign to Georgia in the early morning of 17 July, 1703.24 A group of Cebecis gathered 
at their headquarters (Cebehane) near Ayasofya Mosque and shouted that they refused to 
go on campaign until they had received full payment of their salary, which were ten 
instalments in arrears at the time. They blockaded the gates of the armoury (Cebehane) and 
refused to leave until they received their payments.25 The negotiations between the 
Cebecis, the major (Kaymakam) of Istanbul, Abdullah Paşa and the Deputy Janissary 
Commander, Haşimoğlu Murtaza Ağa went unresolved. Consequently, the Cebecis, fully 
armed, decided to march onto Et Meydanı and to merge with the Janissaries.26 
On their way to Et Meydanı, they expressed their cause to the townspeople of 
Istanbul and made their way to Grand Bazaar to appeal to the artisans and shopkeepers, 
who had closed their shops as they feared looting by the protestors. The Cebecis stated that 
they were not plunderers or brigands. They asserted that their protest was against “the 
people of high rank” who had betrayed the state and religion. Therefore, their numbers 
increased as they gained the support of the townspeople.27 When the crowd reached Et 
Meydanı; they forced one of the gates open and put their banner on the ground in front of 
the gate of Janissary barracks. Some dervishes, who called themselves “Seyyid” joined the 
                                                          
24 Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, “Nusretname”, 144. 
25  Ibid., 144-145. 
26  Ibid., 145-146. 
27  Ibid., 146. 
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Cebecis.28 Moreover, those Seyyids, accompanied by a growing group of protestors, moved 
to Fatih Mosque to bring the judge (Kadı) of Istanbul to Et Meydanı. When they came 
upon him, they also received the support of theological students.29 
In the meantime, Abdullah Paşa and Haşimoğlu Murtaza Ağa were working on 
measures to quell the continuing turmoil. They decided to arm the loyal troops and 
organised a meeting at the palace. The higher-ranking members of the Ulema and 
prominent bureaucratic figures attended the meeting. They planned a strategy that included 
using the Holy Banner (Sancak-ı Şerif) against the “rebels” to paint them as infidels. 
Hence, they would win the public.30 The holy banner, which was a symbol of holy war 
against infidels, was believed to have been used by the Prophet Mohammed.31 Since the 
original holy banner was kept by the Sultan in Edirne, the Kaymakam Paşa and the 
Janissary Agha Deputy wanted to use a green banner that was placed in the tomb of Eyyub 
Sultan Ensari. However, that banner had already been transferred to the Palace and was 
being protected by the imperial bodyguards as the head of bodyguards who feared that the 
rebels would use it in the same manner against the Sultan.32 
While the officials were discussing the measures that needed to be taken against the 
protestors, the Cebecis stormed the residence of the Abdullah Paşa and freed the prisoners 
being held there. This encounter between the Cebecis and the guards of the residence of 
Abdullah Paşa turned into a gun fight which resulted in the death of a Cebeci who was shot 
by a guard. Angered and provoked, the Cebecis stormed the building and plundered the 
goods they found. 33After that, they marched to the Palace where they encountered the 
deputy Janissary commander. The old Murtaza Ağa was unable to escape from the rebels 
and was brought to Et Meydanı and subjected to various humiliations on the way. The 
Cebecis asked him to join their cause and surrender the banner of the Janissaries.34 At this 
point, the Cebecis were convinced that as long as Murtaza Ağa was alive, they would not 
                                                          
28  Ibid. 
29  Ibid. 
30  Ibid., 146-147. 
31  Annemarike Stremmelaar, “Justice and Revenge in the Ottoman Rebellion of 1703”, 55. 
32  Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, “Nusretname”,  147. 
33  Ibid., 147- 148. 
34  Ibid., 148-149. 
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be able to establish an alliance with the Janissaries. Hence, they killed Murtaza Ağa, 
captured the banner of the Janissaries and placed it in the square of Et Meydanı.35 Seeing 
that the rebels had gained the support of the military, Abdulah Paşa decided to go on 
hiding as events turned into a full scale of rebellion. 
Later on, the Cebecis forced the Judge of Istanbul to invite the members of the 
Ulema to come to their headquarters in Sultan Ahmed Square.36 The prominent members of 
the Ulema, who had lost their positions or whose career path had been blocked by 
Şeyhüislam Feyzullah Efendi, adjudged that the cause of the Cebecis was legal in Islamic 
law. As a consequence, the rebels were able to suspend the Friday public prayers, a symbol 
of the Sultan‟s religious authority, and appoint their own men to high posts of the 
administration and the Ilmiye, such as Janissary Commander, Major of Istanbul, 
Şeyülislam, Chief Judge of Anatolia, Chief Judge of Rumelia.37 A petition written and 
signed by members of the Ulema was sent to the Sultan which demanded the return of the 
court from Edirne to Istanbul and the dismissal of Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi, his sons 
and sons-in-laws. The list of the newly appointed officers had also attached to the letter.38 
Furthermore, the rebels assembled a delegation that they had chosen from among 
the members of each participant group (the Ulema, the Military and the Esnaf) and 
dispatched them from the capital to deliver the petition. 39 The rebel delegation was 
confronted by imperial bodyguards in Edirne and were arrested immediately by order of 
Feyzullah Efendi.
 40 (The Sultan‟s inner circle, including the Grand Vizier Rami Mehmed 
Paşa, received orders from Feyzullah Efendi, not to mention the rebellion and the rebel 
delegation to the Sultan.) Finally, when the Sultan was informed of the events that had 
occurred in Istanbul, he dismissed Feyzullah Efendi and his relatives and exiled them to 
Erzurum.41  
The Grand Vizier Rami Mehmed Paşa had initially sent one of his own men to 
                                                          
35  Ibid., 148-149. 
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37  Ibid., 151-152. 
38  Ibid., 154-156. 
39  Ibid., 156. 
40  Ibid., 161. 
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Istanbul with a declaration that he himself had written without the Sultan‟s knowledge to 
state the Sultan‟s final decision.42 Soon after, the Sultan sent his own representative with an 
imperial order announcing the dismissal of Feyzullah Efendi and his sons from their posts, 
just as the rebels had petitioned for, and invited the men, whose names had been written on 
the petition to Edirne, and commanded that they lay down their arms.43 In the meantime 
however, the rebels in Istanbul were concerned about the fate of their delegation as they 
had not received any news from Edirne. The representative of the Grand Vizier failed to 
convince the rebels of the Sultan‟s favourable response. When the representative of the 
Sultan arrived in the capital, the response of the Sultan did not satisfy their demands as 
they had hoped for the Sultan‟s immediate return to Istanbul.44  
 Sometime later, some members of the delegation, who had been arrested by the 
imperial bodyguards in Edirne, returned to Istanbul. The rebels were angered when they 
learnt what their delegation had been put through.45 Despite this, they decided to send 
another delegation to the Sultan, yet it was clear that the diplomacy between Edirne and 
Istanbul had failed. Without waiting for the Sultan‟s response, the rebels started to take 
military action as they were recruiting new troops for their army. In addition to this, the 
rebels made new appointments to fill posts which had been vacated by Feyzullah Efendi 
and his relatives.46 They also made appointments for the post of grand vizierate. The last 
appointments of the rebels clearly indicate that they were defying the authority of Edirne 
Government.47  
The rebel army left Istanbul on 13
th
 August, 1703.48 In the meantime, discussions 
had risen as to the successor to the throne as the rebels had open intentions of deposing 
Mustafa II. While members of the military supported the idea of enthroning Şehzade 
Ibrahim; members of the Ulema were taking the side of Şehzade Ahmet. In the end, the 
wishes of Ulema prevailed over those of the military. The rebels gave in to the wishes of 
                                                                                                                                                                                
41  Ibid., 162-163. 
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the Ulema and accepted the enthronement of Şehzade Ahmet.49 The encounter between the 
Sultan and the rebels ended without bloodshed. Despite the oaths they took to stay loyal to 
the Sultan, the Janissaries refused to fight with the army of the rebels. Abandoned by his 
officers, commanders and soldiers, Sultan Mustafa II had no choice but to leave his throne 
to his brother Şehzade Ahmed.50 
The Chronicles 
In this chapter, four chronicles, Nusretname of Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa51, Zübde-i 
Vekayiât of Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa52, Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi of an unknown author53 
will be used in the analysis of the events. Apart from the Nusretname, none of the 
chronicles were put in pen by official palace chroniclers. In addition, the personal 
biography of Şeyülislam Feyzullah Efendi54 and the chronicle of Balatlı Georg55 are the 
other sources of this chapter. 
Nusretname was written by Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa who served as sword bearer- 
to Mustafa II and Ahmed III. He was born in Fındıklı, a part of Galata district, and was a 
well educated man who was among the prominent figures of the palace.56 He started to 
write his chronicle in 1655 and was appointed as official palace chronicler in 1695 by 
Mehmed III. The first volume of his work (1655-1695) was named Zeyl-i Fezleke. The 
volume which covers the narration of events from 1695 to 1721 was titled “Nusretname 
(The Book of Victories)” by Mustafa II. Considering Mustafa II‟s early policy of reviving 
the Gazi-Sultan image of the classical age by naming the official chronicles of the palace 
as “The Book of Victories”, the Sultan probably wished for his reign to be recalled 
“victorious”.  
                                                          
49  Ibid., 177. 
50  Ibıd., 186. 
51  Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, “Nusretnâme”. See also Mehmet Topal,  “Silâhdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa 
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2001). 
52  Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, Zübde-i Vekayiât, ed. Abdülkadir Özcan, (Istanbul: TTK 1995). 
53  Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi (1099-1116/1688-1704), (TTK Istanbul, 1995).  
54  Fahri Çetin Derin-Ahmed Türek, “Feyzullah Efendi‟nin Kendi Kaleminden HalTercümesi” in Istanbul Üniversitesi 
Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi, vol.23-24 (Istanbul 1969-70), 69-93/205-219.  
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As one of the closest people to the Sultan, Silahdar Mehmed Ağa was in Edirne during the 
outbreak of the rebellion.57 His personal loyalty to Sultan came into view in his text as he 
constantly condemned the rebels. According to him, the main person responsible for the 
rebellion was Feyzullah Efendi, and the whole event was a conspiracy of Rami Mehmed 
Paşa who wished to break the power of Feyzullah Efendi. For our case, Silahdar Ağa‟s 
chronicle can be considered as official representative of the palace-centred view. 
Zübde-i Vekayiat (“Essence of Events”) of Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa covers the events 
from 1671 to 1704. Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa was among the prominent members of 
the palace as he served as “treasurer” (Defterdar) seven times in short terms under rule of 
Mustafa II and Ahmed III.58 Even though Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa had never served as 
official palace chronicler, his chronicle was the main source of Raşid Tarihi, the official 
palace chronicle, which Abou-El-Haj used as main source. Defterdar Mehmed Paşa was in 
Edirne with other palace elites and witnessed the atmosphere of the encounter between the 
rebel army and forces of Mustafa II.59 Hence, Zübde-i Vekayiât will be considered as 
another example of palace-centred view towards the rebellion. 
Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi covers the narration of events from approximately 1688 to 1704 
and was written by an unknown author who reflects the view of a rebel affiliate in Istanbul. 
According to Abdülkadir Özcan, the writer of the chronicle might be an affiliate of Rami 
Mehmed Paşa and presumably had written it during the vizierate of him under rule of 
Ahmed III.60 Compared to the palace-centred chronicles of Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi, this 
offers very interesting details regarding the social life and the Ottoman officials which 
were ignored by the palace chroniclers.61 Hence, Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi can be considered 
as the voice of the rebels for the case of 1703 rebellion. 
Apart from these chroniclers, the work of Balatlı Georg and the personal biography of 
Şeyülislam Feyzullah Efendi will be used to in some occasions. The chronicle of Balatlı 
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Georg reflects the rebellion of 1703 from the view of a non-muslim. The chronicle pictures 
the Şeyülislam Feyzullah Efendi as “wizard” who spelled the Sultan. For our case, Balatlı 
Georg‟s comments on the execution of Feyzullah Efendi are important.62 The personal 
biography of Feyzullah Efendi was written just before the rebellion of 1703. The text can 
be considered as a self-defence of Feyzullah Efendi and his explanation how he 
deservingly became the most powerful man of the Empire. Considering the rebels had 
accused Feyzullah Efendi of violating the jurisdiction of his post, the biography of 
Feyzullah Efendi demonstrates which roles he adopted during the reign of Mustafa II.63 
The Rebels in the Contemporary Sources  
In this part, the discussion will concentrate on the illustration of the rebels in 
palace-centred view over the narratives of Silahdar Mehmed Ağa and Defterdar Sarı 
Mehmed Paşa. Silahdar Mehmed Ağa who used pejorative language towards the rebels. 
The rebels were supposedly incapable of acting freely and took advantage of the Sultan‟s 
absence in Istanbul to create a mutiny. Apart from that, he referred to the rebellion as a plot 
of Rami Mehmed Paşa.64 Accordingly, Rami Mehmed Paşa and the second vizier Moralı 
Hasan Paşa, who both suffered by the presence of Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi, were 
looking for an opportunity to intrigue their plan of deposing him. The protest of Cebeci‟s 
was presented by Silahdar Mehmed Ağa as an opportunity which they had been looking 
for.65 When the first news of the Cebeci protest in Istanbul arrived in Edirne, Rami 
Mehmed Paşa and Moralı Hasan Paşa initiated their master plan. They appointed one of 
their trusted men, named Boşnak Ibrahim Ağa, as Cebecibaşi (The chief armourer). 
Ostensibly, Boşnak İbrahim Ağa was sent Istanbul to handle the protest. But in fact, he was 
entrusted with a task of provoking the unrest.66  
In the outbreak of the rebellion, Silahdar Mehmed Ağa, focuses on the meeting of 
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the Cebecis in their headquarters. According to him, the main content of the meeting was 
to seek an audience. The Cebecis could not address their complaints to Abdullah Paşa -
who was described as a “reveler” by the author- because, in return, instead of paying 
attention to their demands, he would arrest them immediately. Since the Sultan was settled 
in Edirne, the Cebecis decided to bear arms and shouts their war cry.67  
They locked themselves up in the armoury, and battered their superior officers who 
refused to join them. Then they announced that they would not be leaving the Armoury 
until they receive the full payment of their salaries.68 Moreover, they turned a deaf ear to 
those who tried to advise them. As they refused to compromise with their superior officers, 
the attitude of the Cebecis was considered by Silahdar Ağa as impudicity of vile people. In 
the end, Abdullah Paşa accepted the terms of the Cebecis, but due insufficient funds the 
Cebecis were granted 20 purses of golden as a gift rather than receiving the payment of 
their full salaries. The Cebecis accepted the gift of Abdullah Paşa. However, soon after, 
they changed their minds and sent the golden back.
 69  
In this stage of the rebellion, it is not possible to understand why the Cebecis 
“suddenly” changed their mind. In Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa‟s narration there is no 
comprehensive explanation regarding why Cebecis had changed their minds. According to 
him, diplomacy between Abdullah Paşa and the Cebecis had ended in a good way but it 
was not enough to suppress the protest. To Silahdar Mehmed Ağa, the Cebecis refused the 
offer of Abdullah Paşa and sent the money back because some “provocateurs” encouraged 
them to merge with the Janissaries. Those “provocateurs” also asserted that Abdullah Paşa 
and Haşimoğlu Murtaza Ağa were coming to punish them.70 “The provocateurs” remained 
unseen but anyhow this little piece of information fills the blanks of the author‟s pattern.  
According to the rebel-centred view, the Cebecis‟ decision of marching Et Meydanı 
had taken on a spontaneous manner. The author of Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi claims that, in 
order to calm the Cebecis down, Abdullah Paşa sent 15 purses of golden and promised to 
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pay the full salaries in installments. But the Cebecis changed their mind and refused the 
gold and unfurled their banner.71 Considering the course of the events, the Cebecis might 
have considered the support of the public as a weapon. Presumably, according to the rebel-
centred view, the protest of the Cebecis had encouraged the people who were discontent 
with the order of the State. Thus, the Cebecis refused the offer of Kaymakam for they were 
on the verge of making crucial changes to the order of the State. 
In the next part, Silahdar Mehmed Ağa highlights the efforts of the Cebecis to win 
over the public: Firstly, they tried to appeal to the townspeople through the public morale. 
They promised them security in their lives and their properties. Their ultimate aim was to 
punish “the traitors” of the ruling cadres, and not to plunder the city. Therefore, they were 
also cautious about the people who joined them. Some people who were described as 
“ayaktakımı” (riffraff) and “edebsizler” (indecent) were kept out of the rebel 
assemblage.72  
According to Silahdar Mehmed Ağa, when the Cebecis gained access to the Et 
Meydanı, the townspeople were expecting the Janissaries to have punished those traitors. 
But again, as the superior officers ignored their duties, nothing happened. Furthermore, 
some dervishes who call themselves “Seyyid” joined the Cebecis in Et Meydanı. Silahdar 
Ağa describes those Seyyids as “audacious people” who wore green turbans and carried a 
rag like banner.  A group of Seyyids were assigned to bring the judge of Istanbul, Seyyid 
Mahmud Efendi.73 They headed to Fatih Mosque and captured the judge, and in doing so 
they also assured the support of theological (medrese) students.  
Silahdar Ağa considered these developments as manipulation of the public. To him, 
the participation of the theological students in the rebellion cause, and the capture of the 
judge were presented by the rebels as maintaining the support of Ulema.74 According to 
Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi the rebels invited the members of the Ulema, representatives of the 
Esnaf guilds and prominent Janissary officers to their headquarters. They also made it clear 
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that, anyone who refuses to come will be attacked. After this call, a group of Seyyids, that 
were lead by so-named “lunatic” named Mustafa, joined the rebellion. Seyyid Mustafa 
assembled approximately 2000 people, including boatmen of Aleppo and Damascus, under 
his banner. With the help of Seyyid Mustafa the Cebecis must have appealed to the lower 
layers of the society.75 
The Janissaries, on the other hand, were also described as another group that was 
willing to join the rebellion. To Silahdar Mehmed Ağa, they remained at their posts in the 
early stages of the rebellion as they feared Haşim Ağa‟s anger.76 All these details support 
the assertion of the author which claims that subjects could be easily seduced by “the 
wrongdoers” if the ruler is absent.  
Silahdar Mehmed Ağa also narrated the measures which had been taken by 
Abdullah Paşa and Haşimoğlu Murtaza Ağa against the rebels: 
The first step was to invite members of the Ulema and officers in high rank, as well as 
other prominent figures that the rebels would have benefited from their assistance, to the 
palace. He also states that the judge of Istanbul Seyyid Mahmud Efendi did not attend the 
meeting due to his illness. The same point was also confirmed by Silahdar Mehmed Ağa, 
but according to him, the judge did not attend the meeting as he had private dispute with 
Abdullah Paşa.77 This is the explanation of the palace-centred view on the rebel‟s capture 
of Seyyid Mahmud Efendi. The second step was to arm the imperial bodyguards and the 
“loyal” Janissaries. The third and final step was the use of the Holy Banner (Sancak-ı Şerif) 
against the rebels. As the Holy Banner was a symbol of the believers and the path of 
righteousness, this measure assured public support.78  
The same measures were repeated in the narrative of Defterdar Mehmed Paşa. In 
addition, he underlined the rebels‟ intentions of capturing Abdullah Paşa and Haşimoğlu 
Murtaza Ağa. At this point, both chronicles confirmed that Murtaza Efendi with a group of 
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armed Janissaries headed to Bab-ı Humayun to get the Holy Banner.79 But as the Saray 
Agha feared a possible Janissary looting, the gates of the palace were not opened. Hence, 
Murtaza Ağa could not use the Holy Banner against the rebels. In the meantime, a group of 
armed Cebecis made their way to the residence of Abdullah Paşa. They were hoping to 
capture the Kaymakam, but they failed. They stormed the building and freed the prisoners 
that were being held in the jailhouse.80  
Their next target was Murtaza Ağa, as the Janissaries had expressed that he 
remained the only obstacle to the Cebeci-Janissary alliance. The Cebecis encountered 
Murtaza Ağa in Bab-ı Humayun, captured him and brought him to Et Meydanı. Kadı of 
Istanbul was employed to write invitations to prominent military officers and the members 
of the high-ranking Ulema. After this point, the Cebecis obtained the support of the Esnaf 
as the deputy of saddlers.81  
The encounter between the Cebecis and Murtaza Ağa, Silahdar Mehmed Ağa 
confirms the narration of Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa. One important detail remains; on 
their way to the Ağakapısı, the Cebecis announced that the Friday prayers would be 
suspended.82 When they reached the residence of Abdullah Paşa, there was an armed 
encounter between them and the bodyguards. The quarrel between the bodyguards and the 
rebels turned into a gun fight as one of the bodyguards “accidentally” fired his pistol and 
shot a Cebeci dead.83 The furious Cebecis stormed the residence and plundered the house. 
They freed the prisoners and encouraged them to join their cause. Later on, they headed to 
Bab-ı Humayun and by the “irony of the fate”, their path crossed with Murtaza Ağa who 
was going to the palace to get the holy banner.84  
In the narrative of Silahdar Mehmed Ağa, these events were described as if there 
had been a struggle between good and evil. The Cebecis forced Murtaza Ağa to open the 
gates of the Janissary chambers and to give the banner of the Janissary commander. In 
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response, Murtaza Ağa tried to buy himself some time by giving advice. In the end, an 
angry rebel murdered Murtaza Ağa, and thus the Janissaries put their banners in the rebel 
headquarters. After the death of Murtaza Ağa, Abdullah Paşa went on hiding to save 
himself and thus, the last official representative of the Sultan‟s authority in Istanbul was 
eliminated. The rebels took control of the imperial capital and initiated negotiations with 
the Ulema. Thus, the protest of the Cebecis turned into a full blown rebellion85 
To conclude, Silahdar Mehmed Ağa‟s interpretation regarding the developments in 
Istanbul can be summarized in a single sentence: 
Fate overwhelmed the order.  
In the beginning of his narrative, Silahdar Mehmed Ağa mentions the plot 
organized by the Grand Vizier Rami Mehmed Paşa and Moralı Hasan Paşa. Nevertheless, 
Boşnak Hasan Ağa who was elevated to rank of chief armourer in order to organise the 
plot, remained unseen in the development of the events. Apart from that, the absence of the 
Sultan reiterated the main grounds of wrongdoings. Therefore, the officials were unable to 
handle the uprising and failed to suppress the rebellion. According to this assumption, if 
the Sultan had been in the Imperial Capital, none of these events would have ever 
happened. In the pattern of Silahdar Mehmed Ağa, the rebels took advantage of the lack of 
authority, but considering the course of the events this assertion is not convincing enough 
to understand the nature of the events. In the next part, focus will be placed on the 
legitimacy practices and the role of Ulema during the events. 
 The Rebel Alliance and the Ulema 
In the rebellion of 1703, the general attitude toward the Ulema can be interpreted as 
diplomatic, and their influence overwhelmed the other participant groups as they provided 
the legitimacy of rebel assertions. It is obvious that the Ulema were aware of the fact that 
by joining the rebellion without a legitimate base, they would become “an enemy of the 
3state and religion”86. Hence, in order to obviate such accusations, they were very cautious 
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in the decision-making process against the Sultan. For the rebellion of 1703, the decisions 
which were made by the rebel alliance display very important clues regarding the technical 
procedures of a rebellion. In order to confirm this point, it would be necessary to focus on 
the demands of each group that participated on the rebel side.  
- The dismissal of Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi was demanded by using the 
members of Ulema, whose career paths paralyzed by the nepotism of Feyzullah 
Efendi. 
- The return of the court from Edirne to the imperial capital directly affected the 
economical life in Istanbul. The Esnaf suffered the most from the transfer of the 
court centre to Edirne, as they lost their most important customers. Moreover, the 
guild wardens that also took their place on rebel side continued their trade in Et 
Meydanı.87 In general, as far as the contemporary sources assert, the attitude of the 
artisans during the 1703 rebellion can be seen as opportunist as they had no direct 
influence on appointments and discussions for the new Sultan in further stages of 
the rebellion. 
Assumingly, if these demands were to be met by the Sultan immediately, the 
Cebecis and the Janissaries would seek different channels to gain access to the mid-ranks 
of military. 
After the establishment the alliance, the military wing of the rebels appointed their 
own men to the high posts of administration and Friday prayers were suspended. The 
suspension of Friday prayers demonstrates how the Ulema provided legitimacy to their 
positions without being accused of “betraying the role”. As the preacher always saluted the 
ruler, public prayers served as a public declaration of their subjects‟ loyalty to their ruler. 
The reason behind this decision as explained by former Chief Judge of Rumelia, 
Başmakçızade Seyyid Ali Efendi was: 
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“We‟re defying the grand imam namely the caliph, he who cannot champion the justice.”88  
The comment of Başmakçızade Seyyid Ali Efendi based on the term of law, “adl-i 
imam” that resolves the validity of the authority of the ruler to championing the justice and 
being just to his subjects. The Ulema, in the narrative of Silahdar Mehmed Ağa, emerged 
as being composed in the decision making process. Yet again, the Ulema are still 
considered as a group which participated unwillingly in the rebellion. After the approval of 
the rebel appointments, the Ulema appeared as a negotiator between the rebels and the 
Sultan. In that sense, suspension of Friday Prayer can be interpreted as a diplomatic 
message to the Sultan which called to question the legitimacy of him as a ruler. A petition, 
put on pen by the Ulema to deliver demands of the rebel coalition, that was sent to the 
Sultan and the names of the newly appointed officers were attached to it. At this point, 
there is no direct evidence that the rebels had the intention of deposing the Sultan.
 89 
A very interesting point is that none of the chroniclers blamed the members of 
Ulema for their participation in the rebellion. In fact, there was an effort of absolving 
actions of the Ulema in narrative of Silahdar Mehmed Ağa. According to him, wise, 
elderly and aggrieved members of Ulema in the hands of vagrants had no choice but to join 
the rebellion. They were abused by the rebels when they opposed their demands. A dispute 
about the content of the petition displays how the rebels harassed the members of Ulema. 
They tore up the letter immediately as the rebel leaders did not approve of the tone of 
statement that requested the return of the Sultan to Istanbul.90 Then the statement was 
changed as ordered by the rebels. This example clearly justifies the point of the author.  
At first, the rebels appointed Başmakçızade Seyyid Ali Efendi to the post of 
Şeyhülislam91. However, after a short time, due to his old age and illness, Seyyit Ali Efendi 
resigned from his post.92 After the accession of Sultan Ahmed III to the throne, 
Başmakçızade Seyyid Ali Efend would be elevated to the post of Şeyhülislam again and he 
would confirm the punishments of the rebel affiliates. The members of the Ulema who 
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participated in the rebellion also served in the reign of Ahmed III. This may be a reason 
why members of the Ulema were justified in the texts of official palace chroniclers.  
From that view, the Ulema‟s attitude and participation in the rebellion can also be 
evaluated as pragmatic. As already stated, the ultimate aim of the Ulema to join the 
rebellion was to eliminate Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi. Hence, they might have followed 
diplomatic methods to avoid bloodshed and end the dispute in a peaceful way. The military 
actions were considered as a last resort, as the Ulema probably hoped the Sultan would 
return to Istanbul immediately and bend to the rebel demands. But, according to Silahdar 
Mehmed Ağa, this attempt of a peaceful resolution failed as the rebel delegation was 
arrested by Feyzullah Efendi. When finally the Sultan was informed of the developments 
in Istanbul and the fate of the rebel delegation, he dismissed Feyzullah Efendi and exiled 
him and his family to Erzurum. He also invited the members of rebel delegation to 
Edirne.93  
After the dismissal of Feyzullah Efendi, Rami Mehmed Paşa sent one of his own 
men named Çevik Ali Ağa with a letter to Istanbul informing him of the good news. Soon 
after, the Sultan also sent his official representative –Küçük mir-i ahur Selim Ağa- to 
Istanbul with an imperial decree that he agreed to the terms of the rebels. He also assessed 
the situation in Istanbul with his service men to decide what would need to be done in the 
event of military conflict.94 Since the rebels had not received any news from their 
delegation, Çevik Ali Ağa was not able to convince them. Suddenly, a “bostancı” among 
the members of the rebel delegation arrived in Istanbul and informed the rebels of what 
had happened to them. The Ulema took point again and the rebels decided to send another 
delegation to Edirne.95  
The events reached the point of no return after the representative of the Sultan, Mir-
i Ahur Selim Ağa reached Istanbul. Silahdar Ağa blames the rebels, even though Selim 
Ağa‟s decree confirmed the letter of the Grand Vizier, again some “provocateurs” refused 
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to obey the order of the Sultan. The problem was that the Sultan refused to come to 
Istanbul and instead he invited the members of the Ulema, and other people who were in 
the appointment list of the rebels to Edirne. 96 As it seems, the Rebels were unwilling to 
send the members of Ulema to Edirne as they feared a possible compromise against them. 
They feared being labelled as “an enemy of the state”.97 It was when a Sipahi and Molla, 
who were members of first delegation, returned to the camp the moment of diplomacy 
between two sides ended.98 Word reached the city that the Sultan obtained a fatwa: to put 
the people of Istanbul to the sword. Thus, the rebels started to enrol soldiers for their 
army.99 From here on, by all legal means the rebels as well as the Ulema rejected the 
authority of the Sultan. Stremmelaar described this process as battle of legitimacy:100 
“Using force at least in a disproportionate way could be harmful in the battle of 
legitimacy, so the rebels used the non violent means they had at their disposal, such as 
pressuring the authorities, engaging officials in meditation, and legal means. They pleaded 
their case through petitions, sent delegations which were to represent them at imperial 
court, and they sought legal sanction of their actions. The rebels proclaimed their loyalty 
to the Sultan time and time again.”101   
As they adopted the role of restorers of the order, the rebels had taken every 
necessary measure to maintain the order of Istanbul.102 By marching into the court centre 
with their army, they were ignoring the authority of the Sultan. Hence, their decisions had 
to be confirmed by the fatwa of the Ulema. Silahdar Mehmed Ağa and Defterdar Sarı 
Mehmed Paşa did not copy the texts of the fatwas in their narrations but they mentioned 
about the numbers. According to them, there were seven fatwas regarding their military 
actions against the Sultan. On the other hand, according to Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi there 
were only three fatwas, these texts were also copied by their author103: 
                                                          
96  Ibid., 166. “Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi (1099-1116/1688-1704)”,  
97  Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, “Nusretname”, 166. 
98  Ibid., 167. 
99  Ibid. 
100  Annemarike Stremmelaar, “Justice and Revenge in the Ottoman Rebellion of 1703”, 124. 
101  Ibid. 
102  Ibid.  
103  Ibid.,  132. 
 29 
 
 
“If the Sultan of Islam, may God extend his shadow over the earth, while he is charged in 
honour of God and with mercy for the creatures of God, leaves what he is charged with 
and with the pretext of the hunt leaves the seat of the sultanate, and roams in the Muslim 
lands, and oppresses and shows hostility (zulm and taaddi) to the subjects with unjustified 
extraordinary levies and squanders the treasury illegally (bi gayri vecb-i şeri), is there a 
lawful permissibility for the conduct of the aforementioned in this way?” 
The answer was no.104  
In this fatwa the Sultan was charged with being incapable of an ideal ruler as he 
ignored his primary duties. 
“If a group of Muslims because of the oppression (zulm) exerted by an imam rebel (huruc) 
against the imam in order to end the oppression, is that group rebellious (bagi)” 
The answer is no.105 
Thus, the rebels demonstrated their actions as an effort to restore the order and to 
put an end to the rule of the oppressor. 
“If a group of Muslims because of the oppression of the imam rebel against the imam in 
order to end this oppression, is it right that other people support the imam because of the 
rebellion by that people? The answer is no.106 
From the perspective of the rebels, the Sultan was depicted as an oppressor who 
had neglected his duty to his subjects so those who rebelled against him shall not be 
considered an enemy of the state. And it was the people‟s duty to support those who 
mutinied against the oppressor. Conversely, the Ulema of Edirne had used the same 
methods of legitimisation to support their claim against the rebels. From the Sultan‟s 
perspective, the rebels were accused as being “perpetrators of disturbance,”107 disloyalty: 
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rebellion against ruler108 and huruc: betrayal of the role. 109 
As it seems, it is not possible to clarify which side was more legitimate, but it is 
likely that the influence of decision makers made the difference. Obviously, the influence 
of the Ulema in Istanbul was greater than the Ulema in Edirne, especially after the 
dismissal of Feyzullah Efendi.110 Each side had interpreted the situation to suit their own 
interests.  
After deposition of Feyzullah Efendi, or in other words, when the Ulema reached 
its immediate goal, they no longer needed the rebels. Since their existence depended on the 
deposition of Mustafa II, on their march into Edirne, the Ulema had approved the 
deposition of the ruling Sultan. After this point, discussions were concentrated on the 
question of who will succeed the throne. The military favoured Şehzade Ibrahim as a 
successor to throne. On the other hand, the Ulema favoured Şehzade Ahmet who was more 
suitable for the throne as Şehzade Ibrahim was merely child. In the end, the military had to 
accept the decision of the Ulema and thus, Şehzade Ahmed was chosen as a successor to 
throne.111  
Why would military support a mere child instead of Şehzade Ahmet? Or to put it 
more clearly: why would the military and the Ulema support different figures? 
Presumably both sides had favoured the one that they were hoping to have more 
active role under his rulership. In broader context, for the case of the 1703 rebellion, the 
political reality had apparently overwhelmed the religious idealism. 
Feyzullah Efendi: the Şeyhülislam, the Diplomat, the Commander, the Vizier, and the 
Scapegoat 
In the rebellion of 1703, on a rare occasion one of the common points that all 
chroniclers agreed on was the position of Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi as being a sole 
responsible in the events. He was the one who predisposed the Sultan so that he paved the 
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road of unjust decisions, violated the state protocols and monopolized the posts of Ilmiye. 
Silahdar Ağa in Nusretname alluded to these actions of Feyzullah Efendi as one of the 
reasons why the Sultan was considered as unjust. According to him, during the outbreak of 
the rebellion, it was Feyzullah Efendi who underestimated the situation. He was the one 
who had the members of the rebel delegation arrested and imprisoned them in the citadel 
of Eğridere. He did not allow any officers in Edirne to inform the Sultan about the rebel 
delegation. To put it briefly from the perspective of all contemporary authors, Feyzullah 
Efendi was the reason the Sultan remained inaccessible to rebels.112  
In this part we will focus on the biography of Feyzullah Efendi to understand why 
he was chosen as a scapegoat of the rebellion. Thus, it is necessary to reveal his role in the 
narration of the 1703 rebellion. The personal biography of Feyzullah Efendi was written by 
his own pen a short time before the 1703 rebellion. He introduces himself as “Seyyid” 
Feyzullah, a descendent of Mevlana Celaledin-i Rumi‟s mentor Şemseddin Tebrizi.113 
Raised in a prominent Ulema family and favoured by his mentor Şeyh Mehmed Vanî 
Efendi Efendi, who was a respectable religious figure in reign of Mehmed IV, Feyzullah 
decided to pursue a career in Ilmiye. In his early career, he was employed as a tutor to 
Şehzade Mustafa and his brother Şehzade Ahmed.114 On his accession to the high posts of 
Ilmiye, he tended to explain his success as a result of the admission of his personal 
qualities.  
In the biography of Feyzullah Efendi, the reader gets the idea that he considered 
himself as “the chosen one” who was sent by the God to help the ruler give order to state 
affairs. According to Suraiya Faroqhi, in the 18
th
 century some members of the Ulema 
showed a high tendency to adopt the role of high administrators particularly the role of the 
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viziers.115 Feyzullah Efendi‟s actions clearly demonstrated how he interiorised different 
roles in the Ottoman administration that had not been attributed to any member of the 
Ilmyie, who theoretically were not authorized to participate in state affairs. To Feyzullah 
Efendi, he was destined to be the tutor of Şehzade Mustafa. When he was invited to 
Istanbul as a promising Ilmiye student by his mentor Vanî Efendi, he states that he received 
the birth news of Şehzade Mustafa on the road. He interprets his birth as the future Sultan, 
as a beginning of new era of prosperity, peace and victory.  
Apart from that, Feyzullah Efendi signifies his wealth as an indicator of political 
power.116  According to him, all he gained was what he bestowed upon his services to the 
state and the Sultan. He also makes comment on his close relationship with the Sultan. 
Accordingly, his proximity to the Sultan was misinterpreted by those who envied his 
influence and power.117 As he was accused of violating the state protocols by the rebels in 
1703, it would be interesting to underline that he was once dismissed by Sultan Mehmed 
IV. The reason of his dismissal was for transgressing the Sultan‟s privacy by leaving his 
horse on Sultan‟s personal meadow. Feyzullah Efendi blames the gardener and interprets 
his dismissal as a result of being denounced to the Sultan by some very bad people who 
envied his power. Hence, when the Sultan understood the reality of situation, he recalled 
him five days later.118  
After the accession of Sultan Süleyman II, Feyzullah Efendi was involved in a plot 
with Mustafa Paşa, the son of Köprülü Mehmed Paşa.119 Apparently, he was a supporter of 
the party that opposed the Grand Vizier Siyavuş Paşa and who deposed Sultan Mehmed IV 
becoming the most influential political figure. During the turmoil he commanded the loyal 
men of Mustafa Paşa, while the vizier became despondent. But, as the plot was 
compromised he was exiled to Erzurum where he spent next seven years.120 During his 
years of exile, he continued to prepare manoeuvres against those who he called “tyrants” 
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(Zorba). He assisted the opposition party and sent orders to Istanbul.121  
He admits that he became “the voice of the people” as he negotiated with officials 
regarding the problems of the people.122 He did not lose contact with his former student and 
continued to send advice in letters, but the close relationship between him and Şehzade 
Mustafa angers Sultan Ahmed II.123 During the tumultuous periods of Ottoman 
administration, Feyzullah Efendi, as a banished political figure, tried hard to keep contact 
with the opposition party and his former student which was probably his biggest hope of 
reclaiming his previous position. So that, the accession of Mustafa II to throne depicted by 
him as “a shining sun in desperate times”, probably referred to the situation of the Empire 
which was under attack of the enemy and its people were suffering. Thus, he also justifies 
his return to the administrative arena of Ottoman politics as Şeyhülislam  
Another interesting part in Feyzullah Efendi‟s biography is the narration of the 
three military campaigns of Mustafa II. He helped the Sultan in military preparations and 
coordinated battle plans. He even encouraged the Sultan and the soldiers in the field. At 
one certain point, he depicts himself on the battle ground with his sword to boost the 
morale of fearing soldiers and commanders.124  
To summarize his point of view, Feyzullah Efendi did what he was destined to do 
by the will of God.125 The roles which Feyzullah Efendi attributed to himself are:  
- The descendant of Mevlana Celaleddin Rumî 
- The mentor of the Sultan Mustafa II 
- A professor of theology 
- The Şeyhülislam 
- A diplomat 
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- A military commander  
After the rebellion of 1703, Balatlı Georg illustrated Feyzullah Efendi as “qizilbash” 
and “a magician” who possessed the Sultan.126 Furthermore, Balatlı Georg narrates the 
humiliating ceremony which Feyzullah Efendi was subjected to in his execution. Labelled 
as “the enemy of the state and religion”, Feyzullah Efendi was brought to the bazaar square 
on a horse where he was beheaded.127  After the execution, his headless body was given to 
Christian priests who performed a dishonouring funeral ceremony emphasizing his crimes 
against state and religion.128 The leader priest said an absurd prayer ending with: 
 “Neither yours nor ours”129 
On the other hand, Silahdar Mehmed Ağa underlined the dramatic details of an 
executed Şeyhülislam probably in order to show an example of what happens to 
“traitors”.130  
The personal biography of Feyzullah Efendi can be evaluated as an effort of 
justifying his actions as the strongest political figure of Mustafa II era. From his own pen, 
Feyzullah Efendi confirms same points of which he was accused by the contemporary 
authors. He appears as a well educated professor of theology, who was involved in an 
unsuccessful plot against the cabinet of Siyavuş Paşa and who deposed Mehmed IV by a 
military coup. This point actually signifies the fact that, Feyzullah Efendi even before his 
elevation to the rank of Şeyhülislam, was an active and ambitious member of Ottoman 
politics. As he was perceived as a serious threat, he was banished to Erzurum where he 
presumably continued his political activities against the ruling party through sending letters 
to his old student and by what he called “defending the right of the people”. This 
background information actually provides a very useful insight regarding the opposition 
between the members of Ulema and Feyzullah Efendi. And after his execution, the 
chronicle of Balatlı Georg demonstrates the image of him in the eyes of townspeople.  
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Conclusion: “Purge of the Rebels” 
The struggle between power centres was not finished after the deposition of 
Mustafa II and Feyzullah Efendi. In fact, it turned into a different form. According to 
Silahdar Ağa, at the end of the rebellion, a rebel sergeant named Çalik Ahmed, who has 
been appointed as Janissary Commander, had the intention of becoming the Grand Vizier 
and he used his influence on the military to reach his immediate goal.131 The actions of 
Çalik Ahmed were perceived by the new Sultan as direct threat to his authority. Hence, 
Çalik Ahmed was the first one to be dismissed from his post, and was executed 
immediately.132 The second important rebel figure who was purged by Ahmed III cabinet 
was Söhrablı Ahmed Paşa, who was granted the post of vizier after the rebellion. Due to 
his corrupt and arrogant behaviour, he was dismissed from his post and sent to exile to 
island of Sakız.133 The third and presumably the most important target of the purge plan 
was Şeyhülislam Mehmed Efendi who achieved his rank after resignation of Başmakçızade 
Seyyid Ali Efendi. Instead of Mehmed Efendi, Başmakçızade Seyyid Ali Efendi was 
elevated to the post of Şeyhülislam. 134 
The compromise of the Ulema with the new Sultan may refer to a very important 
point, the fact is that their rebel affiliates had become expendable to them after they 
reclaimed their position during the reign of Ahmed III. Presumably, Başmakçızade Seyyid 
Ali Efendi was the most important figure that the Ulema would offer to the Sultan. The 
resign of Başmakçızade in the middle of rebellion can be interpreted as a political 
manoeuvre for the future position of the Ulema.  Hence, the purge of the rebels from the 
ranks of administration and the military was a necessity for the new political establishment 
of Ahmed III. It was presumably the main reason why palace-centred chroniclers could not 
blame the members of the Ulema in the narration of the rebellion. In the formulation of the 
official chroniclers, the rebels were traitors and oppressors who were to be punished from 
the beginning. But from the view of the Ulema, the ones who mutinied against the rule of 
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the “oppressive and unjust” suddenly had become “traitors” to the state which was actually 
a result of the alignment with Ahmed III. This is probably another important motive which 
shaped the argument of the official chroniclers. 
To summarize: 
The rebellion of 1703 was an act against certain figures -especially Şeyhülislam 
Feyzullah Efendi the most powerful man of the political arena within Ottoman 
administration. There was an authority gap in the imperial capital which prepared a certain 
basis for the rebellion as the military was seeking ways to deliver their complaints. The 
rebels were conscientious individuals who followed certain steps to make alliance with the 
Janissaries, the Ulema, the Esnaf, and the townspeople. From the beginning of their 
protest, they had taken every necessary measure to maintain the order of the imperial 
capital. They remained loyal to Mustafa II until the final stage of the rebellion. 
The rebels targeted the Major of Istanbul, the Deputy Janissary Commander and the 
Judge of Istanbul, and appointed their own men to the high ranks of administration. These 
circumstances can be interpreted as an attempt to form an alternative cabinet. In each stage 
of the rebellion, the rebels had asserted different arguments. But the most affective 
argument for the legitimacy of their cause was that of their movement to an act against the 
oppressor who had failed to perform his duty to his subjects. In general, mismanagement of 
the state affairs was the basic reasoning of the rebel argument.  
The palace-centred chroniclers had offered a pattern which justified the Sultan and 
labelled Feyzullah Efendi as a scapegoat. The Ulema appeared as a political agent that 
carried out the negotiations between the rebels and the Sultan. A military encounter was 
perceived as a last resort. Even though, the rebels had marched into Edirne, the military 
encounter between them and the forces of Mustafa II ended peacefully. After the 
succession of Ahmed III, the new cabinet accepted the terms of the Rebels. The Sultan 
returned to the imperial capital and settled with the Ulema, which dissolved the fragile 
alliance of the rebel coalition. The newly appointed cabinet had purged the rebels that 
controlled the military corps, this was the last step of consolidation of the state‟s authority. 
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Thus, according to the palace-centred view order was restored. 
In the “Edirne Incident”, the rebels legitimized their cause by portraying the Sultan 
as “incapable”. Judging from the sources, there are three major arguments asserted by the 
rebels to illustrate the Sultan as being “incapable”: the first one is the Sultan‟s 
“inaccessibility”. The second is the failure of protecting his domains and the Muslim 
provinces against the infidels. And the third is his failure to champion justice. 
As it was cited by Stremmelaar, there are three concepts of justice that attributed to the 
quality of ruler:135 The ruler was supposed to be absolute, independent and free from any 
bias in his discretion over his subjects. Since he was the shadow of God, it was his duty to 
maintain the justice.136 The rebels questioned the Sultan‟s authority over these principles 
and thus, they adopted the role of “restorers of the Order” in a religious-juridical context. 
In response to the rebel arguments, the Sultan painted the rebels as traitors. By defying the 
authority of the Sultan, the rebels had betrayed their role as subjects. Hence, they become 
enemy of the state and religion.  Since an unquestionable loyalty to the ruler is a stipulation 
of Islamic law, “the believers” had to take the side of the Sultan in this battle. From this 
view, it is hard to clarify whether the rebels were traitors or the Sultan was an oppressor. 
But the contemporary authors, who adopted the palace-centred view, considered the 
rebellion as illegitimate for the authorial suspension of the ruling party. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE REBELLION OF 1730 
The Tulip Age and the Rebellion of 1730 
Triggered by the unrest in an army camp in Istanbul, the rebellion of 1730 
demonstrates an opposition led by the Janissaries against Sultan Ahmed III and the Grand 
Vizier, Damat Ibrahim Paşa. Unlike the rebellion of 1703, the Janissaries played the most 
significant role in 1730. Probably this is the reason why the rebellion of 1730 was affiliated 
with the famous rebel brigand “Patrona Halil”. After the outbreak of the rebellion, the 
Janissaries conducted power relations in the same manner experienced by their 
predecessors in 1703 and they established an alliance with the Ulema as well as other 
social figures. Indeed, there were particular factors which had shaped the actions of the 
rebels and their relationship with their “allies”.  This chapter will attempt to analyse these 
factors, and the roles of the rebels which influenced the arguments of contemporary 
authors as much as their positioning legitimizing the battle between the rebels and the 
Sultan. Therefore, at this point assessment of contemporaries about the rebels ought to be 
evaluated in connection with the socio-political agenda of the Ottoman Empire prior to the 
second decade of the eighteenth century. 
Sealed by the treaty of Passarowitz in 1718, the Ottoman Empire pursued a 
peaceful policy on the European front. Accordingly, the following era brought increased 
contact with the Europeans in terms of diplomatic and economic relations. As a result of 
this process and the growing volume of commercial activities with Europeans, Ottoman 
society experienced a form of social transformation which left its footprint primarily on the 
daily-life consumption habits. Hence, the era between 1718 and 1730, went down in 
Ottoman historiography as the “Tulip Age”. A new class of people had emerged in the 
imperial capital who adopted a way of life like that of the palace elites as most of them 
were the affiliates of Damat Ibrahim Paşa.137  
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To Tülay Artan, during the Tulip Age there were also crucial changes to the 
political structure of the Empire. The loss of political and military legitimisation had been 
compensated by the demonstration of power and wealth through architectural monuments 
of the epoch.138 In another words, the symbolic demonstration of power during the Tulip 
Age had became a channel for the Sultan to reclaim his legitimisation as a ruler. Hence, 
there was a chain of material power around the Sultan and the Grand Vizier that enabled 
them to demonstrate their wealth and influence.139 Such radical changes to the 
representation of power presumably conditioned a kind of tension between the higher and 
lower layers of the Empire. 
The majority of scholars considered the rebellion of 1730 as a movement which put 
an end to the Tulip Age. Nonetheless, the Tulip Age still remains a problematic field of 
Ottoman history since there are very limited studies narrated in the contemporary sources, 
distinguishing the changes to the folk‟s consumption habits and the “historical reality”.140 
The changes in economic relations and consumption patterns, accompanied by the 
emergence wealthy class of people (which are beyond the scope of this study) might have 
affected the authorial intentions in the contemporary sources.141 Therefore, a comparison of 
the legitimisation practices, which were performed in 1730 with those of 1703 Rebellion, 
is necessary to get a deeper insight. 
The most essential study devoted to the 1730 Rebellion is Münir Aktepe‟s account 
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of “Patrona İsyanı”. However, his main concern is confined to revealling the economic 
causes or dynamics behind the Rebellion.142 He focuses on the economical and military 
policy of the Grand Vizier Damat Ibrahim Paşa which was assumed to bring about the 
unrest in the Military and the Esnaf organisation. By aiming to increase revenue of the 
imperial treasury, the Grand Vizier imposed new fiscal measures putting extra burden on 
the Esnaf and curbing some privileges of the Janissaries.  
In addition to this, Aktepe touches upon the increasing demographic pressure, 
especially the influx of refugees and immigrants into Istanbul due to the reopening of the 
Persian front. Overpopulation of the imperial capital brought about some deficiencies in 
provisional policy and consequently inflation on food prices.143 As a result of internal 
immigration, agricultural estates were abandoned disadvantaging farm incomes.144 
According to Aktepe, these are the conditions which rallied support for the rebellion.  
On the other hand, Aktepe neither focus on the social changes in the Tulip Age nor 
examines the political opposition to the cabinet of Damat Ibrahim Paşa. Instead, he adopts 
palace-centred approach to the rebels and underlines the personal myth of Patrona Halil as 
being a rebel leader.  
Regarding the economic situation of the Empire, Robert Olson adopts a similar 
opinion to Aktepe.145 Besides, Olson gives room to the interpretations of Enver Ziya Karal, 
Niyazi Berkes and Şerif Mardin in analysing the social changes experienced in the Tulip 
Age. In the critical framework, Orson adopts the view of Şerif Mardin. Accordingly, the 
reason behind the rebellion of 1730 was cultural alienation of “the periphery” from “the 
centre” during the Tulip Age. From this perspective, “the centre” consisted of the Ottoman 
Elites: the Sultan, his officials, military elites, the Ulema- confronted by “the lower 
classes” -reaya, peasants, provincial notables, the Esnaf – that were alienated from the 
atmosphere of the Tulip age. Additionally, by the emergence of what he calls the “petite 
bourgeois” class among the Esnaf, who imitated the consumption habits of the Ottoman 
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Elites, and were also another catalyst of the cultural alienation of the lower classes. 
Nevertheless, as it is cited in his article, this remains as a problematic assumption to the 
extent that the degree of cultural alienation of lower classes has not been defined clearly in 
it.146  
Olson claims that, the Esnaf was discontent with the economic impositions of 
Damat Ibrahim Paşa. The extraordinary campaign taxes and the Ordu Akçesi was main 
ground on which the Esnaf rooted their reaction. In this reasoning, Olson posits the Esnaf 
as a central figure in the revolt as the rebel leader Patrona Halil himself was a second hand 
goods dealer.147 Furthermore, he perceives a shifting to the support of Esnaf along the dates 
of 1730 and 1731 and 1740 as an indicator of fundamental change towards a central 
alignment.148 When their demands were met by Mahmud I, the Esnaf supported the Porte in 
unsuccessful mutinies of 1731 and 1740.149   
Even though, Aktepe and Olson highlight the economic and social problems before 
the rebellion on which more consideration is necessary, Selim Karahasanoğlu interprets the 
Tulip Age as an era of social transformation that shifted the consumption patterns of the 
Ottoman society.150 Accordingly, there are three approaches which dominated mainstream 
Ottoman historiography in the Tulip Age: 
1. The Tulip Age as a beginning of westernization process in the Ottoman Empire. 
2. The Tulip Age as a perturbation of classical age methods. 
3. The Tulip Age as “moral corruption”.151 
He criticized these classical approaches on the ground that they marked the 
rebellion as an act against the so-called constructed Tulip Age. Karahasanoğlu signifies 
that, the ideological concerns about the Tulip Age and the rebellion of 1730 dominated 
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mainstream historiography.152 He criticised the position of the Tulip Age within the 
mainstream Ottoman historiography as the majority of scholars had ignored the social 
changes up to the eighteenth century onwards.153 
Karahasanoğlu rejects the doctrine, positioning the 1730 Rebellion as a movement 
against the Tulip Age. As was voiced in a previous debate over the social aspect of the age, 
by the emergence of a new class of wealthy people, there was likely to have been tension 
between the lower and the affluent classes of the Ottoman society during the Tulip Age. 
However, this field requires detailed analysis of power network blocks, stretching from 
Ottoman elites and prominent military figures to the lower layers of the society. In addition 
to this, a comparison of prosperity between these different layers of society is needed to 
define “the people of wealth” of the Tulip Age.  Hence, Karahasanoğlu claims that a 
comparative study between the 1730 Rebellion, the 1703 Rebellion of Edirne and the 1807 
Rebellion is a must for illuminating the real characteristics of insurrection.154  
Up to this point, the conditions leading up to the outbreak of the rebellion were: 
- The war with Persia had brought social, economical and political deficiencies. 
There was rising opposition to the Grand Vizier‟s peace policy with Persia. It 
may well have been the rebel‟s grounds for appealing to the townspeople to 
unite against Ahmed III and the Grand Vizier Damat Ibrahim Paşa. Apart 
from these factors, there was also an issue of immigration. Presumably, these 
immigrants in the imperial capital might be perceived as potential supporters 
of the rebels. 
- There was ongoing “tension” between the lower and higher layers of the 
Ottoman society.155  
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After addressing these points, this study will focus on the inter-textual dialogues of 
the contemporary authors and their authorial intentions and interpretations in composing 
the narrative of the 1730 Rebellion and the factors which affected the reasoning of these 
authors. 
The Great Strife 
The unrest emerged from a military camp in Üsküdar as the army assembled there 
to embark on a campaign against Persia. Due to unexpected delays, troops were stationed 
at the capital city longer than scheduled. During that time, the rebellion of 1730, was being 
mastered by Patrona Halil an Albanian Janissary from the seventeenth regiment, and his 
lieutenants.156 After several meetings arranged by rebel lieutenants to discuss possible 
action plans, the final one was held on 25
th
 September in 1730 at Üsküdar.157  
Three days later, on Thursday the 28
th
 September in 1730, the Rebels, amounting 
to twenty-five to thirty people, bared their arms and assembled in Bayezid.158 They split 
into three columns, unfurled their banners and headed to the Grand Bazaar. They forced 
both the Esnaf and shopkeepers to close their shops, and invited them to join. They 
announced that their cause was legitimate and any believers had to assemble under their 
banners.
 159 Later, they moved to Et Meydanı via Divan Yolu, where they merged with the 
Janissaries.160 Patrona Halil with a group of his men raided Ağakapısı and freed the 
prisoners who later joined them.161 They also closed down Sarraçhane, the Saddlery, as a 
band of rebels plundered Bit Pazarı and Sipah-Çarsisi to provide weapons, clothes and 
ammunition for their comrades. After that they merged with the Cebecis.162  
Because of the timing of the initiation, which took place on the weekly holiday, 
the majority of high-ranking officers were out of town. When the Janissary Agha, Hasan 
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Ağa, heard about the strife, he patrolled the town and advised shopkeepers and the Esnaf to 
open their shops.163 When the word had reached to him that the Rebels were planning an 
assault on his villa, Hasan Ağa moved back to Üsküdar as he supposedly was threatened by 
Patrona Halil himself.164 Apart from that, the Major (Kaymakam) of Istanbul, Mustafa 
Pasha moved to the city centre to petition the loyalty of soldiers at the dockyard. In order 
to prevent disorder, he also tried to reopen the shops in the Grand Bazaar and patrolled the 
city centre to observe the situation.165 When the efforts of the Janissary Agha and the 
Kaymakam reached a dead end, they decided to inform the Sultan in Üsküdar.166  
The Sultan and the Grand Vizier invited high-ranking officers, the prominent 
members of the Ulema and the Military to a meeting in Üsküdar to discuss the issue. 
Moreover, the Grand Vizier ordered Silahdar Ağa, (the sword bearer) to bring the Holy 
Banner and Holy Relics to the palace under the protection of a band of imperial 
bodyguards.167 The Grand Vizier recommend brute force to be used against the rebels, 
which resulted in a deadlock on the discussions. Mirzazade Ahmed Efendi, the chief judge 
(Kadıasker) of the Rumelia objected this suggestion on the ground that it would be 
unlawful to shed the blood of Muslims.168 In the end, the opposition to him and the Grand 
Vizier left its mark on the meeting and the Sultan moved back to the Imperial Palace with 
his closest advisors.169 In addition, the Grand Vizier requested to stay on his farm in 
Florya.170 The Holy Banner was placed on the Orta Kapı (the middle gate) of the palace. 
Despite the Sultan‟s effort in gathering the believers under Holy Banner for the final stand 
against the rebels, the soldiers and the townspeople remained sided with the rebels.171 
Next day, the rebels took drastic action by suspending the Friday prayers, which 
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was symbolically an open objection to the authority of the Sultan.172 Apart from that, after 
receiving the support of some Ulema members, the rebels made alternative appointments 
to the high posts of administration such as the judge of Istanbul, the Janissary agha, and 
the Janissary agha deputy.173  Later on, the Sultan dispatched a committee of his 
representatives to confront the rebels to ask their terms.174 After expressing their loyalty to 
the Sultan, the rebels complained about “the traitors” within the ranks of administration. 
They demanded the execution of several high-ranking officers including the Grand Vizier, 
the Kaymakam of Istanbul, Şeyhülislam and the deputy of the Grand Vizier.175 
On the following day, Şeyhülislam Abdullah Efendi was exiled to Bursa. The 
Grand Vizier, Damat Ibrahim Paşa, Kaymakam of Istanbul and the Deputy of the Grand 
Vizier, Mehmet Ağa were put to death. The dead bodies were delivered to the 
rebels.176Because of a rumour that an exhibited body was uncircumcised, the administration 
could not convince the rebels to that it belonged to Damat İbrahim Pasha himself. What 
made the situation worse was that some of the rebels claimed the body belonged to Damat 
Ibrahim Paşa‟s Christian furrier, Manol.177 
The mistrust and animosity between the Sultan and the rebels became increasingly 
intense upon the issue of the suspicious “dead body of Damat Ibrahim Paşa” and the latter, 
after guaranteeing the support of the Ulema, refused to disperse and demanded the  
deposition of Ahmed III. Incapacitated by the loss of his close men and the support of the 
Ulema, Ahmed III left the throne to his nephew Mahmud I.178 After the enthronement of 
Mahmud I, Silahdar Mehmed Paşa was appointed to the position of grand vizierate while 
Mirzazade Efendi became Şeyhülislam. Zülali Hasan Efendi, the member of the 
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commission who asked the rebel‟s terms, was appointed as the chief judge of Anatolia and 
rest of the rebel appointments were approved by the new Sultan.179 
The rebels, who obtained positions within the ranks of the Military, recruited their 
supporters into the Janissary corps to strengthen their position.180 During the enthronement 
ceremony of Mahmud I, the kiosks of Sadabad were destroyed which symbolically put an 
end to the era of the Grand Vizier Damat Ibrahim Paşa.181 In the mean time, the new Sultan 
Mahmud I had failed to establish his authority over the rebels. The rebel brigands had been 
accused of misusing their positions and of disturbing the public order.182 The rebels also 
tried to obtain a warranty from the Sultan to secure their lives183 but presumably their 
impulsive actions put them out of Ulema and the Esnaf‟s support.184 The realignment of 
Sultan Mahmud I, palace elites and the Ulema standing on the rebel‟s side, and the rebel 
lieutenants themselves who had been executed as their affiliations were punished.185 Thus, 
the order had “restored”. 
The Chronicles 
 The Ottoman historians and their accounts of the 1730 Rebellion which are 
analysed in this chapter are  Abdi Tarihi of Abdi Efendi, M‟ü‟rit-ül Tevarîh of 
Şemdanizade Fındıklılı Süleyman Efendi, Destârî Sâlih Tarihi of Destârî Salih Efendi and 
Subhi Tarihi. Abdi Tarihi186 which had been composed by Abdi Efendi in order to narrate 
“the great strife”.187 Unfortunately, there is very limited information about the personal 
history and cultural formation of the author apart from that Abdi was a common 
pseudonym among the Ottoman authors. He introduces himself as one of “a humbled 
figure among educated men”, “a craftsman of history” and “a lover of literature” which 
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implies his possible ties to the Ilmiye class. 188  
As a special event chronicle, the content of Abdi Tarihi can be analyzed in three 
major parts:  
In the beginning, Abdi Efendi expresses his purpose for narrating the events in his 
treatise and addresses Sultan Mahmud I as his audience. He gives the details of a 
horrifying storm which struck the imperial capital on August 7 of 1728, a celestial 
happening occurred in Diyarbakır that turned the sky red in the middle of the night on 
February 13 of 1730, and a sun eclipse on the 15 of July in 1730.189 Abdi Efendi 
represented these events as malignant occurrences, indicating the unfortunate events.190 In 
the next passages the author expressed his discontent with the terms of peace with the 
Persians. He also criticized the arrogant attitude of Damat Ibrahim Paşa by emphasizing his 
ignorance from the opinion of knowledgeable men.191 Furthermore, he narrated the events 
which occurred in the eastern front, such as the condition of Afghan Invader, Nadir Şah 
and Renegade Eşref Şah, and illustrates the wrong maneuvers of Abdurrahman Paşa; 
governor of Hemedan who was defeated by the Persians.192 After this part, Abdi Efendi 
narrated the preparation process of the Persian campaign.193 The second part deals with the 
preparations of the army in Üsküdar, the fall of Tebriz, the arrival of the representative 
Eşref Şah and lastly, the initial condition of imperial capital.194 Herein, he tells the outbreak 
of rebellion and other events, resulting in the enthronement of Mahmud I. The third part 
covers the final stand, the purge of the rebels and “restoration of order” by the new Sultan. 
To summarize, Abdi Efendi is concerned with the socio-political reasons 
conditioning the rebellion. He constantly expressed his personal opinions towards the 
rebellion and the rebels. According to his text, the mismanagement of the state affairs and 
moral corruption of the leading figures were the main reasons behind the rebellion which 
signifies Damat Ibrahim Paşa as a scapegoat. Instead of focusing on the reasons which 
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paved the way of mismanagement of the state affairs, he relied on the will of God and 
addresses his faith.  Presumably, Abdi Tarihi‟s primary concern in narrating “the 
inauspicious events” which occurred over the course of the 1730 Rebellion was to make an 
example for its audience.  
Şemdanizade Fındıklılı Süleyman Efendi‟s Mür‟i‟t-Tevârih is an expanded edition 
of the famous history work Takîmü‟t-Tevârih of Kâtip Çelebi.195 The author informs the 
reader about his own writing process, his treatise which was written over thirteen years and 
was referenced by more than four hundred books to complete the account. 196 Katip 
Çelebi‟s history starts with the creation of the universe and chronological order of the 
events from the time of “Adam” to 1654-55. Later on, the work of Katip Çelebi was 
extended by Şeyh Mehmed Efendi to the 1732-33 and then continued by Ibrahim 
Müteferrika to 1733-34.197 Süleyman Efendi expanded the content of the history written by 
Katip Çelebi, up until 1733-34 and used the works of the palace chroniclers Mehmed 
Subhi Efendi and Süleyman Izzî Efendi to narrate the events which occurred after 1730.198  
The adoption of the official chronicles into the work of Süleyman Efendi does not 
overshadow his “history from below-like narrative” since his own research about rumours 
circulating in the streets of Istanbul, occupies a large proportion of it.  
As for the rebellion of 1730, Süleyman Efendi begins his account with the 
unresolved peace negotiations with Persia that were conducted by Damat Ibrahim Paşa. He 
signifies
 that the terms of peace damaged the reputation of Damat Ibrahim Paşa and thus, 
the Grand Vizier appeared as a “traitor” in public opinion.199 Obviously, the author does 
not approve of the Grand Vizier‟s peace policy and emphasises his “corrupt” personality.200 
To put it briefly, Süleyman Efendi expresses his own opinions beyond the restriction of 
palace-centred approaches. Citations from Şehzade Süleyman201 and his discussion on the 
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Grand Vizier‟s length of time in office202 can be interpreted as an implication of his 
criticism regarding the state affairs. Süleyman Efendi does not blame Ahmed III openly, 
but criticised him for trusting Damat Ibrahim Paşa as a grand vizier for fifteen years and 
tolerating his life style which “possessed” the Ottoman elites. 
Süleyman Efendi focused on the word on the streets and surveys the reasons why 
the townspeople turned their backs on their Sultan. According to him, the atmosphere of 
moral corruption and the surrendering of Muslim lands to infidel Persians were the 
determinant factors for the rebellion. The Empire sacrificed a lot for the Persian front but 
the Grand Vizier signed for peace in order to continue his life of pleasures.203 Appearing in 
the text of Süleyman Efendi as driving forces of the rebellion are: the mismanagement of 
state affairs, the protection of Muslim lands against the enemy, the championing of the 
justice and moral corruption. 
“Destari Tarihi” by Destari Salih Efendi is another “special event chronicle” 
which deals with the case of the 1730 rebellion. Among other authors, excluding the author 
Subhi Tarihi, Destari Salih Efendi was the closest chronicler to the palace as his text was 
edited by Salahattin Salahi Efendi, “Sır Katibi” of Sultan Mahmud I.204 During the 
outbreak of the rebellion, Destari Salih Efendi attended the meetings in the palace. Hence, 
his chronicle sheds light on very important details about the palace atmosphere.205 At 
certain points, unlike other authors, Destari Salih Efendi defends Damat Ibrahim Paşa. He 
refers to the rebellion as a conspiracy of Zülali Hasan Efendi, the former judge of Istanbul 
and also an enemy of Damat Ibrahim Paşa.206  
On the other hand, as a collaborative effort of various authors: Arapeminîzâde 
Mustafa Sâmi Efendi, Hüseyin Şâkir Efendi, Râmî Paşazâde Abdullah Ref‟et Beyefendi 
and Mehmed Subhi Efendi, “Subhi Tarihi” is an official chronicle which covers the events 
dating between 1730 and 1774. The final version of “Subhi Tarihi” is a published edition 
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of Mehmed Subhi Efendi. The rebellion of 1730 was recorded by Arapemînizâde Mustafa 
Sâmî Efendi who was presumably appointed as an official chronicler between 1730 until 
his death in 1734. According to Bekir Kütükoğlu, Sâmî Efendi recorded from 1730 until 
1732.207 As Şemdanizade Süleyman Efendi, he adopted Subhi Tarihi as a main source 
which is why it is beneficial to compare these two works to understand the perception of 
the official chroniclers of the time. 
 The Cause of the Justice: the Rebels and the Ulema 
Before analysing the positioning of the rebels in contemporary sources, it would be 
very useful to define who those “rebels” were and what their ultimate aim in the uprising 
against the Sultan was. Traditionally, the contemporary authors describe the rebels as a 
group of vile and low people, plundering the city under the influence of the charismatic 
leader Patrona Halil (and probably with the intention of obtaining a position in the military 
or administration). Süleyman Efendi accuses the rebel leader Patrona Halil, once a crew 
member of a ship named Patorona208, of slaughtering and looting the Muslims.209 However, 
this author also admits that before his hand in the events, Patrona Halil granted permission 
from a member of Ilmiye named, Deli Ibrahim.210 In addition to this, Süleyman Efendi 
portrays Patrona Halil as a charismatic leader who appealed the townspeople to unite 
against Damat Ibrahim Paşa and his cabinet by signifying the latter‟s pleasure-seeking life 
style. Hence, Şemdanizade Süleyman Efendi‟s illustration of Patrona Halil can be 
interpreted as an implicit effort to justify his own reasoning on moral corruption. 
Furthermore, Süleyman Efendi claims that the rebels refused to share money which was 
confiscated from the deputy of the Grand Vizier, Mehmed Kethüda, on the ground that it 
would be “illicit”.211 This is another indicator as the rebels were quite cautious about how 
they legitimised cause. Süleyman Efendi does not approve of the rebel‟s actions, nor does  
he accuse them of being infidels or enemy of the state and religion as Abdi Efendi does. 
Apparently, the author agrees with the actions of rebels as long as it was against Damat 
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Ibrahim Paşa. Hence, even though Şemdanizade Tarihi offers some details about the 
rebels, the author‟s narration concentrates on the actions and influence of Damat Ibrahim 
Paşa. 
On the other hand, Subhi Tarihi and Destari Salih Tarihi do not offer much about 
the actions of the rebels, apart from common actualities which are voiced in all 
contemporary sources, such as their names or pseudonyms and their actions. For the 
identity and the details of the rebels‟ actions Abdi Tarihi is the richest source. In Abdi 
Tarihi, the rebels are depicted as people of low rank who were incapable of acting freely 
without the assistance of “knowledgeable men”.212 Abdi Efendi constantly insultes the 
rebels for their low social status. He describes them as a group of “Infamous Albanians” 
and “Anatolian Turks among infidels”.213 
Apart from that, in regards to the rebellion of 1730, professional, ethnic, and 
religious affiliations with the rebels can be traced through the analysis of their title or 
pseudonym given in the accounts of the contemporary authors. “Patrona Halil”, an 
Albanian Janissary from Horpeşte village in Rumelia214, “Muslı Beşe” a hound-breeder 
(zağarcı) from Niğbolu, “Ali Usta”, “Emir Ali”, “Derviş Mehmed”, “Erzurumlu Mehmed”, 
“Küçük Muslı”, “Kutucu Elhac Hüseyin” were armourers, “Manav İsmail”, a grocer ,215 
“Çınar Ahmed”, “Kara Yılan”216, “Canbaz Emir Musa”, “Oduncu Ahmet”, timbermen,217, 
“Urlu Murtaza Ağa”, “Deli Mahmud” 218, “İbadî”, coffeehouse buskers,219are some of 
names which are mentioned in the text of Abdi Efendi.  
In addition to the above-mentioned names, there were thirty more troops involved 
in the outbreak of the rebellion, according to Abdi Tarihi.220 Moreover, Şemdanizade Tarihi 
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states that, Patrona Halil and his sixteen lieutenants launched the rebellion.221 The Subhi 
Tarihi says the rebels were under the leadership of Patrona Halil and his seventeen 
lieutenants.222 From this view, the rebel lieutenants were among the military organization. 
Considering their pseudonyms, they probably had close ties with the tiny-Esnaf. 
Assumingly tiny Esnaf - Janissary identity of the rebel leaders might have helped them to 
expand their influence on the townspeople.  
What„s more, consistant with Abdi Efendi, those among the supporters of the 
rebels there were also Greeks, Armenians, Gypsies and qizilbashes. From this view, the 
rebels were portrayed as a cosmopolite group, made up of elements in the military, tiny-
Esnaf, immigrants, non-Muslims and marginalized groups. However, among the 
contemporary sources, Abdi Tarihi is the only chronicle which touched upon the rebel‟s 
collaboration with the non-Muslim communities. Hence, this assertion seems deceptive as 
the author may have aimed to blame the rebels of their social background and their 
collaboration with the non-Muslims.223 
The rebellion of 1730 was described as an organised operation. Even though the 
rebels were traditionally depicted as incapable, they organised the rebellion in a collective-
manner.224 Only in the Subhi Tarihi, the outbreak of the rebellion was narrated as an 
impulsive action of the rebels who had evil schemes intended.225 Based on the accounts of 
foreign ambassadors, Aktepe describes Patrona Halil as a vigilante who was sentenced to 
death for organising a mutiny when he was a legend crew member. He was pardoned by 
Kapdan Abdi Paşa, who would later become vizier and stay in the imperial capital as 
“Damad-ı Şehriyari” during the rebellion. Patrona Halil later fled to his homeland, 
Albania and then moved to Niş where he enrolled in the Janissary of the seventeenth 
regiment. There he was involved in another mutiny, which spread from Niş to Vidin. After 
his move to Istanbul, Patrona Halil became a protégé of Kaptan-ı Derya Mustafa Paşa. 
Furthermore, Aktepe highlights that he was in contact with other prominent political 
                                                          
221  Şem‟dânî-zâde Fındıklılı Süleyman Efendi, “Mür‟i‟t-Tevârih”, 6. 
222  M. Subhi Efendi, “Subhi Tarihi”, 22. 
223  Abdi Efendi, “Abdi Tarihi”, 35. 
224  Ibid., 26. Şem‟dânî-zâde Fındıklılı Süleyman Efendi, “Mür‟i‟t-Tevârih”, 6. 
225  M. Subhi Efendi, “Subhi Tarihi”, 22. 
 53 
 
 
figures and an antagonist group that aimed to overthrow Sultan Ahmed III even before the 
rebellion. It was believed that Patrona Halil also had mystical powers.226  
Apparently, mystic connotations attached to the image of Patrona Halil would 
possibly have influenced the foreign ambassadors who witnessed the rebellion. Hence, it 
seems difficult to get a clear distinction between his real personality and his constructed 
mysticism. Nevertheless, he appears as a rebellious and influential figure, probably a good 
public speaker. However, it is still not possible to reveal the real motivation of Patrona 
Halil in designing the rebellion. Therefore, due to insufficient information it would be 
wrong to label him as a revolutionist or restorer of the order who punished corrupt figures. 
Considering his position that he obtained at the end of the rebellion, he can be more or less 
considered as an opportunist. 
Abdi Efendi blames the incapability of Ottoman officers in suppressing the spread 
of the strife. He touches upon an opportunity missed by the officials to repel the rebels. 
When word arrived that the Sultan and the palace elites were moving back to Imperial 
Palace to commence an assault against the rebels, some antagonists deserted the Et 
Meydanı. Nevertheless, Patrona Halil‟s determinant attitude prevented a further 
dissolution. For Abdi Efendi at this stage, passivity of the Porte boosted the morale of the 
rebels. But he does not give to the reason to the Porte‟s delayed response, instead he just 
refers to the will of God.227  
Having failed to repel the rebels, the cabinet of Damat Ibrahim Paşa is portrayed 
as an incapable administration in the account of Abdi Efendi, and Damat Ibrahim Paşa 
himself was implicitly accused with propagating strife. However, concerning the reasons 
of the delay, the author obediently attributes the inevitable course of events to the will of 
God. Undoubtedly, the course of the events were far more involved than God„s will. 
Herein, Abdi Efendi might have intentionally ignored the opposition between the chief 
judge of Rumelia, Mirzazade Efendi and Damat Ibrahim Paşa regarding the use of brute 
force against the rebels. Considering the fact that Abdi Efendi was an affiliate of the Ulema 
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and presented his treatise in the time of Mahmud I, he may have preferred to avoid 
expressing the details of the dichotomy between the ruling cadres of his time and the 
former Grand Vizier in his account.  
Destari Salih Tarihi provides curious details about the initial discussions between 
the Sultan, Damat Ibrahim Paşa, the Ulema and other palace elites. Accordingly, Damat 
Ibrahim Paşa obtained a fatwa from Şeyhülislam Abdullah Efendi and convinced the Sultan 
to use brute force against the rebels. However, Mirzazade Efendi objected to the ruling of 
the Şeyhülislam on the grounds that Muslims‟ blood would be shed.228 Hence, these might 
be the reasons why Abdi Efendi did not give room to this discussion.  
This was followed by “the lootings”, presumably referring to the rebel‟s raids in 
the Grand Bazaar, Sarraçhane, Sipah Pazarı and Bit Pazarı and their efforts to merge with 
the Janissaries. The rebels had, Samancızade Efendi, a notable member of the Ulema and 
Deli Ibrahim, a müderris to confirm their appointments.229 They appointed Deli Ibrahim 
Efendi as the judge of Istanbul,230 Kel Mahmud Ağa as the Janissary Agha (who is depicted 
as “lunatic” by Abdi Efendi), Urlu Murtaza Ağa as Sekbanbaşi and Deli Mahmud and 
Giritli Ali Efendi as the deputies of the Janissary Agha and Sekbanbaşi respectively. These 
appointments may indicate the rebel‟s aims to enhance their influence in the posts of the 
Military and Ilmiye.231 It also hints about the base of the alliance between the rebels and the 
“anti-Damat Ibrahim Paşa” faction of the Ulema. By these appointments, Damat Ibrahim 
Paşa‟s power within the administration and the Ilmiye would be broken. And in return, 
with the support of the Ulema, the rebels would be able to bring legitimisation and success 
to their cause.  
Later on, the rebels‟ demands for the executions of Damat Ibrahim Paşa, his 
deputy, the major of Istanbul and the banishment of Şeyhülislam Abdullah Efendi signified 
the purging of the Grand Vizier‟s cabinet. According to Abdi Efendi, two members of the 
commission, Zülali Hasan Efendi, an Albanian, and İspirizade Ahmed Efendi from the 
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Ulema, were dispatched to ask the rebels for their terms. However, Abdi Efendi claims that 
they were presumably the affiliates of opposing party, who had compromised with the 
rebels and encouraged them to depose of Ahmed III.232 Subhi Tarihi also signifies the 
relationship between the rebels and Zülali Hasan Efendi.233 This is the most solid evidence 
regarding the alliance between the Ulema and the rebels. The Albanian identity of Zülali 
Efendi and Patrona Halil‟s identity appear consistent but, as it was explained before the 
full view of the situation, it was larger than mere solidarity of Albanians.  
On the other hand, Süleyman Efendi, also underlined there was an opposition 
between the Grand Vizier and some members of the Ulema. Just like Abdi Efendi, 
Süleyman Efendi refers to the connection between Zülali Hasan Efendi who had served 
previously as a judge of Istanbul and the rebel leader Patrona Halil.234 Presumably, both 
Abdi Efendi and Şemdanizade Süleyman Efendi might have some reasons for remaining 
silent about the relationship between the Ulema and the rebels. Therefore, it would be 
necessary give attention to Destari Salih Tarihi which is the only chronicle that mentions 
the relationship between Zülali Hasan Efendi and the rebels. Accordingly, there was an 
ongoing hostility between the Grand Vizier and Zülali Hasan Efendi. Due to his failure of 
provisioning the imperial capital, Zülali Hasan Efendi was dismissed from the post of 
judge by the Grand Vizier. Thus, he helped the rebels to gain popularity.235 He was the one 
who recommended execution of the Grand Vizier to the rebels.236 
After the execution of Damat Ibrahim Paşa, his deputy Mehmed Kethüda, 
Kaptan-ı Derya Mustafa Paşa237 and the major of Istanbul, the bodies were brought to the 
Et Medyanı with a religious ceremony which was performed by the rebel‟s affiliates. Abdi 
Efendi condemns the ceremony and accuses the rebels as being “infidels”.238 He states that: 
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“...what a man can do as the order fell to the mouth of furious dogs. Every one 
acts on his own.”239 
After this point, the rebels who expressed their loyalty to the Sultan had changed 
their attitude and thus, Ahmed III had to step down from the throne. The pretext of the 
deposition was over the issue of the uncircumcised “dead body of Damat Ibrahim Paşa”. 
According to all contemporary sources the rebels were indignant over the identity of the 
body.240 Hence, they demanded deposition of Ahmed III. This is the only explanation 
regarding the sudden growing dispute against the Sultan. After the enthronement of 
Mahmud I, Silahdar Mehmed Paşa was elevated to the post of the Grand Vizierate while 
Mirzazade Abdullah Efendi became Şeyülislam and Damad-i Şehriyar Kapdan Abdi Paşa 
became Kaptan-ı Derya.241 
To summarize, the rebels followed the exact precedent of their predecessors in 
1703 rebellion which steps involved: 
- Expressing their “cause of justice” to the public which was symbolized by a 
“banner”. At this level they announced that, they were no plunderers or 
brigands, rather seeking justice to punish “the traitors”. They avoided looting 
and unnecessary bloodshed. 
- Paralyzing the financial life of the city through raiding the Grand Bazaar and 
other financial centres of the imperial capital and seeking the support of the 
Esnaf. 
- Seeking access to Et Meydanı, to merge with the Janissaries and other military 
units.  
- Casting their doubt on the authority of the Sultan. 
- Seeking the support of the Ulema to legitimise their cause. 
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- Waiting for the representative of the Sultan and delivering their demands. At 
this point no conspicuous disloyalty was displayed to the Sultan. 
- Ordering executions and approving of certain appointed men of the rebels to 
the ranks of the administration and the military. 
- Waiting for an opportunity to depose the Sultan. 
In that sense, these common steps between the two events signify that a similar 
method was applied to legitimisation of the rebellions of 1703 and 1730. The arguments of 
the authors also have similar characteristics. Each author had a different point of view 
regarding their affiliations or social status. Nevertheless up to this point, it seems as if the 
rebels were well aware of the steps which were to be followed to bring about a successful 
rebellion. They announced themselves as desecrators of those who betrayed the state. In 
the 1703 rebellion, the treaty of Karlowitz was considered by the rebels as treason to the 
state. The Sultan was considered as incapable due to his failure to protect the Muslim 
lands. Here in rebellion of 1730, the rebels came with a similar argument. Terms of the 
peace with Persia and surrender of the Muslim lands were probably considered as treason 
to the state and this helped the rebels to gain public support. Another important point in the 
1703 rebellion, is opposition to Feyzullah Efendi had created a common ground which 
unified discontent elements against the Porte under cause of the rebels. In the 1730 
rebellion, the common ground of the rebel coalition was the opposition to Damat Ibrahim 
Paşa which will be discussed in detail in following part. 
Damat Ibrahim Paşa as Scapegoat of the 1730 Rebellion 
One of the paralleling factors that all sources agree on is Damat Ibrahim Paşa‟s 
position as being solely responsible for the rebellion. Just like Şeyhülislam Feyzullah 
Efendi in the case of 1703, Damat Ibrahim Paşa was accused of being a scapegoat of the 
1730 rebellion. The reasoning of the contemporary authors depended on differing factors. 
Firstly, Damat Ibrahim Paşa was the most powerful figure of his time whose term of office 
covered fifteen years and lasted until his execution. In the previous chapter, there was a 
conspicuous power struggle between the parties of rebel coalition and Şeyhülislam 
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Feyzullah Efendi. Herein, one shall ask the question if the rebellion of 1730 was perceived 
by anti-Damat Ibrahim Paşa elements as an opportunity of to overthrow him. 
In the case the 1703 rebellion of Edirne, by support of social, military and 
political elements which had opposed the party of Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi, protest of 
Armourers transformed into full scale mutiny which ended with the deposition of Mustafa 
II. The power struggle intensified between Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi and the other 
members of the Ulema who had been dismissed from their previous posts. The depiction of 
Feyzullah Efendi as a scapegoat alluded to his nepotism and his immense influence on the 
Sultan. The acts of Feyzullah Efendi were considered as a violation of protocol. His 
immense wealth and long term of service in the palace were the other reasons which are 
criticised in the contemporary sources. In that sense, the depiction of Feyzullah Efendi and 
position of Damat Ibrahim Paşa in rebellion of 1730 overlaps as both figures were accused 
of being corrupt and influencing the Sultan. These are the most important motives which 
gave sway to the rebels‟ arguments.  
There are numerous accusations thrown against Damat Ibrahim Paşa (the most 
interesting one is probably the “uncircumcised” issue) by the contemporary authors. As for 
the condition of Damat Ibrahim Paşa in the contemporary sources, Abdi Efendi and 
Şemdanizade Süleyman Efendi had considered the era of his vizierate as the beginning of 
the blasphemous mismanagement of state affairs. According to Süleyman Efendi, 
everything started with the signing of the treaty of Passorowitz in 1718. During the 
negotiations, despite the disapproval of the Ulema and other prominent figures, Damat 
Ibrahim Paşa had taken the initiative and convinced the Sultan to sign the treaty which 
surrendered some Balkan provinces to the enemy, as he claimed that there were no 
competent military units to encounter Europeans. By making peace with Europeans the 
State were able to buy time to re-organize the military units, hence, the lost territories 
would be re-conquered.  
Şemdanizade Süleyman Efendi accuses Damat Ibrahim Paşa for not taking 
necessary measures to re-organize the army and making the situation even worse. 
Accordingly, Damat Ibrahim Paşa biased the people with games of lust and conducted 
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peace negotiations with the Persians just for the sake of his own pleasure. 242 Hence, from 
the perspective of Şemdanizade Süleyman Efendi, Damat Ibrahim Paşa was the only 
reason behind the violation of the state order. Şemdanizade Süleyman Efendi throws more 
intensive accusations at Damat Ibrahim Paşa than Abdi Efendi. Süleyman Efendi describes 
him as “a man of fake dignity”. To him, Damat Ibrahim Paşa demonstrated his immense 
wealth over his slaves who wore gems on his belts, book bindings with pearls, expansive 
clocks and upholsteries. On the other hand, he surrendered previously conquered eastern 
lands to the Persia.243 
To Süleyman Efendi, the Sultan‟s unwillingness to lead the campaign himself 
rendered the army immobile in Üsküdar.244 In the meantime, news arrived that the 
Kirmanşâh and Hemedân citadels were looted by Persians, Kara Mustafa Paşa (who 
probably affiliated with Damat Ibrahim Paşa Party), the governor of Tebriz deserted his 
post and left the city to the enemy.245  According to the rumours, survivors of Tebriz were 
marching to Istanbul to seek revenge.246 This condition created unrest among the soldiers, 
and thus the rebellion broke out. 
Apart from that, Süleman Efendi describes the lifestyle of the Grand Vizier as a 
disease which plagued the society. The decent women neglected their social role and 
exhibited themselves while they were enjoying the toys of amusement in the hands of male 
servants.247 In this atmosphere of lust, the state officers ignored their duties, hence the 
reaya suffered in the hands of the oppressive local notables.248 Damat Ibrahim Paşa paves 
the way of rebellion as he biased the Sultan and other government officers with his 
pleasure seeking ways. Consequently, the Sultan was considered as unjust and incapable 
by the rebels as he left his authority to the hands of an “extravagant hedonist” for fifteen 
years. 249 
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Moreover, Süleyman Efendi commented on the long term vizierate of Damat 
Ibrahim Paşa. Accordingly, Damat Ibrahim Paşa was not capable of managing the state 
affairs for fifteen years as he lacked the qualities of an ideal governor. There were some 
other prominent figures who had served such a long term before, but they gained their 
positions by working for the interests of the state.250 Thus, Süleyman Efendi‟s narration can 
also be considered as a sophisticated critique of the Ahmed III‟s reign.  
Up to this point, the accusations of the author had intensified on two points: 
- Damat Ibrahim Paşa‟s corrupt personality. 
- Damat Ibrahim Paşa‟s incapability of managing the state affairs. 
These relevant accusations signify a connection between the outbreak of the 
rebellion and the condition of the empire. The failure of the Grand Vizier in state affairs 
was justified on his corrupt personality. The position of the Sultan within this procedure is 
as one who was biased by corruption. Probably, unwillingness of the Sultan to lead the 
campaign, explicitly demonstrates the incapability of fulfilling his tasks as a ruler. Hence, 
Süleyman Efendi appears as an affiliate of the anti-Damat Ibrahim Paşa party who 
reclaimed their positions in Mahmud I era, his text justifies the fall of “the corrupted”. 
The approach of Süleyman Efendi and Abdi Efendi are based on similar factors. 
The difference is Abdi Tarihi was written for a didactic purpose which demonstrates the 
fate of a ruler who left his authority into incapable officials. The admonition of Ahmed III 
in the end clearly confirms this condition. Accordingly, Sultan Ahmed III enthrones his 
nephew Şehzade Mahmud by his own hand and makes a speech of admonition. The first 
passage of the speech has very interesting details which enable us to get an insight into the 
mind of Abdi Efendi: 
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“At first, do not give in to your Grand Vizier and always pay attention to his 
actions. Do not keep the same person in the post of [Grand] Vizierate for five or ten years. 
Do not confide to his words. Always be merciful and munificent!”251 
What Abdi Efendi highlighted as the mistakes of the Sultan were: 
- Authorising the Grand Vizier with superfluous power. 
- Extending the service term of the Grand Vizier.  
- Being influenced by the decisions of Grand Vizier. 
Thus, the author signifies the role of Damat Ibrahim Paşa as a scapegoat and 
justifies the inaction of the Sultan who was influenced by malicious people. Abdi Efendi 
confirms the point of Süleyman Efendi as he accuses Damat Ibrahim Paşa of proliferating 
hedonism. Another good example on this point providing insight into the atmosphere in 
Istanbul in the early stages of the rebellion: 
“Even the Kayimmakam Paşa was planting tulips on his garden, the [typical] 
mood of Istanbul!” 252  
Abdi Efendi presents the rebellion itself as a punitive and catastrophic event that 
was foreboded by the omens as the moral corruption had been plaguing the society 
throughout the era of Damat Ibrahim Paşa. To put it briefly, in order to justify the fall of 
the Damat Ibrahim Paşa cabinet, the author had labelled the affiliates as corrupt in all 
means. There is no solid evidence which proves “the era of blasphemy” was put to an end 
through rebellion in the texts of Abdi Efendi and Süleyman Efendi. Both authors agree that 
the restoration of order was fulfilled with the elimination of the rebels after the fall of 
Damat Ibrahim Paşa cabinet.  
On the other hand, as an official chronicle, Subhi Tarihi contains rather diplomatic 
language towards Damat Ibrahim Paşa. Accordingly, treacherous rebels created disorder in 
                                                          
251  Abdi Efendi, “Abdi Tarihi”, 41-42. 
252  Ibid., 29. 
 62 
 
 
the city. They raided the financial centres and merged with the Janissaries. After 
discussions in the palace, the Sultan appointed Zülali Hasan Efendi and İşpirizade Mehmed 
Efendi to asked the rebels their terms of peace. The rebels expressed loyalty to the Sultan 
and demanded the execution of fourteen names. However, after the executions they 
changed their attitude and demanded the deposition of Ahmed III.253 Hence, unlike Abdi 
Tarihi and Şemdanizade Tarihi, in Subhi Tarihi no conspicuous accusation attributes 
Damat Ibrahim Paşa or any other figure for being responsible for the rebellion. 
Furthermore, the opposition between Damat Ibrahim Paşa and Mirzazade Efendi is also 
ignored. The passivity of the Porte is clarified for not having loyal troops to repel the 
rebels.254 Thus, the narrative describes the events as an impulsive action of some 
antagonists against the State. 
Among contemporary authors, Destari Salih Efendi‟s approach differs from 
Süleyman Efendi and Abdi Efendi. He depicts the rebellion of 1730 as a plot of Zülali 
Hasan Efendi who had been dismissed from his previous post of “the judge of Istanbul” by 
the Grand Vizier.255 Unlike Abdi Efendi and Şemdanizade Süleyman Efendi, Destari Salih 
Efendi does not consider the lifestyle of Damat Ibrahim Paşa as a reason for the rebellion. 
According to him, Damat Ibrahim Paşa was a competent servant of the Sultan, who won 
great victories against the Persians on the eastern front. Moreover, the author claims that, 
unlike the depiction of the others, the Grand Vizier was not lavish and corrupt. On the 
contrary, Damat Ibrahim Paşa was a man of dignity who was killed by the hands of 
vagrants. He points out that the state officers in Anatolia neglected their duties as the 
Grand Vizier was in Istanbul. That is why the Porte decided to re-open the eastern front.256 
However, during the preparations for the campaign in Üsküdar, some vagrants who were 
guided by Zülali Hasan Efend initiated the rebellion.257 Thus, as an affiliate of Damat 
Ibrahim Paşa‟s party, Destari Salih Efendi‟s explanation can be considered as a rebellious 
act against anti-Damat Ibrahim Paşa party. The position of the rebels within this struggle 
was a tool to eliminate the Damat Ibrahim Paşa cabinet. In that sense, the text of Destari 
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Salih Efendi appears as an answer to those who accused Damat Ibrahim Paşa.  
To summarize, there are three different arguments which dominated the 
contemporary sources regarding the condition of Damat Ibrahim Paşa. Şemdanizade 
Süleyman Efendi and Abdi Efendi conclude that the rebellion was an act against the Damat 
Ibrahim Paşa party. The moral corruption and mismanagement of the state affairs prepare 
the background of their reasoning. They had close ties with the Ulema and were probably 
the affiliates of the prevailing party which survived to the Mahmud I era. Hence, they 
probably blame Damat Ibrahim Paşa‟s policies and the lifestyle of his affiliates to justify 
the position of the prevailing party. They do not neglect the role of Zülali Hasan Efendi in 
the rebellion as being a tutor to the rebels, but they ignore certain points which indicate the 
opposition between Damat Ibrahim Paşa and some members of the Ulema who gained 
ranks after the rebellion.  
As a member of palace elites in Ahmed III‟s reign, Destari Salih Efendi single-
handedly defended Damat Ibrahim Paşa. He refers the rebellion as a plot of Zülali Hasan 
Efendi who manipulated the rebels to reclaim his position. On the other hand, the official 
palace chroniclers who narrated the events in Subhi Tarihi, obtain a diplomatic attitude 
regarding the rebellion of 1730. From this perspective, the rebellion was an impulsive act 
of some vile men who were assisted by some palace elites. For the course of the events, 
even though all of the authors came into agreement on some certain points, none of them 
consider the rebels as an individual group that were trying to get their share in this power 
struggle. The rebels used the religious legitimisation practices in their actions. They 
consider Damat Ibrahim Paşa as a traitor as due to his failure against the infidels. 
Moreover, the lifestyle of Damat Ibrahim Paşa and his affiliates is interpreted as 
blasphemy.  Hence, the rebels shall be interpreted as individual opportunists that aligned 
with the anti-Damat Ibrahim Paşa elements within the Ottoman society and sought ways to 
obtain position in the military and the administration. For the authors, their affiliates and 
social position determined their approach and reasoning regarding the reasons of the 
rebellion.   
 
 64 
 
 
Conclusion 
In order to conclude the legitimisation methods that were followed by the rebels 
in 1730, it is necessary to compare the whole process with the rebellion of 1703. As it was 
mentioned before, there are similar characteristics between the rebellion of 1703 and 1730. 
The rebellion of 1703 has a more complex structure as an impulsive protest of the Cebecis 
turned into a full blown rebellion. The alignment of different social elements against the 
Porte were based on the opposition to the common enemy; Şeyülislam Feyzullah Efendi. In 
the rebellion of 1730, there is similar opposition to the Grand Vizier Damat Ibrahim Paşa. 
Each figure had a great influence over the Sultan and had filled the government 
instrumentalities with their affiliates, which was the focal point of political dichotomy that 
existed prior to the events.  
In 1703, even though the Cebecis had been organising themselves in a 
collaborative manner from early stages until the end, it is not clear whether their ultimate 
aim was to depose of the Sultan and Şeyühülislam Feyzullah Efendi. It is not possible to 
clarify whether the rebels would have ended their protest if their demands had been met in 
the early stages. In the end, the protest of the Cebecis turned into a campaign against 
Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi, rather than an act to receive their unpaid salaries. But in the 
rebellion of 1730, the rebels were presumably aware of the fact that the success of their 
cause was dependent on the elimination of the Grand Vizier‟s cabinet and deposing the 
Sultan.  
The “treason argument” was used by the rebels in both events. For the case of 
1730, this point indicates that the rebels‟ ultimate aim was to depose the Grand Vizier as 
there was shifting on the agenda of the rebels in the early stage of the 1703 rebellion. 
Therefore in 1730, the rebels particularly targeted the Grand Vizier and then sought ways 
to bring  to their cause on a religious basis which positioned Damat Ibrahim Paşa as 
indecent. The “moral corruption” argument was connected to “treason”. Hence, the rebels 
were able to label the Sultan as an inappropriate ruler for tolerating such incapable and 
corrupt figure so close to him. Later, this condition created a legitimate background for the 
deposition of the Sultan. Hence, in the case of 1730, the moral corruption argument was 
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interpreted by the contemporary authors to provide a pretext to the treason argument. The 
origin of the “moral corruption argument” linked the Grand Vizier and his affiliates to their 
excessive lifestyles.  
In both events, the most powerful figure of the administration is chosen as a 
scapegoat by the majority of the contemporary sources. This attitude also allows them to 
justify the Sultan as being the responsible of the inauspicious events. Even though, there 
was an attempt of defending Damat Ibrahim Paşa, the same attitude is adopted by the 
contemporary authors who deal with the rebellion of 1730. Furthermore, in both events the 
rebels were backed by some members of the Ulema. Apart from approving the rebel 
arguments of restoring the order, assistance of the Ulema shall be interpreted as a 
diplomatic move. In 1703, the majority of the high-ranking Ulema members were 
dismissed from their previous posts by Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi. However in the 
rebellion of 1730, the dichotomy between the anti-Damat Ibrahim Paşa and Ulema is not as 
visible as it is in 1703. The common point is after the elimination of the targeted political 
figures, the most prominent figure among the rebel-supported Ulema elevated to the post 
of Şeyülislam and assisted the new Sultan to purge the rebels. 
The arguments of the contemporary authors are heavily affected by their 
affiliations and social standing. The official chroniclers adopt very diplomatic language as 
they needed to favour the ruling cadres, many of them survived into the reign of the new 
Sultan. From the perspective of the official chroniclers, the “inauspicious events” started 
with the mutiny of vile people who had been manipulated by some political figures that 
held grievances with the Porte. This point shall be evaluated carefully as the “ignored 
parts” that actually provide very important clues regarding the power struggle between 
different power elites. 
Compared to 1703, the condition of the Esnaf was rather invisible in the rebellion 
of 1730. The contemporary sources signify that the rebel leaders were among the petty 
artisans. According to Richard Olson, in 1731 and in 1740, there were two unsuccessful 
attempts to depose Mahmud I that was lead by the Janissaries. However, the Esnaf armed 
themselves against the antagonists and assisted the Porte. Hence, the antagonists who 
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failed to win the support of the public, were crushed easily by the Esnaf. Indeed, a single 
example is not enough to conclude the whole situation of the Esnaf, but apparently they 
preferred to align with the new Sultan.258 In addition, Aktepe underlines that after the 
rebellion of 1730, Mahmud I had annulled the new tax imposition which was conducted by 
Damat Ibrahim Paşa. This actually confirms the alignment of the Esnaf with the Porte.259  
However, there is no sufficient information about the role nor their participation in the 
rebellion in the contemporary sources. Hence, this field requires further study and is 
beyond the scope of this work.  Another important point is the rebels may have had a 
predestined plan of attack as they followed the exact steps in both events. In order to 
confirm this point it is necessary to compare these two events with the rebellions of 1807 
and 1826 in next chapters. 
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CHAPTER 3 
FROM 1807 TO 1826: CONSOLIDATION OF THE STATE AUTHORITY AND 
ABOLISHMENT OF THE JANISSARIES 
Rebellion against “the New Order”  
In first two chapters, rebellions of 1703 and 1730 were evaluated within 
framework of legitimisation practices and arguments that were narrated in the 
contemporary sources. Moreover, the depiction of the rebels from the view of the 
contemporary authors and the legitimisation patterns were also discussed.  As far as we 
observe; certain figures had chosen as scapegoats and accused of misguiding the Sultan, 
which in fact signifies a dichotomy between various power centers within the Ottoman 
administration. Arguments of the contemporary authors were based either on treachery of 
rebelling Janissaries-and their affiliations- or treason and corruption of scapegoat figures. 
Hence, there is continuity between arguments of the authors in cases of 1703 and 1730 
rebellions.  However, in 1807 rebellion, a certain institution, which represented central 
authority of the Porte, was targeted by the rebels. It was “the New Army” which was the 
most important outcome of the Porte‟s the New Order policy. 
Institution of the New Army would mean a constant threat to the very existence of 
the Janissary corps and privileges of the social groups that were affiliated to the 
Janissaries. In addition, the Porte would have to build an argument to prove legitimacy of 
the New Order, as it was a western institution. Hence, a battle of legitimisation between the 
Porte and the antagonists was inevitable. This chapter aims to develop an analysis on the 
Porte‟s propaganda efforts and its reflection to abolishment of Janissaries over religio-
intellectual arguments.  
The era of Selim III can be considered “the beginning of the end” within the 
Ottoman history. Selim III succeeded to throne in 1789 in the middle of war with Russians. 
In his early reign, he had to face continuous series of crisis such as; raids of Mountaineer-
Kırcalı Bandits in Rumelia in 1787-1807, revolt of Pazvandoğlu -a local power-holder of 
Rumelia- in 1792, invasion of the Egypt by “ally” Napoleon army of France in 1792, 
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Wahhabi sacking of Holy Cities and suspicion of pilgrimage in 1803, Serbian rebellion in 
1804, revolt of Tayyar Mahmud Paşa, a power holder of Anatolia in 1805, and British 
Naval Expedition of Dardanelles in 1807.260 The modernization of the army would be 
evaluated as an inevitable result of Ottoman‟s ineffectiveness to encounter the European 
forces and provincial power-holders. Therefore, the New Order (Nizam-ı Cedid) would be 
considered as a political movement, which was aimed to consolidate power of the Porte on 
military organization of the empire and economical sources by establishing military and 
fiscal reforms.261  
The New Order program was launched by Selim III and with a group of several 
high and low rank bureaucrats, military officers and members of the Ulema hierarchy. The 
primary objective of the movement was to create a professional standing army in a Franco-
Prussian model and a private treasury (Irad-ı Cedid) to finance the expenditures of military 
and other administrative reforms. Such radical changes in the military, fiscal and 
administrative structure of the empire would also challenge the privileges of the local 
power holders and the Janissaries. Hence, in order to avoid a possible reaction of the 
Janissaries and the society, the Porte constituted the New Army corps within the 
organization of the imperial bodyguards.  
The reforms were announced as to reorganization of Cannon Corps (Topçuyan), 
The Cannon-Wagon Corps (Top Arabacıyan), the Miners (Lağımcıyan) and the Mortar 
Corps (Humbaracıyan) corps.262 Furthermore, the Porte initiated new recruitment system 
on Anatolian provinces and transferred several tax revenue units under control of New 
Treasury to increase surplus from the provinces.263 The recruits of the New Army were 
stationed on the barracks that were built on Levend Çiftliks and performed European 
methods of military training under supervision of European tutors. The recruits of the New 
Army were drafted among more homogenous part of the Ottoman society, mostly among 
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the Anatolian peasants. Unlike the Janissary corps, the recruits of the New Army were 
isolated from the city life as their barracks were stationed in the outskirts of the imperial 
capital. They were performing regular military training under strict supervision of their 
officials.264 
Although the New Army had no opportunity to test its battling skills on long and 
extensive war, it was successful against the French troops in Egypt265 in which they were 
deployed as auxiliary forces while the Janissaries formed the main body of army. In 
addition, The New Army also won minor victories against the rebelling Mountaineer 
bandits in Rumelia. Eventually, the success of New Army against French troops resulted in 
further expansion attempts of recruitments in other regions of the Empire.266  
On the other hand, fiscal and administrative reforms did not meet the expectations 
of the Porte. In fact, it prepared a common basis for provincial elements and the Janissaries 
to unite against the Porte and New Order grandees. By the 1793, control of several fiscal 
units (mukataa) and fiefs (tımar) as well as with the incomes of previously untaxed 
alcoholic beverages and tobacco products had given under supervision of The New 
Treasury. The new fiscal impositions caused disturbance among malikane-holders and 
their financial associates of whom were among the provincial power-holders. The fiscal 
reform was considered by the provincial power holders as an attempt to abrogate tax-
farming system.267 By the nineteenth century, majority of the tax and revenue units, which 
were directly connected to New Treasury were under control of power-holders of the 
Rumelia.268 Hence, the concerns of the Janissaries were shared by the provincial elements 
that felt their privileges threatened by the Porte over fiscal reform.  
Moreover, in 1807 resistance of some of the provincial power-holders against 
enrolments for the New Army, created a massive tension that turned into a rebellion in 
Thracian provinces. Since the foundation of the New Army to Edirne Incident of 1806, the 
Porte also had an unsuccessful attempt of disciplining Janissaries by subjecting them to 
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military practice. Due to the unwillingness of the Janissaries, this attempt did not last long. 
The Porte also had taken measures to reduce the number of the Janissary payrolls.269 Even 
though, Selim III cited that the New Army was not designed as an attempt to replace the 
Janissaries270, the reaction of the latter was utterly negative towards the New Army and the 
New Order grandees.  
According to Aysel Yıldız Danacı, as the Janissaries who maintained their 
business on some public spaces like coffeehouses, barber shops, (also the Janissary 
barracks), their reaction expressed through spreading gossips, rumours and exchanging 
notes against New Order in imperial capital and probably on the other parts of the 
Empire.271 Another protest method which was expressed by Danacı Yıldız was the fires 
which attributed to the sabotage of the Janissaries who were also assigned as fire-workers. 
During the reign of Selim III there were more than sixty fire incidents that struck the 
imperial capital.272   
Ali Yaycıoğlu also stressed the effect of Janissary reaction on Ottoman society 
and different layers of administration to mobilize “the dissident” against the Porte: 
“At the center of the opposition against the New Order were the Janissary corps and 
Janissary affiliates. The Janissary-ship was the empire-wide collective identity. The Janissary 
corps was more than an army for the state. From the late sixteenth century on, the Corps 
established a peculiar “contractual” relation with the Sultans, as a corporate military group. 
While the corps had an autonomous internal hierarchy, jurisdiction and military symbolism, this 
corporate identity was fertilized by a religio-political orientation, Bektaşizm. From the beginning, 
the Janissary-ship was connected to the order of Hacı Bektaş, which provided the Janissary with 
an autonomous religio-political outlook and sense of collective solidarity. This group 
consciousness, which derived from their distinctive collective identity, had the capacity to mobilize 
thousands of affiliates of the corps with political agendas that may have been beyond their 
immediate collective interest but with references to the wellbeing of the general public or 
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protecting the old laws (kanun-u kadim)273 
According to Yaycıoğlu, the Janissary opposition particularly would be 
understood within the tradition of the “dissent” towards the central authority and the sultan, 
because the New Army (the New Order in broader context) threatened to obliterate the 
Corps.274  In broader context, the explanation of Yaycıoğlu highlighted the effectiveness of 
“Janissary Cause” as a social phenomenon, which played an umbrella role in terms of 
uniting different arguments that were based on shared interests of economic, politic and 
religious affiliations against central authority.275 Therefore, especially after facing with 
collective resistance of the Janissaries, local power-holders and other elements of society 
against the New Order in Thracian provinces, the Porte had to defend the New Army (and 
the New Order) in a relentless legitimisation battle.  
Especially between 1792 and 1798, Selim III had paid extra attention to control 
the public order to prevent the negative reactions towards New Army coming from the 
lower layers of the society.276 In that sense, influx of wandering and unemployed people to 
the imperial capital was considered as main threat to the public order. The efforts of Selim 
III had concentrated on enforcements of law with greater determination- to prevent officers 
from neglecting their duties-, employing local people for the security of their neighborhood 
and recognizance system for the outsiders
 277. Although we do not have a clear idea about 
the “wanderer” definition of the Porte, the police officers had also been given the task of 
monitoring the outsiders whose names were noted in recognizance records.278  
According to Betül Başaran, during the early reign of Selim III, the majority of 
trade branches that monitored by the Porte over recognizance records were under the 
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278  In order to get the permission to complete bussiness affairs in imperial capital, the outsider were obliged to find 
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control of Janissaries or Janissary affiliations.279 Furthermore, Aysel Danacı Yıldız 
revealed that in 1793, due to his offensive talks against the New Order in a barbershop, a 
civilian from Tophane was banished to Rhodes Island. Yet more, in the same year a 
proprietor of a coffeeshop in vicinity of Ayasoyfa was banished to Tenedos Island, as he 
was accused of allowing people to gather and spread gossips against the New Order. Other 
examples of the banishments were a member of 33
rd
 regiment criticized the state policy in 
a coffeehouse that belonged to a member of 10
th
 regiment (he was also punished since he 
did not stop him), and a former canon-wagon carrier for similar reasons in the same year.280 
These examples clearly demonstrates that the Porte attempted to expand its 
authority on social life of the imperial capital as the coffeehouses were the most important 
medium of the Janissaries to influence the public opinion; which put considerable pressure 
on the New Order grandees and Sultan.281 In return, the Porte had sought ways to reply the 
accusations of the antagonists through treatises, which were designed to defend the 
legitimacy of the New Order. As these treatises appeared after the public reactions towards 
enhancement of the New Army, it would be useful to review the process that united the 
anti New Order elements against the Porte. 
The Edirne Incident of 1806 
From 1805 onto 1807, the resistance against the New Order had come in to view 
in Anatolian and Rumelian provinces. In the beginning of the New Order establishment, 
the Porte had to deal with some hostile rumours and individual reactions. But the 
expansion process of the New Army united the power-holders, Janissaries and Janissary 
affiliations against the Porte. Thus, the Edirne Incident of 1806 would be considered as the 
most serious collective challenge which prepared a base for the alignment of anti New 
Order elements in the rebellion of 1807.282 
                                                          
279  According to recognizance defter of November 1792 there are 1110 shops in Eyüp/Topçular district, were monitored 
and due to designitions of the shopowners  %40 of them were military-Janissary affiliates. There are 142 records of 
coffeehouses, 106 rooms of unmarried men (bekar odaları), 50 lodges, 46 fodder-sacks (mutaf dükkanı), 38 barbers and 
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280  Aysel Danacı Yıldız, “Vaka-yı Selimiyye”, 114-155. 
281  Ibid., 115. 
282  Ali Yaycıoğlu, “Provincial Challange”, 318-328. Aysel Danacı Yıldız, “Vaka-yı Selimmiye”, 136-164. 
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Even though there are some noteworthy reactions against New Order like the case 
of Selimiye Mosque Incident in April 1805 and the revolt of Tayyar Mahmud Paşa in 
1804- 1806, the Edirne Incident is the most significant example of popular opposition to 
the New Order283. Despite his struggle intensified against his rival, a well-known New 
Order supporter Cabbarzade Süleyman Bey, Mahmud Tayyar Paşa used the anti New 
Order propaganda to win the support of public. In that sense, anti New Order propaganda 
of Mahmud Tayyar Paşa was basically a maneuver against his rival but not the New Order 
itself. Apart from that, Sultan Selim III‟s attempt of visiting the Friday Prayer Ceremony in 
Selimiye Mosque with the New Order soliders as an honor guard, -which was supposedly 
the traditional role of the Janissaries- caused disturbance among the Janissaries. As 
escorting the Sultan in Friday players was prestigious to the Janissaries‟, they felt their 
privilege was violated. In response, they armed themselves and crossed to Üsküdar, and 
opened fire on the attendants.284  
As for the Edirne Incident during the summer 1806, provincial power-holders and 
the Janissary affiliations in Thracian provinces had the Porte to face with the most serious 
resistance against the New Order.285 The turmoil in Thracian provinces started after 
deployment of 24.000 strong New Army forces, which were accompanied by the cavalry 
units of two great Anatolian families -the Cabbaroğlus (the rival of Mahmud Tayyar Paşa) 
and the Karaosmanoğlus-, under command of Kadı Abdurrahman Paşa over task of 
suppressing the rebelling Serbs. However, the real aim of this move can be considered as 
an attempt of establishing New Army in Rumelia.
 286  
The power-holders and Janissaries as well as local people, did not welcome the 
New Order establishment in their provinces, as this would mean recruitment of new 
soldiers, imposition of new taxes and consolidation of the central authority.287 Actually, it 
was not the first time that the New Army forces were sent to Thracian provinces. Before 
the Edirne Incident of 1806, the New Army forces under the command of Kadı 
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Abdurrahman Paşa fought against the Mountaineer bandits in 1804. During this short 
campaign, the New Army had won minor victories against the bandits and a New Army 
unit was permanently stationed in Çorlu as a measure of protection.288 But this time, the 
attitude of the local elements were rather different as the rumours spread around and 
claimed that the New Order would eradicate the well being of the Janissaries and their 
affiliations. Since majority of the residents were among Janissary affiliations in Edirne, 
establishment of the New Order would mean the diminishing of their privileges. Besides, 
consolidation of the central authority would curb the control of the power-holders on 
economical and military sources.289 
After the arrival of New Army forces to Tekfur Dağı province, agents were sent to 
districts to encourage the population to enroll as solider in the New Army. Furthermore, in 
order to protect the people from possible raids of Mountaineer bandits, agents of the Porte 
were assigned to deliver the edicts of Selim III which subjected local administrators to 
built two New Army barracks between Edirne and Istanbul.290 The first reaction came from 
Tekfur Dağı town. Due to his unwillingness and negative attitude towards the New Army 
presence, the deputy judge (naib) of the Tekfur Dağı was replaced by the Porte. In 
response, people from the lower layers of the town had mutinied, and murdered the newly 
appointed officer. In addition to this, leading figures of town and the local Janissary 
officers had asked the New Army forces to leave the town, to prevent further disorder.  
The New Army forces in Tekfur Dağı withdrawn and set up their camps in 
outskirts of town.291 The Porte ordered the New Army to move into Çorlu and Silivri but 
the situation in these towns was no different than Tekfur Dağı. According to some reports 
of dragomans, there has been a massive mobilization against the New Army under 
command of Dağdevirenoğlu, the ayan of Edirne. The assemblage of the Rebels consisted 
of regular and irregular units of several brigand leaders, provincial Janissaries and the 
forces sent by some other provincial power-holders, including the explicit support of 
Tirsinikli İsmail Ağa of Rusçuk and İsmail Bey of Serez who had also close ties with the 
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Porte.292 Yet more, it was reported that Tepedelenli Ali Paşa contributed the assemblage 
with a symbolic force of his men.293 Furthermore, the British agent in Bucharest claimed 
that 186 local notables from higher and lower layers of the provincial power hierarchy 
signed a pact to resist the New Army and to depose Selim III.294  
It is not that certain whether if there were a pact or plan of deposing the Sultan. 
But the turmoil which evolved to the Edirne Incident should be considered more than a 
mere revolt against the New Army but a civil unrest which united different segments of 
Thracian society against the Porte. Especially, Dağdevirenoğlu‟s anti New Order 
propaganda on townspeople asserted that the New Order would convert them to reaya and 
nothing more than grocery apprentices, appealed the Janissaries and imperial bodyguards 
that were stationed in Thracian provinces.
 
Thus, while the Porte was dealing with the 
problems in Tekfur Dağı province, the Janissaries with the support of the residents and 
local power holders, revolted against the New Army in Edirne.295 
The incident started with the murder of commander of the imperial bodyguards in 
Edirne as he was accused of instituting the New Army secretly, under name of 
“Bostanî”.296 Later on, the events turned into a rebellion, as the residents protested the 
New Order and closed their shops. Even, the legitimacy of the Sultan was challenged as his 
name suspended in Friday Public prayers. According to some rumours, the rebels even 
expressed their intention of marching to the imperial capital.297  
By June 1806, Kadı Abdurrahman Paşa began his march on Rumelia. After 
repelling the raids of rebel irregulars, he reached to Silivri where he did not face with a 
serious resistance.298 Threatened by the military superiority of the Paşa, the rebels sought to 
use new methods of war: Cutting the supplies.  
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The Rebels captured and murdered the purchase agent of the New Army, killed 
the couriers and seized the treasury which was used for provisioning of the New Army. In 
response, Abdurrahman Paşa laid siege on town of Babaeski (Baba-yı Atik) and defeated 
the rebels including forces of Dağdevirenoğlu on the road of Çorlu. In order to feed the 
army, he seized the animals and grain supplies of the town. Later, he proceeded to Silivri. 
Kadı Abdurrahman Paşa intended lay siege on town of Tekfur Dağı to reinforce blockade 
of Rear-Admiral in the sea but he was ordered to retreat to Silivri.   
The Porte did not favor the usage brute force against the rebels as any harsh 
measure would spread the events to the other provinces and risk the existence of the New 
Order Policy.  The negotiations between the Porte and the rebels in Edirne had started. 
Consequently, the New Army was ordered to return to their stations in Anatolia. Thus, the 
Porte‟s attempt of establishing the New Army had failed in Thracian provinces. These 
developments had forced the Porte to adopt new view of warfare to break the resistance of 
the society.
 299 
After the events of Tekfur Dağı, the Porte initiated a series of propaganda 
activities which aimed to explain the benefits and legitimacy of the New Army and other 
reforms in Thracia. More or less, during this time, treatises of Ubeydullah Kuşmani and 
Koca Sekbanbaşi emerged as voice of the Porte. The Porte did not enforce the towns that 
refused to enrollments. Instead, they tried to recruit soldiers from other towns of the region 
over imposing the idea of maintaining the security and protection of inhabitants against the 
attacks of the enemy. Moreover, the Porte had not imposed new taxes as the expenditures 
of the New Army would be covered by the imperial treasury and the recruits would be 
awarded with food and new clothes. Thus, Selim III aimed to portray a compassionate 
Sultan image in Thracian provinces. 300 
Nonetheless, the propaganda of the Porte was not as effective as it was expected. 
The New Army was officially assigned to fight against Serbian rebels not recruiting new 
soldiers in Thracian provinces. But, after the arrival of the New Army to Edirne, we 
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observe that Commander Kadı Abdurrahman Paşa spent more effort on recruiting soldiers, 
rather than reinforcing Belgrade. Presumably the opposing side was well aware of this 
controversial situation which would contribute to their success of winning the public.301  
The weakness of central authority in Thracian provinces was probably another 
reason behind the decision of the Porte. Hence, the Porte might have felt the need to inform 
the public about the New Order. Kadı Abdurrahman Paşa‟s harsh military measures can be 
considered as another reason of failure of the Porte‟s policy. Even though he received 
orders which prohibited usage of brute force, Kadı Abdurrahman Paşa did not hesitate to 
be involved in skirmishes with Rebels and terrorized the towns of Thracia.302 During this 
time, Sultan Selim III made some crucial changes on his cabinet including the post of 
Şeyhülislam. Intensive shifting of officials also may indicate that the Sultan did not found 
proper support from the Ulema and officials.303  
According to Ali Yaycıoğlu, the Edirne Incident can be evaluated as the 
beginning of a larger coalition of provincial elements and New Order antagonists in 
imperial capital. Cited from the reports of British ambassador in Istanbul, Yaycıoğlu 
narrated that Janissary affiliates in Istanbul were following the developments of Edirne 
Incident. Thus, the Porte had to take extra measures to prevent circulation of information 
and closure of coffeehouses which were considered as gossip nests against the New Order.
 
304 
Yet, Yaycıoğlu claims, Selim III mentioned in his orders that a possible defeat of 
New Army in Rumelia would overthrow the New Order and prestige of his Sultanate.305 
This proof clearly indicates opposition against the New Order in Thracian provinces was 
perceived by the Porte as not mere revolt of provincial elements but an overall challenge to 
central authority.306 And presumably, the Porte must have sought ways to prevent the 
expansion of the rebellion, as the empire had already been shaken by the revolts of 
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Serbians, Tepedelenli Ali Paşa and the Mamalouks in Egypt.307 
For our case, the Edirne Incident of 1806 has crucial importance, since the rebels 
presumably from this point on, established an argument to legitimize their cause which 
labels the New Order as an infidel innovation and a violation to order of universe. Same 
arguments would come into view, in legitimisation process of 1807 rebellion as a tool to 
depose Selim III and abolish the New Order. As the Porte, probably was aware of this 
explicit threat to success of the New Order policy and legitimacy of Selim III as a ruler; 
propaganda activities shall be considered as an effort to silence the reactions by explaining 
the needs, benefits and religious legitimacy of the New Order. As the authority of the 
Sultan called into question in the Edirne Incident, theme of “compassionate Sultan” shall 
be regared as Selim III‟s counter efforts for not being labeled as “oppressor”. Hence, the 
legitimacy battle over the New Order can be considered as Selim III‟s efforts of reclaiming 
his sultanic legitimacy by adopting the image of “the renovator of the religion and order”. 
In next parts our discussion will concentrate on this matter. 
The Legitimation Issue of the New Order: Mukabele-i B’il-mis’l versus Bid’at308 
As mentioned before, from his early rule to Edirne Incident, Sultan Selim III had 
taken extensive measures to control the public opinion. Especially after the Edirne 
Incident, the Porte had sought ways to appeal the public by treatises that had been written 
by opinion leaders among the military and the Ilmiye class. According to Kemal Beydilli, 
the texts which were written on the New Order should be categorized into following types: 
1. The works, introducing the New Order to European audience which are namely: Tableau 
des Nouveaux Reglements de l‟Empire Ottoman and Seyid Mustafa‟s Dialtribe sur l‟etat 
actuel de l‟art militaire, du genie, et des sciences. 
2. The works, defending the New Order, aimed to answer the accusations directed on to New 
Army; Dihkakanizade Ubeydullah Kuşmanî‟s Zebîre-i Kuşmâni fî Ta‟rîf-i Nizâm-ı 
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İlhâmî309 and Tokatlı Mustafa Ağa‟s Koca Sekbanbaşi Risalesi (Hulasat-ül Kelam Fi Redd-
İl Avam). 
3. The works, criticizing the New Order and discusses the problems on implementations; 
Ömer Faik‟s Nizam‟ül Atik Fî Bahri Amîk310 
4. The works, written on what should be done regarding the reforms; Mehmed Emin Behic 
Efendi‟s Sevanihü‟l-Levayih311 
Here after, we will focus on treatises which had written to defend the New Order.  
Koca Sekbanbaşi Risalesi is written by a military opinion leader who identifies 
himself as vastly experienced on art of war. The author claims that, the treatise was written 
in 1807, when he was at eighty seven. According to Koca Sekbanbaşi, the rapid changes in 
the world – expressing the military superiority of the European rivals of the Ottoman 
Empire; particularly Russia- obliged the Sultan to form a new and westernized army as the 
traditional corps failed to encounter the enemy.  As war defined as “treachery” by the 
Prophet; in order to defend the well being of the Empire, Muslims shall practice the war 
methods – deceits- of the enemy. Thus, the Sultan had initiated formation of the New 
Army to protect his domains from the enemy threat.312  
The treatise is in four chapters; as the first chapter deals with the establishment of 
the New Army and the reasons behind it. Second chapter is an analysis of current and past 
condition of the traditional corps (asakir-i atika) while the third chapter is written on 
explaining the military exercises that the New Army troops were performing; the fourth 
chapter deal with the issue of the New Treasury. In each part, after creating a list of the 
accusations that attributed to the New Army, the author aimed to disapprove them. The 
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author narrated testimonies of notable figures amongst the military, his own experiences 
and anecdotes to explain the necessity of New Army establishment. Considering the simple 
language of the treatise, presumably the author addressed the Janissaries and their 
affiliations from low layers as an audience.313  
On the other hand Zebîre was written by a well-educated Ulema grandee of a 
Naqshibendi-Mujadiddi background, Ubeydullah Kuşmani, by request of Kadı Abdurrahman Paşa. 
As far as we know, Kuşmani who identifies himself as a wandering “dervish”, probably 
from the Blacksea or Caucasian provinces, that witnessed reign of Sultan Selim III, 
Mustafa IV and Mahmud II. He was a famous and sharp-tongued supporter of the New 
Order as he constantly preached against the Janissaries in mosques.
 314 After the fall of 
Selim III Kethüda Sait Efendi states that, he participated in secret meetings which regarded 
the re-establishment of trained soldiers. Even after the Sekban-ı Cedid establishment of 
Alemdar Mustafa Paşa which ended with another Janissary revolt, he was aggressively 
criticizing the Janissaries in his public preaches. As a result of his negative attitude, in one 
night of Ramadan he was attacked by odabaşi of 7th regiment.315  Soon after, presumably 
due to his opposition to the Janissaries and Janissary affiliates in the government, he was 
banished for a short time in 1808.316  
Ubeydullah Kuşmani followed the same pattern as Koca Sekbanbaşi used in his 
treatise. In each part of the treatise, the author listed the accusations that thrown the New 
Order and aimed to justify the efforts of the Porte by referring to hadiths of Prophet 
Mohammed and verses of Quran.317 He based his arguments on “rule of reprisal”.318 
Referring to the hadith which defined the war as “treachery”, Muslims were obliged to use 
the weapons of infidel enemy. Thus, Ubeydullah Kuşmani considers “the New Army” as a 
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necessity to prevail over the enemy in Holy War. The explicit religious content and 
sophisticated language of treatise indicate that, Zebire was presumably addressed to the 
Ilmiye members, particularly high rank members of the Ulema hierarchy. By that time, the 
Porte must have felt the need of Ulema support to win the public. Hence, Ubeydullah 
Kuşmani was employed to create religious legitimisation basis for the New Order.  
The treatise of Kuşmani, constituted of an introduction, two articles and a 
conclusion which was written in a sermon-type.319 The introduction of Zebire starts with 
the succession of Selim III to throne. In this part, the author developed a religio-intellectual 
argument which positioned Selim III as “renovator of religion and faith” that sent by God 
to restore the order of the Islam. In the first article, the author commented on accusations 
which were attributed to the uniforms and instruments of the New Army.320 The second 
article is more like a moral preach which Kuşmani, relentlessly criticized opposition to the 
New Order, and the Janissary affiliations over their Bektashi identity.321 In the conclusion, 
the author supported his main argument by referring to religious scholars.322 In next part, to 
understand the legitimisation arguments which were built by the Porte we will to discuss 
the content of the treatises of Koca Sekbanbaşi and Ubeydullah Kuşmani. 
Treatise of Koca Sekbanbaşı  
In the beginning of his treatise, Koca Sekbanbaşi underlines the Sultan‟s duty of 
protecting his domains against the attacks of infidel enemies and presents an atmosphere of 
fear which is related to the evil designs of the enemy. Thus, the author states that a ruler 
must be cautious and the army must be prepared for the maneuvers of the enemy. As a 
result of being unprepared, the Ottoman army had suffered continuous defeats in the hands 
Russians since 1768.323 In this atmosphere of fear and threat, due to their unwillingness to 
perform military trainings and their involvement in commerce, the Janissaries are unable to 
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encounter the enemy.324  
In order to emphasise the ineffectiveness of the Janissaries, the author blames the 
non-military elements within the structure of the corps. Even though the Sultan had 
initiated the New Army to have well-disciplined and stationary troops, those grocers, 
boatmen, porters, fishermen etc, who had no proper military knowledge criticize the Sultan 
and newly formed army in coffeehouses and barber shops. The author indicates the 
negative attitude of the Janissaries towards the New Army as a violation of the state order. 
He refers to strict measures of Süleyman I, as he cut the tongues of the antagonists who 
spoke against him in coffeehouses. To him, opposing to the New Army is a “wrongdoing” 
and “refusing the will of God”.325  
By giving such example, Koca Sekbanbaşi criticizes the “order” of the Janissary 
corps. Thus, he emphasises, the New Army establishment as a necessity that would solve 
the problem of disciplined troops. Probably, the author must be aware of the antagonist 
arguments which praised success of the Janissaries in the Golden Age. In that sense, the 
example of Suleyman I presumably aimed to underline the discipline issue.326   
From this point on to the second chapter, the author provided answers for the 
critiques of the New Army. First issue is if the New Army violated the order of the 
universe. According to this assertion, as the New Army violated the order, the Mountaineer 
bandits have appeared as a divine punishment.327 To answer, Koca Sekbanbaşi claims that 
such problems would emerge if there is no regular, well-disciplined and stationary military 
force.328 After this part, Koca Sekbanbaşi concentrates on the Russian threat and underlines 
the defensive weaknesses of the Imperial capital. As it was cited by the Prophet a ruler is 
entrusted with a task of protecting his domains from the evil designs of the infidels. To 
Koca Sekbanbaşi, by establishing the New Army Sultan Selim III had fulfilled his task as a 
ruler. In addition, he signifies each the New Army regiment had accompanied with an 
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imam as they are soldiers of Islam.329  
In the next part, Koca Sekbanbaşi answers; whether if there is a need to the New 
Army as the Ottoman army conquered the Christian lands by sword.330 In response, the 
author answers the issue over the establishment of Janissary Corps: After series of defeats, 
Sultan Süleyman I formed Janissary corps as it was necessary for the state to have trained 
and well-disciplined army.  The Janissaries were subjected to regular military training like 
the New Army troops and issued with new uniforms and military weapons. Thus, the 
Janissaries became successful in the battlefield. Consequently, overwhelmed by the 
Ottoman military superiority, the European rivals of the empire had new methods of war 
and effective artillery corps to prevail in the battlefield. 331  
According to Y. Hakan Erdem, a man of knowledge and experience like Koca 
Sekbanbaşi probably knew that the Janissary corps was not established by Sultan 
Suleyman I.332 Mert Sunar argued that ordinary Janissaries of the seventeenth and the 
eighteenth century considered sultan Suleyman I as a founder of their corps.333 As it was 
cited by Aysel Danacı-Yıldız, presumably Koca Sekbanbaşi aimed to demonstrate even a 
great Sultan could be defeated if he did not have a regular and well-disciplined army.334.  
Up to this point, Koca Sekbanbaşi illustrated an atmosphere of fear. He 
summarized the problems of the Janissary corps: The first problem is the non military 
elements within the corps. Second problem is the soldiers‟ unwillingness of performing 
military exercises. Third problem is their poor performance in the battlefield. Furthermore, 
they have opposed to the order of their ruler. And, in order to defend the New Order, he 
develops an argument which positions Selim III as a “renovator of the order” and the New 
Army as a precaution against the evil designs of the enemy. In  
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In the next part, the author signifies that, defeated by the Ottomans, European 
kings had withdrawn their soldiers from commercial life and subjected them to regular 
military exercises. Thus, they raised an army consisted of effective artillery corps and 
gunmen. As the Janissaries lacked the discipline and military capability of the infidel 
enemy, they had been defeated in the battlefield. They arrogantly claim that the enemy 
would be defeated by the sword. But in the military campaigns, they create unrest in army 
camp for their wages and rations (tayın) and deserted the battlefield in military encounters. 
Moreover, Koca Sekbanbaşi accuses them for looting Muslims and Reaya, insulting 
women and disobeying the orders of the Sultan. Disobedience of the Janissaries stated by 
author as a reason of Russian expedition of Crimea as well as loses of other strategic 
frontiers in Danube.335  
During the sultanate of Selim III, the loss of Crimea, a Muslim province by 
population, had caused major trauma in Ottoman society. By expressing such manner, 
Koca Sekbanbaşi offers an alternative reasoning, regarding the loss of Crimea that justifies 
the Sultan for being incapable of defending the Muslim provinces against. Thus, Selim III 
appears as a proper ruler who is having the necessary measures for the well being of his 
empire whose success undermined by the reaction of the Janissaries. Yet, he even argues if 
this attitude of the Janissaries is treason to religion and state.336 
Furthermore, he pays attention to battle skills of the New Army troops which was 
also praised by the Janissaries.337 The most significant example for this issue is the 
confession of Cezzar Ahmed Paşa who impressed by success of New Army troops against 
the French in Egypt and Alexandria. According to author, the Paşa himself admitted that he 
did not approve the New Army establishment until he saw its success against the French.338 
After this part, particular examples regarding clumsiness of the Janissaries in the battlefield 
were listed by the author. Yet more, he also claims that a single trained troop of the enemy 
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is equal to a hundred of Janissaries.339  
The second chapter of the treatise aimed to explain the organization of the New 
Army. Koca Sekbanbaşi praises the discipline of New Army troops that is related to the 
new training programe which the Janissaries called “the infidel innovation”. The discipline 
issue, in the second chapter associated with the organization of the New Army. The author 
defends the military training methods, regimental formation, musical instruments and the 
uniforms of the New Army.340  He comments on the issue of the privileges and payrolls of 
the Janissaries.341 According to the author, the New Army would not obliterate the 
Janissary corps. These are just “useless doubts” of the Janissaries.342 Apart from that, in the 
end of the second chapter; he narrates a dialogue regarding a discussion between him and a 
notable among Janissaries: 
Koca Sekbanbaşi asks what should be done to defeat the enemy. The answer he 
received is, as the Janissaries are truly qualified soldiers, there should be re-enrollment to 
dismiss the Persians, Turcoman and Kurdish thieves and other converts among the corps. 
The new recruits should be trained with sword as it is a weapon of a true soldier. Koca 
Sekbanbaşi claims that it is not possible to complete such re-enrollment even in one 
hundred and fifty years. In addition, he claims that there is no need to re-enroll the 
Janissary corps as the Sultan had already enrolled new troops that perform military 
practices with cannons and guns. Thus, the answer of Koca Sekbanbaşi convinces the 
Janissary notable. The notable says, if the Janissaries would obey the order of Sultan 
(which subjects them to perform regular military exercises) there would be no need to the 
New Army.343 Even though, Koca Sekbanbaşi refuses the idea that the New Army is not an 
attempt to replace Janissary corps; this dialog implicitly positions the New Army as an 
alternative of the latter. 
 For the issues of military uniforms and organization of the New Army, the author 
signifies the stationary functions of the New Army. The uniforms would prevent desertion 
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and intrudes of enemy spies.344  He asserts that even if a soldier in uniform deserts his 
station, his officers would easily notice him outside the camp.345 Furthermore, on issue of 
instruments and banners; he explains the formation of New Army regiments and their 
organization in army camp. He underlines that the uniforms and regimental system of the 
New Army was key of their success against Mountaineers.346 These examples clearly 
demonstrate that, Koca Sekbanbaşi‟s approach stressed organizational functions of the 
New Army to silence the reactions of the Janissaries.347  
As for the weapon issue, he narrates a story about Ali the Great Imam, who was 
outmaneuvered by his infidel enemy who brought more man and equipped with extra 
weapons. In the end, Ali uses the weapons of his enemy for not to be defeated.348 
Consequently, this story refers to religious legitimacy of using the weapons of infidel 
enemy. Another issue which Koca Sekbanbaşi mentioned is the taxes on alcoholic 
beverages (zecriye). The author narrates comments of a certain Janissary who was assigned 
as “collector of taxes on alcoholic beverages” with a respectable salary.349 The third part of 
the treatise deals with the methods of military training which New Army Troops subjected 
to perform regularly. In the third chapter, Koca Sekbanbaşi admires Russian military 
superiority350 and once more comments on the case of spies.351 He relies on his personal 
experiences on his captivity and gives brief information about modernization of Russian 
army.352 Thus, he may have aimed to draw attention of reader to necessity of technical 
borrowings from Europe.353The last chapter of the treatise is about the New Treasury and 
its functions.354 A striking comment of the author expresses the complex structure of the 
New Treasury. According to him, it is not possible to explain what the New Treasury is to 
those who do not know how to read and write. However, he tries to explain the purpose 
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and the structure of the New Treasury over giving examples from the golden era by 
referring to regulations on the treasury of the greatest Sultan Suleiman I.355 
To conclude, treatise of Koca Sekbanbaşi offers insights of an old and wise 
member of the Janissary corps regarding the New Order regulations, to his “comrades”. 
The weaknesses of the Janissary corps, evil designs of the enemy, and effectiveness of the 
New Army on the battlefield constituted the content of the text. Apart from that, the 
treatise could be considered as a text to be read on public spaces like coffeehouses as 
anecdotes and stories would seem to be designed for the audience from lower layers of 
Ottoman society. Even the author himself, gives clues about his “audience” as he 
frequently mentioned their lack of knowledge and ignorance –typical palace centered 
view- while explaining the issues.  
The Janissaries were depicted as a manipulated and misinformed group as the 
corps is full of incapable people and non-military elements. However, it is not clear who or 
what manipulated or misinformed the Janissaries. On the other hand, Selim III is portrayed 
as compassionate, determined and a capable ruler who had taken necessary military 
measures to protect his domains from the attacks of the infidel enemy. Apart from their 
religious affiliations, Koca Sekbanbaşi criticizes anything related to the Janissary corps. 
This is very important, since the author does not focus on religion as a primary source of 
legitimacy. Ubeydullah Kuşmani, on that other hand, addressed a different audience with a 
more sophisticated religio-intellectual argument.  
Tretise of Ubeydullah Kuşmani 
Kuşmani‟s Zebire starts with the definition of New Order. According to the 
author; the New Order is “the arrangements blessed by God” (tertibât-ı nusret-medâr) and 
“regulations of upcoming glories” (tanzîmât-ı fütûhat-intizâr) for protecting the Islam. 
(hamiyet-i islamiye ve gayret-i imaniyye). In the introduction, the author declares his aim 
of writing his treatise which is silencing those who spoke against New Order and help the 
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expansion of the New Army establishment.356 Kuşmani‟s New Order defence, based on a 
pattern which illustrates Selim III as a renovator of religion (müceddid) who is sent by God 
to restore the order of universe. The author underlines ineffectiveness of the Janissaries in 
the battlefield which was considered as a result of wrongdoings of their superior officers. 
In addition to, he describes the corps as morally and substantively exhausted. In this 
pattern, he as war is defined as a “treachery”, the Janissaries had been outmanoeuvred in 
the battlefield by deceit methods of the infidel enemies.357 Indeed, well-organized and 
disciplined army of the infidels could not be repelled by the Janissaries that refuse to 
exercise the military methods of enemy. Hence, as “rule of reprisal” obliges, Sultan Selim 
III, had decided to found a new and western style army with the approval of the high rank 
members of Ulema for the sake of the Islam world and to have vengeance for former 
defeats. As pattern of Kuşmani positions the Sultan as the chief imam, all of the Muslims 
should obey his grand order (ul-ül‟emr) to prevail against infidels in Holy War (cihad).358  
To put it briefly, by positioning the New Order as a religious duty, which was 
expressed by the Prophet over “rule of reprisal” and the Sultan as a renovator of religion, 
Kuşmani provides a legitimate religious basis for the policies of the Porte. Thus, in 
religious context, his interpretation allows him to label any opposition to the New Order as 
blasphemy. 
The key issues which the author deals with in the introduction are: 
- The legitimacy of Selim III as a ruler and provides religious validity to his efforts. 
- The Janissaries‟ ineffectiveness to meet the military expectations of the State. 
- The necessity of obeying the order of the Sultan and the condition of high-rank 
members of Ulema.359 
Kuşmani heavily criticises the antagonists by describing them as “numbs” who 
question the grand order of their Sultan. According to him, as was cited by the Prophet, the 
                                                          
356  Ubeydullah Kuşmani, “Zebire”, önsöz 4-9. 
357  Ibid., 4. 
358  Ibid. 
 89 
 
 
subjects must be patient with the orders of their ruler.360 Even though, he admits that the 
New Army is formed in a western style, he rejects accusations of the antagonists which 
labelled it as an infidel innovation. He reveals the aim of the New Army, which was to 
defeat the infidel enemy as commanded by God.361 He depicts the antagonists as “pseudo-
soldiers” that were ignorant, arrogant and lazy vagrants who deserted their stations doing 
nothing but getting drunk in taverns. He continues, as their hearts were full of sedition and 
wrongdoing, they had followed the path of liars. Thus, by opposing the New Order, they 
were rejecting the will of God and should have been put to death as they were no different 
from infidels.362  
Kuşmani adapted very supercilious attitude towards the Janissaries and frequently 
condemns them. According to him, the real threat to religion and the state were the 
Janissary corps that embodied vile people from lower layers.363 Furthermore, Kuşmani 
directs his accusations against members of the Ulema and officials that opposed to the New 
Order 364 He attempts to disprove the counterclaim of the antagonists which refers to the 
elderly scholars of Islam. According to that claim, as there was no solid example of 
approving any such initiative in decisions of the elderly scholars; the New Order is 
religiously invalid. In order to reply, Kuşmani directly refers to the Quran and describes 
those scholars as being incapable.365 He advised wise members of the Ulema to stand for 
the Sultan and support the New Order through informing the people in public speeches. To 
support his claim, he refers to the “punishment of people of Lot”; to emphasise his point 
that the victory of a Holy War requires more than devotion to daily religious duties.366  
At this point one wonders whether the pattern of Kuşmani was designed to appeal 
to the members of the Ulema. The religious content of the treatise clearly signifies that the 
Porte might have aimed to address Sunni-Orthodox affiliations within Ottoman society. 
Considering the Porte‟s efforts to win the public‟s approval by explaining the benefits of 
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the New Order by the Edirne Incident of 1806, and by seeking support of the Ulema, the 
Porte might have aimed to enhance its influence on layers of Ottoman society that were 
under effect of anti-New Order propaganda. Nevertheless, proving such a claim requires 
focusing on the network of relations of the high ranking Ulema and the officials in the 
provinces. What is certain is that the Porte addressed the treatise of Kuşmani to members 
of Ilmiye. 
In the first part, Kuşmani, deals with the religious validity of the establishment the 
New Army, their uniforms and instruments. In the beginning of this part, Kuşmani 
responds to the accusations of the antagonists who considered the New Army as unholy 
(pîrsiz). According to that claim, unlike the New Army the Janissary corps were blessed by 
the patron saint (pîr)  Hacı Bektaş Veli. Moreover, they portrayed the troops as being 
“unbelievers” as they dressed in the uniforms of the Franks, performed infidel military 
methods and used infidel instruments.367 Kuşmani refers to these accusations as proof of 
ignorance. He asserts that tranpete is equal to the instruments which had been used by 
Arabs and Persians in war.368 As for the uniform issue, he describes the uniforms of the 
New Army as the clothes of proper soldiers which presumably points out the non military 
elements among the Janissaries. He adds, if proper clothing was a requirement of being a 
proper soldier it should have been possible to raise five million soldiers in the imperial 
capital.369 Therefore, being a proper solider depended on adjusting to training and warfare 
methods which the New Army troops were performing.370 
In the last part, the author focuses on education (maarif) and discipline (terbiye) 
of the New Army troops which were represented as key issues of having a successful 
standing army.371 Apart from that, Kuşmani tries to invalidate the Janissary belief which 
considered Hacı Bektaş Veli as founder of the corps.372 Moreover, he argues that the 
Janissaries should not be considered as followers of Hacı Bektaş Veli as they lacked proper 
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faith373 and condemns them as being “heathens” by expressing their extreme care for their 
cauldrons.374 
To conclude, the assertions of Kuşmani to defend the New Army were principally 
based on disproving the Janissary claims that illustrated the New Army as “bid‟at”. In 
order to support his interpretations, Kuşmani frequently attacks on moral corruption 
grounds of the Janissary corps by labelling them as plunderers, deserters and in a broader 
context as “heathens”. The following example clearly demonstrates his point of view that 
refers to a Quranic verse: 
“Those of you and what you worshipped are the combustibles of hell”375 
In addition to this, he expresses the State‟s need for educated and disciplined 
soldiers, which was illustrated as a religious obligation, in a Holy War against infidels. He 
narrated the reactions of the Sekbans when the Janissary corps was founded to emphasise 
the righteousness of the New Order policies.376 Thus, he concludes the New Army 
establishment was a necessity for the sake of the Empire which is another episode of the 
restoration of the order after the establishment of the Janissary corps. According to 
Kuşmani, over time war methods change, the glorious days of the Janissary corps had 
ended. Even if the Janissaries had been given the “sword of God” (Zülfikar), they would 
not have been able to prevail over the enemy.377 
The author mentions the necessary changes which should have been made to 
restore the order, he praises the leadership of the Sultan who anticipated the needs for the 
protection of Muslims. According to this claim, the order of the universe was violated, as 
the previous rulers had neglected enemy threat. Hence, the Janissaries became useless 
lacking proper training and discipline.378 In that manner, the anticipation of Selim III is 
represented as a necessity to renovate the order. As they were well trained, the New Army 
troops performed with devotion for the belief that they had been successful against the 
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French in Egypt.379  
As France was considered the most dominant military power of the Europe, the 
author evaluates the modesty of the French troops as a key to their success; which would 
also be an implicit criticism towards the undisciplined Janissaries. This comparison 
between the French and the New Army leads us to conclude that by having proper military 
training, the New Army troops were able to be successful in defending the Muslims. In the 
end, he accepts Selim III‟s efforts to obligate a religious duty in war, as was approved by 
the high-ranking members of the Ulema hierarchy.380 Thus, Selim III is praised and the 
Sultan‟s legitimacy and capability as a ruler is reiterated by the author.381 
The last part deals with the issue of moral corruption. The author condemns the 
Janissaries‟ habits of drinking coffee, smoking tobacco and using narcotics. 382 This point 
clearly indicates that Kuşmani‟s disapproval of the Janissary claims he relied on exposure 
of irreligious actions of the antagonists. In that sense, the Bektashi identity of the 
Janissaries probably provided Kuşmani with a proper basis to develop an argument which 
would turn the Sunni-Orthodox affiliations of the Empire against them. Kuşmani„s 
objective was to bring light on the Bektashi affiliations of the Janissaries which would be 
considered a means of disproving the accusations which labelled the New Order as 
“bi‟dat”. Obviously in Zebire, Kuşmani developed an intellectual-religious basis for the 
New Order policy of the Porte which needed the support of higher and lower layers of the 
Ottoman society. 
To conclude, it is obvious that the propaganda efforts of the Porte concentrated on 
two topics: The first topic is to explain the benefits and necessity of the New Order 
regulations to the lower layers of the military. For this purpose, Koca Sekbanbaşi was 
employed to write a text which targeted the Janissaries and Janissary affiliations through 
the interpretations of a respectable figure among them. In order to emphasise the continuity 
between Zebire of Ubeydullah Kuşmani, and the texts which were written for the purpose 
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of legitimising the abolishment of the Janissaries, it is necessary to focus on the analysis of 
Fezleke-i Kuşmani to analyse the author‟s view of the 1807 rebellion. 
Fezleke-i Nasihat-ı Kuşmânî: Creation of Enemy of State and Religion: Rebellion of 
1807 
Between late May and June of 1807, the imperial capital had witnessed a popular 
uprising which resulted in the dethronement of Selim III and fall of the New Order. In four 
days, the protests of yamaks who were stationed in the citadels of the Bosphorus turned 
into a popular Janissary rebellion. Leading up to the outbreak of the rebellion, two 
important topics occupied the political agenda of the Porte; namely, the 1806-1807 Russo-
Ottoman war, and the British Expedition of Dardanelles that terrorised imperial capital in 
1807.383  
The Russo-Ottoman war of 1806 started with the Russian invasion of Danubian 
principalities of Wallachia and Moldovia. During the heyday of Edirne Incident, the Porte 
announced the deposition of hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia, without the approval 
of Russia, for being collaborated with rebels in Edirne and Serbia. As the deposed 
hospodars were appointed to their posts with common agreement of Russia and Ottoman 
Empire, the decision of the Porte was protested harshly against by the Russia, and later by 
England. The importance of the Russo-Ottoman war of 1806 for our study is due to the 
success of Alemdar Mustafa Ağa the ayan of Rusçuk, on Danubian front, who would 
elevate Mahmud II to the Ottoman throne in 1808. He had appeared as a new performer in 
the Ottoman history. During the 1806-1807 war, a former Janissary Alemdar Mustafa Ağa 
had become the most powerful notable of Rumelia, as a result of the elimination of 
Pazvantoğlu and Tirsinikli İsmail Efendi, and was given the rank of “Pasha” for his 
success against Russians.384 
On the other hand, the Porte‟s declaration of war on Russia was a total 
disappointment for Great Britain as they considered this move as an outcome of French 
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influence. Moreover, as a possible aggression with the Ottoman Empire would threaten the 
security of the trade route to India, British foreign policy was based on providing the 
neutrality in the Ottoman Empire.385 Nevertheless, after the declaration of war, diplomatic 
protest of the British ambassador turned into a political crisis which resulted in a naval 
expedition in the Dardanelles. In February 1807, a British fleet under command of Admiral 
Duckworth passed the Dardanelles and anchored close to the Prince Islands in the 
Bosphorus.386 The British threat created tremendous anxiety and panic in the imperial 
capital. After ten days of negotiations with British commander and ambassador, the British 
fleet left the imperial capital without any military conflict.387 The tension which struck the 
imperial capital for ten days and massive mobilisation of inhabitants created a conditions 
for the coming rebellion in May. During the mobilisation of the Janissaries and mariners 
(kalyoncus) the conflicts among different Army units had become apparent. It is also the 
reason why the yamaks from the Black Sea were brought to citadels of the Bosphorus to 
reinforce the defence of the city.388 The rebellion of 1807 shall be interpreted as 
culmination of anti-New Order movement which had challenged the Porte in Tayyar 
Mahmud Paşa revolt and in the Edirne Incident before.389  
Turmoil had started with a protest by the yamaks who were deployed in Rumeli 
Feneri Citadel. Presumably, presence of the New Army troops in citadels on the Bosphorus 
should be considered as the main cause of yamak disturbance which was also echoed in 
rumours as they were forced by their superiors to wear New Army uniforms.390 The 
majority of the contemporary sources claim that, the uniform issue was the main reason of 
the rebellion. However, there is no solid evidence to support this claim. What is certain is 
that during the British naval expedition, some of the New Army troops had been deployed 
together with the yamaks at the forts on the Bosphorus, Istanbul. According to Aysel 
Danacı, Selim III had issued an order to move the New Army troops back to their barracks 
in Levend Çiftligi to prevent a possible dispute.391 Apparently, presence of the New Order 
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troops in the citadels was interpreted by the yamaks as an rising attempt of transforming 
them into the New Army troops. 
The yamaks at Rumeli Hisarı Citadel who expressed their opposition to become 
New Army soldiers were summoned by their officers to a meeting on 25
th
 of May 1807. 
During the meeting, some disputes turned into a gunfight and a certain Hasan Haseki, an 
artillery officer, was murdered by yamaks; this triggered the rebellion.392 Later on, united 
with their comrades in the other citadels, yamaks murdered an intendant of the Bosphorus, 
Mahmud Raif Efendi, a notable of the New Order grandee along with his servant. The 
news of the murder of Mahmud Raif Efendi reached the city by late afternoon which 
caused the anxiety of the Ottoman officials.393  
On the second day of the rebellion, prominent figures of the Ottoman 
administration such as Kaymakam of Istanbul; Köse Musa Paşa, Kethüda Nesim Efendi, as 
well as certain representatives of the Janissary corps gathered to discuss measures to 
prevent a proliferation of the rebellion as rumours circulating among inhabitants claimed 
that the yamaks intended to march into the city. Even though they decided to dispatch 
delegates to the rebels, this attempt failed as the members of the delegates presumably 
hesitated to go the rebel camp.394  
The yamaks who organised themselves in their camp in Büyükdere started their 
march which would take three days to the imperial city by following the route of the 
Bosphorus shore. In their camp, they elected Kabakçıoğlu Mustafa Çavus as their 
spokesman, and took an oath of putting an end to the New Order desecration and not 
harming the public. Since they needed the support of the inhabitants of Istanbul, they were 
cautious about the discipline of the group. During their march, they unfurled their banners 
and invited Muslims to join their cause. They assured the security of the inhabitants as they 
were not plunderers and thieves; they wanted to punish those who violated the order. They 
expressed their ultimate aim of abolishing the New Order. Moreover they also encouraged 
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the inhabitants to open their shops and go about with their daily routine.395 The rebels 
paused around Ortaköy to ensure the support of the artillerymen that were deployed in 
Tophane. They sent a delegation to the artillerymen to convince them to join their cause. 
After the negotiations between two groups, the artillerymen decided to join the yamaks. 
On May 27, the crowd reached Istanbul where they gathered at Et Meydanı. At 
this stage, people from the different elements of the imperial capital and different corps of 
the army had merged with the yamaks who were seeking to gain the support of the 
Janissaries. The rebels sent their representatives to commercial districts of the imperial 
capital to invite Muslims to join their cause and advised non-Muslims to continue daily 
trade. Besides they purchased weapons and then made their way to Divan Yolu; the 
traditional rebel route to Et Meydanı.396 While in the commercial districts, some of their 
men were punished for disobeying the discipline issue.397 Later on, the crowd gained access 
to Et Meydanı where they merged with the Janissaries. The protest of yamaks turned into a 
massive pro-Janissary rebellion.398 Meanwhile, ruling elites were discussing the measures 
needed against the rebels. Although there were some suggestions of using the New Order 
troops against the rebels, the elites finally agreed on dispatching a delegate of Ulema to ask 
the rebels terms.399 
On the fourth day, the rebels were visited by the delegation of Ulema; Şeyülislam 
Ataullah Efendi, Anadolu Kadıaskeri Efendizade Hafid Efendi, Rumeli Kazaskeri Ahmed 
Muhtar Efendi  and Istanbul Kadısı Muradzâde Mehmet Murat Efendi.400 This meeting 
should be regarded as preparation of the execution list. The rebels accompanied the 
members of the delegation with a great respect, since the legitimacy of their cause was 
dependent on the approval of the Ulema.401 Soon after, the Ulema delegates and the rebels 
agreed on the execution of eleven names and the list was submitted to Sultan Selim III.402 
During the day, most of the officials were either murdered or exiled. The New Army was 
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annulled and the property of the New Order grandees confiscated.403 
On the final day of the rebellion, the most radical decision of the rebels was 
realised; the dethronement of the Selim III. The deposition fatwa of the Şeyülislam 
Ataullah Efendi declared Selim III as an unjust ruler who oppressed his own subjects.404 
Thus, the rebels legitimised their cause as the fatwa of Şeyhülislam basically declared them 
as extinguishers of the unjust order of Selim III. The main stage of the rebellion of 1807 
ended with the enthronement ceremony of Sultan Mustafa IV on May 30, of 1807. 
However, the internal strife in the Ottoman Empire would continue since the new 
government immediately failed to establish its authority in the imperial capital and in the 
provinces.  
The rebellion of 1807 can be evaluated within the context of internal power strife 
between different power groups that competed for power within the establishment of the 
Ottoman administration. The pretext of decisions, which provided legality and religious 
legitimacy to the rebellion of 1807, were based on moral corruptions of the New Order 
grandees and the Sultan‟s oppression to his own subjects through establishing infidel 
innovations. Although there is no consensus between the contemporary sources on reasons 
and righteousness of the rebellion, the majority of sources agree on the New Order 
Grandees‟ lavish and corrupt image which assumedly helped the rebels to gain support of 
the public.405 The rebels organised themselves in a collective manner and decisions were 
made after much deliberation. Their prudence to maintain the peace and order in the city 
was one the key elements of winning the public. 
In the first and second chapters, this study focuses on case analysis of the 
rebellions in contemporary sources to demonstrate the view of the authors and roles which 
had been attributed to the elements of the events, namely: the sultan, the rebels, the Ulema, 
the administration, and the artisans. The basic reasons for the rebellions of 1703, 1730 and 
1807 were different. However, there were similar circumstances, such as: opposition to a 
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certain leading figure or institution which unites different elements of society under same 
cause - the catalyst of this unification or realignment is the Janissary corps -, seeking 
legitimisation over a claim of restoring the order by deposing the unjust Sultan who 
oppresses his subjects.406  
At this point, it would be necessary to emphasise that the continuity between the 
textual arguments from 1703 to 1826 differ after 1807. Since the abolishment of the 
Janissaries also brought closure to the Bektashi Order, the Porte labelled the Janissaries as 
“enemy of state and religion” which might indicate grandees of Mahmud II may have 
followed the pattern of Ubeydullah Kuşmani. Hence, at this point, in order to understand a 
possible continuity among Zebire, Üssi-i Zafer and Gülzar-ı Fütuhat, we have to take a 
close look at Fezleke-i Kuşmani and his perception of the rebellion. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE FINAL STRUGGLE: ABOLISHMENT OF THE JANISSARIES 
Early Reign of Mahmud II: 1806-1826 
The period between “the Alemdar Incident” and the abolishment of the Janissaries 
witnessed Mahmud II‟s relentless campaign to expand his royal influence on the provincial 
power-holders, the central government itself, the military units and the Ulema. Mahmud II 
used every method to consolidate his authority over the Ayans, the Janissaries and other 
military units such as the Artillery units, the Canonniers and the naval corps. In the early 
reign of Mahmud II, the Porte had to struggle against Russia on the region covering the 
Danube, rebelling Serbs and Greeks in Rumelia, and other rebellious local elements both 
on the eastern and western provinces. According to Avigdor Levy, Mahmud II‟s efforts 
had concentrated on three main fields from 1806 to 1826: 
- Re-establishing the central authority over power-holders. 
- Consolidating his personal control over the central government. 
- Strengthening the overall defence of the state, due to external enemy threat.407 
The war against Russians in the Danube had resolved with the signing of a treaty in 
Bucharest in 1812. Later on, as the Russia‟s military agenda was being dissolved by the 
Napoleonic Wars, the Porte had found an opportunity of turning its attention to the internal 
issues. The rebelling Serbs laid down their arms in 1817 as they were granted limited 
autonomous rule.408 The Wahhabi rebellion in Arab provinces, which severely damaged 
Selim III‟s public image, were suppressed by the forces of Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşa, the 
governor of Egypt. The occupied Holy cities of Mecca and Medina were reconquered in 
1813 but the quash of the rebels took five more years.409 
In order to re-establish the central authority, the Porte took strict measures to 
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increase the number of loyal officers in the provinces. During this time, there had been a 
gradual shifting in the number of officials appointed in the provinces. The power of 
prominent families, who held the control of the provinces, was broken by the Sultan. By 
1820, a large majority of the Porte had consolidated its authority over large parts of Rumeli 
and most of Anatolia.410 The Porte spent a lot of effort on eliminating the semi-independent 
governor, Tepedelenli Ali Paşa, who had established his authority in the Greek and 
Albanian provinces. Tepedelenli Ali Paşa accepted the Porte‟s superiority in 1819 and was 
executed in 1822.  
However, the elimination of Tepedelenli Ali Paşa had triggered a rather bigger 
problem; the Greek Rebellion of 1822.411 With the help of the modernised army of Kavalalı 
Mehmed Ali Paşa, the Porte managed to suppress the rebellion.412 By 1826, Mahmud II 
managed to establish his direct control over the provinces and financial resources in 
Rumelia and Anatolia. According to Howard Reed, Mahmud II had something of a secret 
agenda to break the power of the Janissaries. Between 1806 and 1821, Mahmud II subdued 
the Janissary strongholds such as in Aleppo, Crete and Thessaloniki. This condition was 
interpreted by Reed as Mahmud II‟s preparation for the destruction of Janissaries.413 
In order to consolidate his authority in the central government, Mahmud II sought 
ways to build loyal cadres within the high ranks of the administration and the military. 
From 1806 to 1826, the post of Grand Vizierate had been granted to Halet Efendi, Deli 
Abdullah Paşa, Silahdar Ali Paşa, Benderli Selim Paşa and Hasan Ağa Paşa. The method 
of Mahmud II was simple; if the candidate‟s loyalty was under suspicion, he would be 
replaced immediately. Thus, the Sultan filled the ranks of the administration with his most 
trusted men that pledged unquestionable loyalty. 414 Apart from that, between 1808 and 
1822 Mahmud II changed the Janissary commanders seventeen times. By 1826, there were 
twenty-six living ex-Janissary commanders.
 415 The gradual shift of the officers in the 
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military depended on a principle of expanding his authority over the military units without 
touching the institutional status quo.416  
Extra attention was paid to the units of the artillery and the canon and canon-wagon 
corps. The numbers of these elite unities were increased. The corps were equipped with 
modern weapons and their salaries were raised.417 The Sultan favoured these units with 
special care as he was even accompanied by the artillerymen in the opening ceremony of 
Nusret Mosque in April of 1826. Traditionally, the Janissaries were the guardian of honour 
to the Sultan. As a sign of prestige, they escorted the Sultan on his right side. During the 
ceremony, Mahmud II kept the artillerymen on his right and the Janissaries on his left side. 
Yet, he saluted the artillerymen but ignored the Janissaries.418 Assumedly, the Sultan‟s 
attitude was considered as an insult to the Janissaries but they did not react in the same 
way as they had done after the Selimiye Mosque Incident.  
After the Greek Rebellion of 1822, the naval corps were also re-organised. The 
Porte needed to recruit Muslim sailors from the Anatolian and Northern African provinces, 
as well as some Christian troops from the Danube provinces to replace the Greeks in the 
navy.419 The fortification stronghold of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles were strengthened 
and the imperial arsenal was ameliorated as the Porte purchased new and modern fire arms, 
stored at Topkapı Palace.420 By spring of 1826, these elite units of the army corps were 
filled with the loyal troops and officers of Mahmud II.421 
In spite of the determinant efforts of Mahmud II, the Porte was not able to 
neutralise “the Janissary disorder”. In 1810, there was a dispute among the Sultan, the 
Janissaries and the Ulema as the Sultan wished to lead the army himself. Apart from that, 
during the Galata Fire of 1810 the Janissaries were accused of looting houses. In March of 
1811, the members of the 26
th
 and the 27
th
 regiment were involved in a gun fight in the 
streets of Istanbul and couple of days later they murdered a Jew who refused to pay them a 
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bribe.422 In May of 1811, the Janissaries were accused of assaulting a Christian coffeehouse 
owner.423 They refused to join the Danubean campaign in 1811. In the meantime 750 
purses of gold, which were issued to the army, were robbed by Janissary deserters.424 In 
November of 1811, the Janissaries attacked some members of the Ulema in Istanbul.425 In 
1811, there was another dispute between the Janissaries and theological students.426 The 
accumulation of these raids worsened the public image of the Janissaries in the eyes of 
townspeople and the Ulema. 
Meanwhile, Mahmud II was paying extra attention to his relationship with the 
Ulema. His success of winning public opinion was probably a result of his ability to 
control the leadership of the religious order.427 In order to create loyal Ulema, Mahmud II 
won the support of Nakşibend-Mujaiddidi and the Mevlevi orders which supported the 
military policy of the Porte.428 The Sultan himself attended religious ceremonies, built new 
mosques and helped the pious foundations to please the Ulema.429 In early 1826, the Porte 
published a popular book about the life of the prophet to create positive public opinion for 
the Military reforms.430 
To summarise, Mahmud II forced the Ulema to condemn the military policy of 
Selim III and supported the rebelling Janissaries in 1807 to take a more passive role under 
his rule.431 Prior to the establishment of Eşkinci policy in 1826, the ruling cadres of the 
administration and elite units of the military were in relatively more reliable hands than the 
grandees of the New Order. Mahmud II‟s success of appealing to the public by using 
religious means was probably the reason behind his success of uniting the society against 
the Janissaries. The Greek Rebellion of 1822 had given him the opportunity to launch his 
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military reforms as the ineffectiveness of the Janissaries had become obvious.432 It is likely 
that his success of suppressing the rebellious elements had a positive effect on the 
campaign of Mahmud II against the Janissaries as the contemporary authors establish their 
arguments of legitimisation on the basis of “renewing the order”. 
 The Chronicles 
In this chapter, three contemporary sources which deal with the abolishment of 
Janissaries are analysed.433 The first treatise is Üss-i Zafer of Mehmed Es‟ad Efendi434, 
which is the most famous source regarding 1826 incidents. The second source is Gülzar-ı 
Fütuhat of Şirvanlı Fatih Efendi435 which was written by a civil servant of Divan-ı 
Humayun. Neticet‟ül Vekayi of Mehmed Daniş Efendi436 is another contemporary source 
which deals with the abolishment of Janissaries.  
Üss-i Zafer was written soon after the abolishment of the Janissaries. Es‟ad Efendi 
was the son of a notable Ilmiye member. His father was known as also a bibliopole 
(sahhaf) who later served as the Judge of Jerusalem and chief lecturer of Süleymaniye 
Medresesi.437 Therefore, Es‟ad Efendi was able to take lessons from his father and other 
notable lecturers of Ilmiye. During his father‟s service as the Judge of Jerusalem, Es‟ad 
Efendi stayed with him for a year and studied Arabic. Later on he graduated as a müderris 
in 1808.438 Between 1808 and 1825 he served in different positions as a müderris and tried 
his fortune as naib in Kütahya and Birgi. After the dismissal of Şanizade Ataullah Efendi 
in 1825, he was appointed as an official palace chronicler and served until 1837.439 It is 
interesting to underline that his brother Fazlî Paşa had close ties with the New Order 
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grandees before 1807 rebellion.440  
After the insurrection of 1826, he presented Üss-i Zafer, which deals with the 
course of the 1826 insurrection, to Sultan Mahmud II. For the purpose of this study, the 
chronicle will be evaluated in three major parts. The first part deals with the events which 
occurred after the establishment of Eşkinci Ocağı. As he was entrusted with the task of 
putting Eşkinci decree on paper, Es‟ad Efendi copied the text of document. In this part he 
discusses the legitimacy of Eşkinci Corps which could be evaluated as a revival of the New 
Army. In the second part, he narrates the course of events of the 1826 insurrection. Since 
he was an official palace chronicler, he witnessed every stage of the decision making 
processes during the insurrection, so Üss-i Zafer is considered a primary source regarding 
the abolishment of the Janissaries. The last part of his chronicle deals with the 
establishment of Asakir-i Mansure-yi Muhammediye Corps. Hence, Üss-i Zafer can be 
considered as an official voice of the Porte‟s legitimisation propaganda. 
Üss-i Zafer, Gülzar-ı Fütuhat, also known as “Risale-i Ocağ-ı Mülga”, was 
written in the aftermath of the abolishment of the Janissaries; the treatise has three copies. 
One of them was catalogued in Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi while the other two are in İ.Ü. 
Kütüphanesi Eski Eserler Bölümü.441 As far as we know, Şirvanlı Fatih Efendi was a civil 
servant who was born in Circassia. He came to Istanbul where he was educated in Divan-ı 
Hümayun and graduated as senior scribe. He was known as Hoca of Divan-ı Hümayun, and 
presumably for some time worked as lecturer. Apart from that, during his period as an 
official, he was given rank in Hacegan and held the mukataa of Avlonia in Albania.442 
Gülzar-ı Fütuhat  is evaluated in two major parts. The first part of the treatise 
deals with the events of the 1826 insurrection, the abolishment of Janissaries-Bektashi 
Order, and the establishment of Asakir-i Mansure-yi Muhammediye. The second part is the 
author‟s personal evaluation regarding the condition of Caucasian provinces and 
neighbouring countries Russia and Persia.443 Just like Es‟ad Efendi, Şirvanlı Fatih Efendi 
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contains very sophisticated language, enriching his texts with poems, hadiths and verses of 
Quran. There is strong evidence that during the insurrection of 1826, Fatih Efendi joined a 
crowd which had gathered in Sultan Ahmet Square. Hence, his treatise should be regarded 
as an eye witness testimony. 
Neticet‟ül Vekayi was written by Mehmed Daniş Efendi, a prominent member of 
palace elites. The treatise starts with a narration of the events from 8
th
 April of 1826 to 15
th
 
of June 1826.444 Compared to Üss-i Zafer and Gülzar-ı Fütuhat, the language of the text is 
relatively simple. It is the only copy of the treatise catalogued in “İ.Ü. Kütüphanesi Türkçe 
Yazmalar” collection.445 Mahmed Daniş Efendi focused on the chronology of the events. 
Considering the content of his work, which consisted of copies of official decrees, 
Mehmed Danış Bey probably had easy access to the Ottoman bureaucracy. In that sense, 
his text shall be regarded as a reflection of the elites‟ attitudes in the palace of the events. 
The Final Struggle: The Rebellion of 1826 
The rebellion of 1826 was triggered by the establishment of the Eşkinci Policy 
which may have been considered as a revival of the New Army. According to the issue of 
the Porte, some troops would be drafted among certain Janissary regiments to perform 
regular military training under the supervision of government officials in Et Meydanı.446  
Soon after the beginning of the first drills, the Janissaries could not wait long to 
react against the order of the Porte. The rebellion started on 14
th
 of June 1826 in Et 
Meydanı. Small groups of Janissaries along with their trusted sergeants and captains 
gathered at their barracks. As their numbers grew, they invited Kulkethüdası Hasan Ağa to 
join them. In response, Hasan Ağa told them that it would be inappropriate to join them 
alone. The best for him was to come together with prominent Janissary commanders.447 In 
the meantime, some Janissaries headed to Ağa Kapısı to storm the residence of the 
Janissarry Agha. When the rebels reached his residence, Janissary commander Hüseyin 
Ağa Paşa was returning from his patrol in Tahtakale. According to contemporary sources, 
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the Janissaries could not capture the commander as he was relieving himself in the 
bathroom, so they set the building on fire instead. The Janissary commander, Hüseyin Ağa 
Paşa went on hiding in vicinity of Süleymaniye.448 
On 15
th
 of June, Janissaries brought their cauldrons to Et Meydanı where they got 
the support of the armourers (Cebecis) and the saddlers. Sergeants were sent to various 
districts of the imperial capital such as Asmaaltı, Unkapanı and Tahtakale to announce 
their claim. The word was released that prominent government officials including the 
Grand Vizier, and the Janissary Agha had either been killed or captured. Therefore, the 
porters and a group of labourers joined the Janissaries at Et Meydanı where a growing 
numbers of rebels assembled.449 
The rebels split into two columns. First column was under command of Nakılcı 
Mustafa, a porter, and the second was under control of Ser-hoş Mustafa, well-known for 
being a drunkard. The band of Nakılcı Mustafa was assigned to storm the residence of the 
Grand Vizier in Bab-ı Âli while Ser-hoş Mustafa was sent to the residence of Necib Efendi, 
deputy of Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşa of Egypt and also the intendant of Eşkinci Corps. As 
the Grand Vizier Hüseyin Ağa Paşa was in his summer house in Beylerbeyi and Necip 
Efendi in Kanlıca, the rebels failed to capture them. Instead, they seized 6000 purses of 
gold from the Grand Vizier‟s residence and set the building on fire. They also seized 700-
800 purses of gold from the residence of Necib Efendi. In the city centre, they announced 
that they would take vengeance upon those “fatwa givers” and kavuklus, who had issued a 
fatwa against them.450 Besides, they also announced to shopkeepers to open their shops and 
told them not fear looting as they were not plunderers. In the meantime, they encountered a 
member of Ulema, Seyda Efendi, and wounded him.451 
When the word of turmoil reached Beylerbeyi, the Grand Vizier a sent message 
with his brother to Hüseyin Ağa Paşa and Mehmed İzzed Paşa to his kiosk with their 
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troops. The Grand Vizier moved to the imperial palace and summoned the deputy treasurer 
Kıbrısî Mehmed Ağa to inform the Sultan about who was in the Beşiktaş Palace, what the 
developments in the city centre were, and to ask permission to use the Holy Banner against 
the rebels. He sent his men to invite the prominent members of Ulema to the palace: 
Şeyhülislam Kadızade Tahir Efendi, the former deputy of judge of Anatolia Arif 
Beyefendi; Arab-zâde Hamdullah Efendi, who would be appointed as deputy judge of 
Anatolia; the judge of Istanbul, Sadık Efendi; and Kürd Abdurrahman Efendi, a notable 
lecturer. Furthermore, the intendant of arsenal Sa‟id Efendi, some chief officers of the 
cannon corps, cannon-wagon corps, the miners and the mortar corps were also 
summoned.452 
The deputy of the Janissary scribes, Raşid Efendi was sent to the rebels to ask 
their terms. The Janissaries had replied that they did not want to perform infidel military 
exercises, which were against their traditional law, and they pronounced some names of 
Ulema members and palace elites to be punished for it. In return, the Ulema assured the 
legitimacy of the military training which was approved by the Şeyhülislam. Thus, the terms 
of the rebels were rejected.453 
Later on, “the coalition of the palace elites”, that were reinforced by the 
theological students, the artillerymen under command of a famous Karacehennem Ibrahim 
Ağa, the mariners (kalyoncu), the canon-wagon corps, the miners, and the mortar corps 
made their way to the palace. After the arrival of the Sultan, a meeting was held in the 
“Chamber of Circumcision” to discuss what needed to be done about the Janissaries. In his 
speech, the Sultan asked members of Ulema if the acts of the Janissaries were hurûc-ı 
„ale‟s-sultân (a betrayal of their role as subject against ruler). In response, the members of 
Ulema confirmed that they were, which led to the Sultan‟s agreement to use brute force 
against the rebels. The Holy Banner was fetched and was granted to the Grand Vizier and 
the Şeyhülislam. Some notable members of the Ulema, namely: Dürrizade Es-Seyyid 
Abdullah Efendi, Mekkizade Mustafa Asım Efendi, Yasincizade Es-Seyyid Abdülvehab 
Efendi and Sıdkizade Ahmed Reşid Efendi were summoned to palace. The Sultan 
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remained in the palace while his loyalists made their way to fight against the enemy of the 
state and religion.454 
In the meantime, street-criers were sent to districts of the imperial capital to invite 
“the believers” to unite under the Holy Banner at Sultan Ahmed Mosque. In addition, the 
judge of Istanbul was entrusted with the task of informing the muezzins to read the 
message of the Sultan.455 The first skirmishes between the rebels and the loyalists started 
after the Sultan‟s call. The rebels attacked the crowd on the road and some people became 
“martyrs”.456  
After the distribution of arms, the loyalists assembled on Sultan Ahmed Mosque 
where they merged with forces of Hüseyin Ağa Paşa and Mehmed Izzed Paşa and 
discussed whether the use of violence was legitimate or not. Members of the Ulema 
advised them to dispatch a delegate to the Janissaries to conciliate with them; Ahıskalı 
Ahmed Efendi was entrusted with the task of negotiator. However, Ahmed Efendi himself 
and Mehmed Izzed Paşa rejected the advice of the Ulema. Hence, as a final decision, the 
loyalists began their march on the rebels. The forces split into two groups under the 
command of Mehmed İzzed Paşa and Hüseyin Ağa Paşa. The artillerymen and the 
mariners led by Hüseyin Ağa Paşa were dispatched on route to Divan Yolu. The mortar 
corps, the miners that were reinforced by students of theology and volunteer inhabitants, 
marched across Saraçhane. The upcoming reinforcements were under command of Necib 
Efendi and his lieutenants.457 
The forces of Hüseyin Ağa Paşa were attacked by the Janissaries near Horhor 
fountain but they managed to repel the Janissaries back to Et Meydanı. The Janissaries 
fortified the gate of Et Meydanı with large stones to prevent access of the loyalists. The 
forces of Mehmed Izzed Paşa were beseeched Et Meydanı. Karacehennem Ibrahim Ağa, 
asked the Janissaries to surrender, but the Janissaries refused. After merging with the other 
loyalist forces, Mehmed Izzed Paşa and Hüseyin Ağa Paşa ordered artillerymen to open 
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fire on the gate. The gate was opened by an artilleryman named Mustafa. The loyalist 
troops under the command of Karacehennem Ibrahim Ağa and Hacı Hafız Efendi invaded 
Et Meydanı, which dissolved the Janissaries and made them flee. After the final 
bombardment, the survivors went on hiding in their barracks at Bektashi Tekkes.458 The 
final bombardment caused very tragic scenes; the Janissaries, who were stuck at Et 
Meydanı, called out the names of their artillerymen friends and begged for their mercy. But 
in return, many of them were killed by cannonballs. The survivors, who were captured 
while trying to flee, were either stabbed or strangled by the loyalists.
 459 
 The main struggle finished after the battle of Et Meydanı, however, the 
government‟s “Janissary hunt” had just begun. Patrols were dispatched to different districts 
of the imperial capital in pursue of survivors and for the protection of the city. Mehmed 
Izzed Paşa and Hüseyin Ağa Paşa made their way to the “old barracks” to find and catch 
those in hiding.460 The third day of rebellion, 16
th
 June on Friday, witnessed the executions 
of the arrested Janissaries. During the public prayer, a Sultan‟s escort was replaced by 
artillerymen and troops from mortar corps. On Friday evening, prominent figures in Sultan 
Ahmed Mosque had discussed the details of a possible abolishment of Janissaries. The 
council also agreed on the establishment of new corps named the “Victorious Soldiers of 
Mohammed” (Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhamediye). The next morning, a decree of 
abolishment of the Janissaries was discussed at the great council and was signed by the 
Sultan; formally abrogating the Janissary corps.461 
Another important aspect of the rebellion was the closure of Bektashi Order. As a 
main affiliation to the Janissaries, the Bektashi Order had become the Porte‟s target. In 
order to discuss the condition of Bektashi Order, the Porte invited representatives of 
Nakşibendi, Mevlevi, Halveti, Sa‟di orders and Şeyhülislam to the palace mosque, under 
the leadership of the Grand Vizier. Probably the religious context of the council was one of 
the key factors behind the decision of closure. Teachings of the Bektashi order were 
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considered as heretical by these Sunni-Orthodox orders. In that sense, the image of the 
Bektashi Order and its followers were illustrated as being superstitious, ignorant, and even 
infidel.462 The council made its final decision; due to their inappropriate approach to the 
religious principles, the Bektashi order must be closed and the followers should be sent to 
exile.463 The property of the Bektashi Order was confiscated by the Porte and allocated to 
the service of mainstream Sunni-Orthodox orders.464 
Discussions on the Rebellion of 1826 and the Pattern of Legitimisation 
For the case of the 1826 rebellion, apparently all the contemporary sources have 
agreed on the same concept of legitimisation. Accordingly, contemporary authors consider 
the Janissaries as being ineffective army corps who failed to prevail over enemy. The 
Muslim lands were surrounded by infidel enemies who designed deceitful plans. So, as 
rule of reprisal obliges, the believers were able to use weapons and military training 
methods of infidels to have vengeance upon the enemy. Hence, as the Ottoman Empire‟s 
existence was based on championing sharia and waging cihad, the Sultan decided to form 
a new unit of trained soldiers to be drafted among the Janissaries with approval of the 
Ulema. Those who rejected the military training, or in other words, the order of the Sultan, 
would be punished as they would be rejecting the will of God. 
The reaction of the Janissaries was attributed to the newly formed army corps. In 
addition to this, Janissaries‟ opposition to members of Ulema and the Sultan is emphasised 
as another reason for the rebellion. Thus, all the contemporary authors depict the rebels 
with the image of being an “enemy of state and religion” in every means. Accordingly, the 
Sultan was portrayed as a “renovator of religion and order” (müceddid). Mahmud II‟s 
previous achievements, which illustrate his services to Muslim World, and capability as a 
ruler are frequently repeated in the contemporary sources. Therefore according to 
contemporary sources, by abolishing the Janissaries and closing the Bektashi Order the 
Sultan had accomplished his holy mission. His efforts were praised as acting for sake of 
state and religion. 
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As for the narration of the events, the authors create a distinct dichotomy between 
the loyalists and the rebels. The rebellion of 1826 is illustrated as a struggle as if between 
good and evil; the believers and the heathens. Anything affiliated to the Janissaries such as: 
their barracks, the symbols of their regiments, their tattoos, the cauldrons etc. were 
severely criticised by the authors. 
Even though the authors share a pattern of legitimisation, there are different 
discourses which dominate the texts. As for Üssi-i Zafer, which reflects the official view of 
the Porte, dominant discourse of the treatise was the legitimisation issue of the Eşkinci 
Corps and Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye, the new army which was established after 
the abolishment of the Janissaries. Es‟ad Efendi, considers the establishment of Eşkinci 
Corps as the main reason behind the rebellion. According to him, the Eşkinci policy of the 
Porte was an outcome of the Sultan‟s master plan to renovate the order of religion and state 
and re-organize the holy law (müceddid-i dîn ü devlet ve mü‟eyyid-i kânûn-ı şerî‟at).465 
In the beginning, the author gives information about the general condition of the 
Janissary corps by466 referring to Kocasekban Risalesi and previous attempts of Selim III.467 
This also means that Es‟ad Efendi might consider the establishment of Eşkinci Corps as an 
extension of Nizam-ı Cedid. Then, he mentions the discussions among the Sultan, the 
palace elites and members of the high ranking Ulema regarding the establishment of the 
Eşkinci Corps.468After this, he focuses on the approval process of the Eşkinci Corps by the 
Ulema.469 According to discussions among members of Ulema, at their zenith the 
Janissaries had won battles for Islam but as the world changed they were unable to meet 
the needs of the state. They ignored their military duties and became an immoral and 
mutinous group which committed crimes against their rulers in the past. Their failure 
against the rebelling Greeks revealed that the Janissaries were not up to the task of 
protecting the lands of the Muslims.470 Furthermore, Es‟ad Efendi mentions the non-
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military elements among the Janissary corps and their undisciplined behaviour. He even 
adds, due to their outdated organisation, spies intrigued easily into corps and were able to 
manipulate them.471 Thus, as rule of reprisal and Holy War obliges that the state should 
have trained soldiers to have vengeance upon the infidel enemy. 472  
This discourse of “vengeance” should be evaluated as a reaction to the Greek 
rebellion in 1821. As it was mentioned before, one of the legitimisation concepts of the 
New Order was to provide protection to Muslims against attacks of infidels. However, in 
the texts which were written after 1826, discourse of protection was replaced by “having 
vengeance upon enemy”. This discourse may also reveal another important point which 
damaged the image of the Janissaries. The success of the trained troops of Kavalalı 
Mehmed Ali Paşa in the Greek Rebellion probably had positive impact on public opinion, 
because it also signified the fact that the performance of the trained troops had saved the 
Empire from a possible defeat. Hence, it is possible to claim that the atmosphere of the 
Greek rebellion of 1822 had created psychological basis for the Porte‟s propaganda against 
the Janissaries. 
After this part, the author narrates a draft of Eşkinci decree which was submitted 
to members of the Ulema and the administration.473 Here in, it is important to emphasise 
that the Eşkinci decree had the same characteristics of the legitimisation pattern which 
Kuşmani and Sekbanbaşi innovated for the New Order.474 The decisions of the Porte were 
presented as an effort to revive the Holy War. Apart from some technical details of training 
process, the decree mentions that each regiment would be assigned to religious education 
under guidance of their imam.475  As it was decided inappropriate for the soldiers of Islam, 
who would participate in Holy War, trade of the Janissary‟s salary tickets (esame) would 
be prohibited.476 Apparently the Porte might have preferred to present the financial burden 
of the Janissary‟s pay tickets as an immoral behaviour for the soldiers of Islam. Moreover, 
in order to prevent possible resistance by the people and the Janissaries, they signified that 
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these new troops must have religious education. Considering the New Order policies, 
Mahmud II followed the methods of Selim III but his influence on the members of the 
Ulema and elite army corps, such as the artillerymen and the canonries, presumably made 
the difference for his success in upcoming events. 
In the following part, Es‟ad Efendi brings another discussion of legitimisation into 
focus in regards to the trained troops and their religious validity. The author himself admits 
that he aimed to justify the policy of the Porte for those who would not understand the 
needs of the state.477 He discusses religious validity of the usage of infidel weapons and478 
meaning of rule of reprisal.479 In order to explain his assertions, the author refers to the sage 
scholars of Islam; including, Mukaddime of Ibn Haldun and also to Koca Sekbanbaşi 
Risalesi. These two references signify the organisation of Muslims in the war against 
infidels. Accordingly, the success of the Muslims in campaigns depended on being well 
organised and prepared for war. Hence he asserts that, it is the duty of all Muslims to have 
military training to learn and perform these formations.480 The third reference expresses the 
issue of discipline; the Muslim troops should obey their superiors as they follow imam in 
prayer.481 The fourth reference was to emphasise legitimacy of the “rule of reprisal.”482After 
this, Es‟ad Efendi mentions Ibn Haldun and his interpretations on the grounds for war. 
According to this, there are four major types of warfare in which only two of them are 
religiously legitimate.483 One of the legitimate types of war is Cihad which is waged in the 
name of God to spread the order of Islam. And the other is the war against invaders who 
attack the land of Muslims.484 Hence, Es‟ad Efendi concludes that, by establishing Eşkinci 
Corps the Sultan‟s policy would be evaluated as an effort to prevail in Cihad and protect 
the Muslims lands from the attacks of infidels.485 In addition to this, the author mentions 
Koca Sekbanbaşi Risalesi to evaluate the military condition of the Empire. Here in, Es‟ad 
Efendi interprets arguments of Koca Sekbanbaşi as being legitimate as they were 
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confirmed by Ibn Haldun in Mukaddime.486 
To summarise, Es‟ad Efendi followed the same pattern of legitimisation which 
was developed by Ubeydullah Kuşmani and Koca Sekbanbaşi in the New Order era. By 
offering such a sophisticated discussion of legitimisation, his text combines together the 
technical military analysis of Koca Sekbanbaşi and religious interpretations of Kuşmani. 
Furthermore, by referring to wise scholars of Islam, he tries to justify the idea of rule of 
reprisal and the need of having trained troops, which he evaluates as a being the duty of 
Muslims in Holy War. In that manner, the primary aim of Es‟ad Efendi, which comes into 
view in his text, is to express the legitimacy of these efforts to the Porte before and after 
the abolishment of Janissaries. Unlike Ubeydullah Kuşmani, he tries to justify his 
arguments by referring to discussions on legitimacy and the practice of rule of reprisal in 
scholars of Islam. Therefore, he presents the Eşkinci policy of the Sultan as being religious 
duty. Moreover he frequently repeats approval of Ulema which considered the new corps 
as religiously legitimate. Thus, he expresses his legitimacy for the punishments in rebellion 
of 1826.  
As a propaganda text, Üss-i Zafer of Es‟ad Efendi would be considered as the 
most sophisticated narration regarding the events which occurred on June 1826. Es‟ad 
Efendi narrates the details regarding the Eşkinci policy of the Porte and argues the religious 
legitimacy of the decisions which were taken against the rebels. In addition to this, he 
illustrates an immoral image of the Janissaries which is supported by several anecdotes and 
stories. In that sense, his arguments in Üss-i Zafer are interpreted as a fusion of ideas from 
Ubeydullah Kuşmani and Koca Sekbanbaşi. Probably Es‟ad Efendi‟s position as a palace 
chronicler played the crucial role as he had to access the meetings and other sources while 
the other authors‟ narrations were presumably based on their own observations. 
As discourse of vengeance dominated Neticet‟ül Vekayi, Mehmed Daniş Bey‟s 
narration expresses view of a palace elite who once had close ties with the New Order 
grandees. Mehmed Daniş Bey frequently mentions the rebellious crimes that Janissaries 
had committed in era of the New Order and in early sultanate of Mahmud II. In order to 
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support his claims, he severely criticises the Janissaries. To him, the enemy of state and 
religion had finally got the punishment they deserved for their crimes. 
 Unlike Es‟ad Efendi, Mehmed Daniş Bey did not pay extra attention to the 
legitimisation issue of the events, but he generally holds the perspective of Es‟ad Efendi. 
According to Mehmed Daniş Bey, the establishment of the Eşkinci Corps was the reason 
of the rebellion; the Sultan decided to form Eşkinci Corps to have well trained and 
qualified soldiers to prevail against infidel enemies.487 As traitors and infidels, the 
Janissaries refused the order of Sultan and mutinied against him.488 This is the only 
interpretation that Mehmed Daniş Bey expresses in his text. In that sense, Mehmed Daniş 
Efendi focuses primarily on the eradication process of the Janissaries.  
Şirvanlı Fatih Efendi follows a similar method of legitimisation as Es‟ad Efendi 
narrates in Üssi-i Zafer. According to him, throughout the history of Islam the Ottoman 
Empire was the most glorious Muslim state that showed boundless mercy to its subjects 
since the time of the Prophet and the four caliphates.489 As the existence of the Ottoman 
Empire was based on the appraisal of the grand order of Islam (i‟lâ-yı kelimetullah), it was 
the primary duty of its rulers to fight against infidel enemies.490 However, as the Janissaries 
became useless and treacherous, the Russians prevailed over the believers and invaded the 
Muslim lands. Hence, the order of the state needed to be re-organized as had been 
attempted in the era of the New Order but which was unsuccessful due to the mutiny of the 
Janissaries. As it was obliged by rule of reprisal, Sultan Mahmud II formed a new army 
corps which was subjected to regular military training by the approval of the Ulema.
 
But 
the dissident Janissaries instead mutinied, and so the struggle between the believers and the 
infidels had started.
 491  
Apparently, Şirvanlı Fatih Efendi considered the establishment of the Eşkinci 
Corps as main reason for the rebellion. Just like Es‟ad Efendi and Mehmed Daniş Efendi, 
he frequently criticises the Janissaries for being an enemy of state and religion. Even 
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though he gives brief information about the condition of the Janissaries and religious 
legitimacy of the abolishment of Janissaries, Şirvanlı Fatih Efendi is especially attentive to 
justify the closure of the Bektashi Order.492This part is followed by the establishment of 
“Asakir-i Mansure-yi Muhammediyye”.493 Later on he expresses his own personal opinions 
about the Sultan. According to him Mahmud II was a capable and accomplished ruler who 
succeeded in defeating the rebelling Wahhabis on Holy Lands, Tepedelenli Ali Paşa in 
Albania and the rebelling Greeks in 1821. Therefore, he portrays him as renovator of the 
order and the state (müceddid). Being “müceddid” requires service to public, appraisal of 
religion and the battle of forces which threaten the religion. As the Sultan achieved these 
goals by his defeating the enemies of state and religion, he should be considered as 
“müceddid”.  
Moreover, he asserts that God sends “renovators” of order in every century. As 
Mahmud II, born in 1199 at the beginning of the new century, the author perceives the 
birth date of the Sultan as another auspicious proof supporting his illustration of his as 
being “mücdeddid”.494 To summarise, Şirvanlı Fatih Efendi expresses the capability of 
Mahmud II as a ruler over his service to the state and religion. The abolishment of the 
Janissaries, and his previous victories against rebelling elements of the Empire should be 
evaluated within this context.  
As it seems, after the abolishment of the Janissaries, the müceddid image of the 
Sultan and his military reforms for the sake of Islam and state with an approving of rule of 
reprisal, dominates contemporary sources. From this point on, it would be useful to depict 
an image of the “enemy of state and religion” as by the contemporary authors. 
“The Furious Dogs of Hell”: The Janissaries and the Loyalists in the Rebellion of 1826 
As already mentioned, in the case of the 1826 rebellion, all of the contemporary 
sources had continuously accused the Janissaries of being infidels and traitors to the State 
and religion. In that sense, the authors consider the abolishment of the Janissaries and the 
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closure of the Bektashi Order as being a divine intervention for those who refused the will 
and order of God. This part aims to reveal the illustration of the Janissaries by the 
contemporary authors and to discuss the events which occurred during the peak of the 
rebellion.  
According to Es‟ad Efendi, the Janissaries were equivalent to “furious dogs” 
(kelb-i akur).495 For Şirvanlı Fatih Efendi, they were “furious dogs of hell” (seg- i akur-ı 
cehim).496 As for Mehmed Daniş Bey, they were betrayers of the religion (ha‟in- i din-i 
mübin).497 Et Meydanı, the headquarters of the rebels, are depicted as nest of sinners. 
Customarily, the rebels are depicted as ignorant people who were incapable of acting 
freely. However, the view of the contemporary authors ignored some details that remain 
within the borders of their method of legitimisation.  
Before the outbreak of the rebellion, the final decision of Janissaries was made 
after deliberations in Et Meydanı. Es‟ad Efendi weighs up the evidence based on the 
arguments among the Janissaries to decide how to react.498 Accordingly, some of them 
suggested mutiny when members of the Ulema came to visit Et Meydanı to discuss matters 
of training. But this opinion is opposed by others who were affiliated with the Bektashi 
Order, so it would have been inappropriate to commence without the exposure of their 
cauldrons. Another idea was to mutiny after the military trainings; the best time to initiate 
their plans would be after the troops of Eşkinci had left Et Meydanı, with their weapons 
and ammunition. This idea also was opposed by the others as they thought that if the troops 
had enjoyed “benedictions” of the Porte, they would have not obeyed them. Hence, they 
decided to react immediately.499  
Es‟ad Efendi also narrated the testimony of the intendant of the Eşkinci Corps 
Sa‟ib Efendi, who sensed a disturbance among the Janissaries prior to the rebellion. For 
that reason, Sa‟ib Efendi summoned prominent figures among Janissaries to his presence 
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to talk about the matter of military training.500 He tried to explain necessity of trainings that 
were approved by the Ulema as a “rule of reprisal” that would be given to train soldiers of 
Islam to prevail over the infidel enemy. The answer Sa‟ib Efendi received was that as the 
Janissaries are “thick brained” (kalın beyinli), they could not realise the benefit of such 
training and contested them as mere infidel methods. Hence, they refused to participate in 
military training and spread rumours opposing them.501 They persisted with their 
unyielding attitude and finally on the third day, rebellion broke out on the night of the 16
th
 
of June.502  
Up to this point, Es‟ad Efendi illustrates the Janissaries as unyielding, rebellious, 
superstitious, and ignorant as a “pack of dogs”. Despite this, by spreading rumours for their 
cause the Janissaries were able to manipulate ignorant people, mobilised their comrades 
and won support. They managed to organise themselves in a collective manner and made 
calculated decisions before the outbreak of the rebellion. This point also reveals that, 
presumably the Janissaries had perceived the Eşkinci policy of the Porte as a potential 
threat to existence of the corps. Thus, the rebellion of 1826 could be considered as a 
counter-offence of the Janissaries to protect the existence and privileges of their corps.  
According to Mehmed Daniş Bey, the Janissaries considered initiation of military 
trainings as a revival of the New Order. From the perspective of the Janissaries, even 
though the gunners were drafted among them, the intendant of Eşkinci Corps was a man of 
Necib Efendi, the deputy of Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşa of Egypt. Apparently, involvement 
of Egyptian officers in the Eşkinci establishment had disturbed the Janissaries. Hence, they 
interpreted the Eşkinci policy of the Porte as equal to the New Order which would bring 
unrest to their corps.
 503  
Mehmed Daniş Bey‟s narration confirms the point of Es‟ad Efendi, as the rebels 
were depicted as making decisions in a collective manner. Interestingly, Mehmed Daniş 
Bey seems to regard the reaction of the Janissaries as being related to their opposition 
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against the New Order; a very important detail for understanding the view of the author. 
Besides, the Janissaries presumably followed a similar method of organising themselves 
against an infidel innovation just like in the case of the 1807 rebellion. This is a 
noteworthy point since all of the sources ignore the arguments of the Janissaries in the 
outbreak of the rebellion of 1826. 
On the other hand, Şirvanlı Fatih Efendi mentions the Janissaries disrespectful 
behaviour towards the members of the Ulema. According to his narrative, members of the 
Ulema had visited the training grounds to advise the Janissaries regarding military training. 
The Janissaries started training with fierce and mock with methods which they were 
subjected to perform. The members of the Ulema who witnessed this scene remained silent 
to observe what would happen next.504 Şirvanlı Fatih Efendi is the only author who ignores 
the Janissary meetings before the rebellion. However according to him, the real problem 
was the Janissaries‟ inappropriate behaviour to members of the Ulema and their negative 
attitude towards military training. Furthermore, he narrates the Janissary crimes in era of 
the New Order. This point appears support the view of Şirvanlı Fatih Efendi that considers 
the Eşkinci policy of the Porte as being a revival of the New Order. 
So far Şirvanlı Fatih Efendi depicted the Janissaries as immoral group of people 
who disobeyed and disrespected the will of the Sultan; this was view was supported by the 
Ulema. In the dominant argument in his narration, he reveals that the struggle between the 
“righteous and treacherous” occurred when the Janissaries insulted the members of the 
Ulema and refused to do the trainings. Similarly, Mehmed Daniş Bey and Şirvanlı Fatih 
Efendi also signify that the struggle between the rebels and the Porte started after 
establishment of the New Order. Thus, Şirvanlı Fatih Efendi retells the background reasons 
for the punishment of the Janissaries. 
Until now, two of the authors create links between Janissaries‟ reaction to the 
New Order and to Eşkinci Corps. Even though he frequently repeated the previous 
Janissary crimes, Es‟ad Efendi, as an official chronicler, does not refer the New Order as a 
reason for rebellion. At this point one wonders if these authors were under the influence of 
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the New Order Grandees. However, as we do not have sufficient information about the life 
of Şirvanlı Fatih Efendi, it is almost impossible to be certain. Most likely, Mehmed Daniş 
Efendi, as a member of palace elites, had very close relationships with the powerful groups 
in the Ottoman administration. As we know Es‟ad Efendi‟s brother was a member of the 
New Order Grandees, but such speculation does not provide sufficient evidence as this 
topic requires detailed study on the networks of relationships; beyond the scope of this 
study. In summary, even though the Janissaries were depicted as ignorant, disrespectful, 
rebellious, and superstitious, they managed to organise themselves in a collaborative 
manner and seemed sufficiently aware of the steps to follow at the outbreak of rebellion. 
After this point as Es‟ad Efendi narrates, on the night of 16th of June the rebels 
sent representatives to Hasan Aga deputy of the Janissary Agha, and invited him to join 
them. Hasan Ağa turned down the request of the rebels as it would not have been 
appropriate for him to join them alone. He admits it would be better for him to join with 
other commanders of the Janissary corps.505 Later, the rebels stormed the residence of the 
Janissary commander to capture him and set the whole neighbourhood on fire.506 
Apparently, they were aware of the fact that since the Janissary commander was a 
supporter of the Porte, they would not be able to appeal to the other units of the army, such 
as the artillerymen and the cannon corps. 
After a failed attempt to capture the Janissary commander, the rebels proceeded to 
city centre where they announced their cause to the public.507 At this point, it is important 
to underline that in rebellions of 1703, 1730 and 1807, the contemporary sources mention 
that the rebels asserted their cause in court. However in the case of 1826, this is ignored by 
the contemporary sources. According to Es‟ad Efendi, after they stormed the residence of 
the Janissary commander, the rebels moved to the armoury, (Cebehane) and convinced the 
armourers (Cebecis) to join the rebellion. Later on, they made their way to Sarrachane, 
Tahtakale, Asmaaltı, Unkapanı and some other districts of Istanbul where they spread false 
rumours; such as, the seizures of prominent figures in the administration including the 
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Janissary commander and the Grand Vizier. Thus, the rebels emerged with their affiliates 
from lower layers of society, such as labourers and porters. They split in two groups under 
command of certain figures and plundered the residences of the Grand Vizier and Necib 
Efendi, deputy of Kavalalı Mehmed Ali Paşa, where they tore up copies of Quran. At this 
point, the rebels sent street-criers to districts of the imperial capital to announce their cause 
to public.
 508 The rebels condemned the members of the Ulema who had issued fatwa 
against them. Moreover, they announced that they would not murder innocent people nor 
plunder the property of the people.509 Such details were not mentioned by Mehmed Daniş 
Bey and Şirvanlı Fatih Efendi.  
According to Mehmed Daniş Bey, after they stormed the residence of Janissary 
agha, the rebels sought ways to merge with their affiliates. They coerced people to join 
them and sent criers to various districts of imperial capital to invite grocers, porters, and 
the unemployed living in Bekar Odaları. Later on, the rebels stormed the residences of the 
Grand Vizier and Necib Efendi. While they were plundering the residence of Necib Efendi, 
some rebels slashed pages of Quran and some other monuments with their knives as they 
claimed that “They referred to these when they issued fatwas against us”. He even adds 
that some of them drew the symbol of their regiments on the papers of these holy 
monuments. 510 The same details are also confirmed by Şirvanlı Fatih Efendi.511  
Then, the rebels began their march to the armoury. On the road, they murdered a 
servant (çukadar) of El-hâc Yusuf Efendi, a prominent member of the Ulema. It is actually 
hard to determine whether their act was against the high-ranking Ulema or a personal 
dispute. But the authors consider the killing of Yusuf Efendi as an threatening provocation 
to the members of the Ulema. Mehmed Daniş Bey continues his narration; the rebels 
sought the support of the other army units.512 Accordingly, the rebels sent their sergeants to 
the artillery Corps and yamaks that were stationed in the citadels at the Bosphorus. 
However, their request was turned down by these units. One rebel representative even 
                                                          
508  Ibid., 59. 
509  Ibid., 59-60. 
510  Mehmed Dâniş Efendi, “Neticet‟ül Vekâyi”, 49-50. 
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asked for their cauldron, a symbol of their acceptance to join the rebellion, to which the 
chief artillery officer replied that “they would not even give a rice pot”. It is important to 
underline that the yamaks refused to join the rebellion as they were ashamed of their 
previous crimes that had they committed against Selim III.513 
Es‟ad Efendi on the other hand does not mention the negotiations between the 
rebels and the other army corps. Nevertheless, considering the banishment of the yamaks 
after closure of the Bektashi Order,514 the intention of Mehmed Daniş Bey‟s narration is 
only an attempt to signify the treacherous aims of the rebels. Ironically, the ignorant and 
superstitious vagrants appear as manipulators who failed to buy the loyalty of the 
artillerymen and the yamaks. The same yamaks would appear again in the treatise of 
Mehmed Daniş Bey in the banishments of the Bektashis. In this part, due to their 
affiliations with the Bektashi Order, the yamaks are accused of being called infidels by the 
author. Perhaps for the same reason, Es‟ad Efendi ignored the negotiations between the 
rebels and the yamaks. To conclude, according to Mehmed Daniş Bey, there were 
negotiations between the rebels and other army units but for unclear reasons the units have 
remained loyal to the Porte. 
Some similarities can be drawn between the methods of the rebels and the 
traditional methods of Ottoman rebellions: 
- They organised themselves in a collective manner. 
- They tried to gain the support of high ranking officers of the Janissary corps.  
- They announced their cause and tried to win public support. They assured the 
public that they were not plunderers and murderers and took some measures to 
prevent chaos in the city. They appealed to the artisans side with them. 
- They tried to negotiate with other corps of the army, particularly the support of 
some of the Ulema members. 
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But for some reason, the above-mentioned details are played down or ignored by 
the authors who portray the rebels as “infidels”. Probably, the rebels who claimed that their 
cause was legitimate and showed efforts to maintain the order did not fit the illustration of 
the Porte after the abolishment of Janissaries. Another point to be underlined is, the authors 
express that the rebels targeted members of the Ulema who issued fatwa against them, and 
grandees (kavuklular) who initiated Eşkinci policy. Although, it signifies a dispute over 
Eşkinci policy between the Ulema, the Ottoman bureaucracy and the Janissaries, the rebels 
must have been aware of the fact they needed the Ulema support. Due to the effort of the 
Grand Vizier to isolate members of the Ulema, we can assume that either they were not 
able to be reached, or they had already been reached but this part is ignored by the authors. 
It is impossible to know the real truth without hard evidence. Thus, the depiction of the 
“enemy of the Ulema in every means” can be considered as an exaggeration of the authors. 
This raises two points: 
The first is that since the rebels could not find the support they needed from the 
Ulema and the townspeople, the question of the Sultan‟s dethronement may have not risen. 
Because according to the aforementioned rebellion methods, the dethronement demand 
generally came later in the proceedings. The second point is that they may have remained 
loyal to the Sultan; however, whilst they still accused those close to him of “treason”.  In 
that sense, depicting the rebels as vandals shall be regarded as another exaggeration of the 
authors to support their claim that they were an “enemy of state and religion”. But it is not 
possible to make a firm decision over this situation. 
After the meeting in the palace, a representative of the Porte was dispatched to the 
rebels.515 It is noteworthy that the Porte did not send a delegation consisting of the 
members of the Ulema. Es‟ad Efendi claims the rebels declared to the representative that 
they refused to perform military trainings. And they demanded execution of some officials 
and certain high-ranking members of the Ulema.516 
As for Mehmed Daniş Bey, following the meetings in the palace the Sultan 
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ordered Holy Banner to be fetched and invited loyalists to meet in Sultan Ahmed Square 
immediately. As people were gathering under the Holy Banner of the Prophet, a 
representative was dispatched to ask the rebels their terms. The rebels gave a list of names 
and demanded their execution. Moreover, as the Sultan unfurled the Holy Banner, they 
avowed their “Noble Cauldron” (Kazgan-ı Şerif). 517  
This is actually one of the most striking illustrations of a declaration of Holy War 
between the believers and the infidels. In fact, this event reveals that the Holy War was not 
only against the Janissaries but also against Janissary affiliations. Since the cauldrons were 
associated with a Bektashi identity of the Janissaries, Mehmed Daniş Bey reveals a 
dichotomy between the rebels and the loyalists as an opposition of superstition to the path 
of believers. 
According to Şirvanlı Fatih Efendi, the Sultan, the grand vizier, members of the 
high-ranking Ulema and other prominent members of the Ottoman administration gathered 
at the palace. They fetched the Holy Banner and called for the believers. Later on, in 
Sultan Ahmed Square, the crowd joined the side of Sultan and marched toward the rebels. 
According to him, it was a test of faith as all believers were obligated to join to the final 
battle against infidels.518 Şirvanlı Fatih Efendi does not narrate anything about negotiations 
between the rebels and the Porte. But as it seems he also interpreted events as a battle 
between true believers and infidel enemy. 
Es‟ad Efendi is the only author who narrates the details of discussions in the 
palace. Accordingly, the Sultan asked to Şeyhülislam and other members of the Ulema if 
the rebellious act of the Janissaries was a betrayal to the their role as subjects (hurûc-ı 
ale‟s-sultan) and what an appropriate punishment would be. The answer he received was to 
put them to death”.519 With the approval of the Ulema, the Sultan fetched the Holy Banner 
and announced his call to the believers. The Sultan remained in his palace but the Grand 
Vizier, the Janissary agha, Şeyhülislam and other members were moved to Sultan Ahmed 
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Palace to begin their final assault on the Janissaries.520 
When the crowd joined the forces of the Porte, Es‟ad Efendi narrates another 
discussion among the loyalists in Sultan Ahmed Mosque. Apparently, there had been a 
discussion regarding what needed to be done against the rebels, as members of the Ulema 
regarded them as sinners and infidels who opposed their rulers and the orders of their ruler. 
The first answer was “they should be put to death”. However some people suggested 
dispatching a delegation to approach the rebels again. And, if the rebels refuse to 
conciliate, then it would be appropriate to attack them. Ahıskalı Ahmed Efendi, a 
prominent member of the Ulema was chosen for this duty. However, he himself admitted 
that it would only delay the ultimate punishment of the rebels. A final decision was made 
by the Grand Vizier and thus the loyalist forces began their assault.
 521 Again, there was an 
attempt to send a delegation, but this time the members of the delegation were chosen 
members from the Ulema. Yet, it appears that this idea was opposed by the Grand Vizier 
again. 
All of the authors consent the final assault was lawful and necessary. For the 
Janissaries, who had betrayed to their state and to religion, there was no point of return but 
to destroy them. Mehmed Daniş Bey offers very interesting reasoning regarding the 
punishment of the Janissaries:  
The Janissaries had to pay for the crimes they committed against Sultan Osman II, 
and Sultan Selim III. He cites rebellious acts of the Janissaries against Kadı Abdurrahman 
Paşa in the Edirne Incident of 1806, and the assassination of the Janissary agha in 
Silistire.522 Furthermore, he mentions the murder of Alemdar Mustafa Paşa in Kadir 
Gecesi.523 By offering such discourse of vengeance, Mehmed Daniş Bey appears as a 
spokesman of the New Order grandees.  
For Es‟ad Efendi, the Janissaries had betrayed their duty by rejecting military 
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training.524 Şirvanlı Fatih Efendi interpreted the final assault as divine intervention of the 
infidels. To him, people should have learned the example of what would happen to them if 
they rejected their religious duties and the will of their ruler. He despised the Janissaries 
and their affiliations, and so depicts them as being evil.525 The authors narrate that some of 
the Janissaries were tattooed with crosses and with the symbol of their regiment.526 This 
interpretation shall be regarded as excommunication the Janissaries‟ symbols which would 
have been prohibited by the abolishment of the Janissaries.  
To put it briefly, excommunication of the Janissaries in contemporary sources 
were associated with their Bektashi Identity and their crimes they had committed against 
the State. Apparently, concepts of legitimisation in case of 1826 were mostly expressed 
through realignment of the Porte, the Ulema and the townspeople against the Janissaries. 
As already mentioned, the Janissaries‟ image in public was badly tarnished after Greek 
Rebellion of 1821. Hence, they had no choice but to seek ways to win back the public 
opinion with claims of restoring the order or denouncing the traitors to the state and 
religion. Despite their efforts, this time the inhabitants of the imperial capital chose the side 
of the Sultan which emphasises Mahmud II‟s success in winning public opinion. Apart 
from the abolishment of the Janissaries, the Porte had to take radical measures, such as 
closure of Bektashi Order. Since this study aims to reveal patterns of legitimisation, in the 
next stage the campaign against the Bektashi Order is analysed. 
The Closure of the Bektashi Order: Final Step of Restoration of the Order 
Closure of the Bektashi Order would be interpreted as another political 
manoeuvre which would allow the Porte to neutralise the Janissary‟s existence in the 
society and in the political arena. It also reflects a purge of anti-Porte elements, which had 
a crucial importance for Mahmud II to consolidate his authority over the Empire. The 
decision to abolish the order was agreed on by a council of mainstream Orthodox-Sunni 
orders, consisting of representatives from Nakşibendi, Halveti, Sa‟di, Mevlevi orders and 
Şeyhülislam under the pretext of restoring the order. Hence, excommunication of the 
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Bektashi Order could be interpreted as another part of the legitimisation propaganda of the 
Porte. 
As previous parts emphasised, the pattern of legitimisation in the contemporary 
sources derived from and are modified by concepts which were offered by Ubeydullah 
Kuşmani and Koca Sekbanbaşi. Ubeydullah Kuşmani blamed the Bektashi identity of the 
Janissaries to create an immoral illustration of the corps. This argument also served as 
another purpose, which was to illegalise Janissary claims of restoring the order over 
rejecting infidel innovations of military training. For the case of 1826 the rebellion, the 
contemporary authors illustrate a process of restoration of the order by establishing new 
army units that would be better capable of encountering the infidel enemy. This is the first 
view of restoration of the order. The second view is the destruction of the Janissaries for 
their crimes to the state and religion. And the third is closure of the Bektashi Order as the 
Janissaries were affiliated as its followers.  
According to Fatma Sel Turhan, there was no factual argument behind the 
decision of the council. The Bektashi‟s were accused of violating the essential pillars; 
hence, were labelled as an enemy of religion. This interpretation relates to accusations of 
the “enemy of state” which was attributed to the Janissaries. Thus, the Bektashi Order are 
illustrated as cultivating rebels and infidels.527 This part aims to reveal the illustration of 
Bektashi Order by the contemporary sources, the reasons behind the closure of the 
Bektashi Order, which requires further research and is beyond the scope of this study.528 
For the purpose of this study, the closure of the Bektashi Order, which had deep impact on 
Ottoman society, signifies the fact that the Porte would have had to pursue a larger-scale 
legitimisation policy. Therefore, all of the contemporary sources try to reveal righteousness 
for the closure of Bektashi Order. Es‟ad Efendi is the only author who narrates details of 
the meeting with copy of the decree which was issued for closure of the Bektashi Order. 
                                                                                                                                                                                
526  Ibid., 14, Mehmed Dâniş Efendi, “Neticet‟ül Vekâyi”, 55. 
527  Fatma Sel Turhan, “The Abolishment of Janissary Army  and its Reflections”, 141-148. 
528  On the condition of Ulema and Bektashi Order in 1826 see; Butrus Abu Maneh, “Studies on Islam and the Ottoman 
Empire in the 19th Century (1826-1876), (Istanbul: Isis 2001), 59-73. Suraiya Faroqhi, “Anadolu‟da Bektaşilik”, 
(Istanbul: Simurg 2001), 183-197. Güntekin Yıldız, “Osmanlı Kara Ordusunda Yeniden Yapılanma ve Sosyo-Politik 
Etkileri”, 78-91. Tobias Heinzelmann, “Cihaddan Vatan Savunmasına: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu‟nda Genel Askerlilik 
Yükümlülüğü 1826-1856”,(Istanbul: Kitap 2009). In addition, on the official ideology of the Ottoman Empire regarding 
heresy, see Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, “Zındıklar ve Mülhidler”, (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt, Yayınları, 1998) 106-131. 
 128 
 
 
Mehmed Daniş Efendi underlines the proximity between the Bektashi Order and the 
Janissaries. In addition, Şirvanlı Fatih Efendi provides very interesting reasoning regarding 
the closure of the Bektashi Order. 
According to Es‟ad Efendi, representatives of Nakşibendi, Halveti, Mevlevi, Sa‟di 
orders and Şeyülislam gathered in the palace mosque under moderation of the Grand 
Vizier.529 The discussion started with a speech from Şeyhülislam. He mentioned the 
spiritual leaders of the Bektashi Order with great respect. However, the followers of the 
order had to be differentiated, as they were under claim of Bektashi-ship, manipulated the 
people with their blasphemous teachings and interpretations. As the Bektashis converted 
haram to helal and insulted the pillars, Şeyhülislam labelled the order and its followers as 
performers of sin (fisk-u fücur).
 530 He later asked the opinion of the attendant Şeyhs what 
should be done to them. 
Some attendants hesitated to voice their opinion as they expressed their ignorance 
to Bektashi attitude. However, some members of the Ulema claimed that, even though the 
Bektashis are desecrators of the pillars, it would be appropriate to punish them. In 
response, the attendants announced certain names of Bektashi leaders who were accused of 
consciously ignoring essential pillars, such as fasting and prayer. Then, on the basis of the 
aforementioned accusations, Şeyhülislam announced the final judgment; due to their 
inappropriate approach towards Islam and the violation of it, the leaders of the Bektashi 
Order should be put to death, the order must be closed and its followers should be sent on 
exile.531  
Considering the narration of Es‟ad Efendi, the accusations which attributed to 
Bektashi Order depend on their interpretations of religion. The council reclaimed the 
holiness of the spiritual leaders but implicitly affiliates the Janissaries as being responsible 
of the corruption of the Bektashi Order. However, despite accusations of being 
superstitious, there is no solid evidence to reveal the precise nature of the decision of the 
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council. Obviously, attitude of the Şeyhülislam and other members of the Ulema were 
decisive in the final judgment. This meeting and the attitude of the attendant Şeyhs also 
reveal that the Porte had symbolically sealed realignment of Orthodox- Sunni Ulema on its 
side. 
In Neticet‟ül Vekayi, Mehmed Daniş Bey voices the organic links between the 
Janissaries and the Bektashi Order. He admits the Bektashi Order was “the order of the 
superstitious” (mezâhib-i bâtıla). And, the Janissaries identified themselves as followers of 
the Hacı Bektaş even a representative of the Hacı Bektaş Veli had lived in the barracks of 
99
th
 regiment.532 All members of the Janissary corps under the claim of Bektashi-ship had 
performed their superstitious and infidel methods which ignored the pillars and 
manipulated people in the provinces. Hence, over claims of desecrating the pillars, 
performing superstitious rituals and rebelling against the State, the Order was closed; the 
Bektashi leaders were interrogated and jailed in the Armoury.533  
Apparently, Mehmed Daniş Bey explicitly admits that the closure of the Order 
was a result of their affiliations with the Janissaries. It was the Janissaries who had 
corrupted the Order and manipulated the people in the capital and provinces under claim of 
Bektashi-ship. Considering the author‟s illustration of 1826, that was symbolized as a clash 
between the “cauldron” and “the holy banner”, closure of the Bektashi Order was 
represented as another part of struggle between the infidels and the believers.  
Şirvanlı Fatih Efendi narrates very sophisticated reasoning regarding the closure 
of Bektashi Order which occupies a huge part in his treatise. According to him, Bektashi 
order had consisted pharaoh-like enemies of state who were equal to Ebu Cehil534 within its 
organisation. The Bektashis were depicted as “a group of ignorant and absentminded 
people who pretended to follow the path of God (sûret-i hakdan görünen bâtıl bir gurûh-ı 
câhil u gâfil) and a “treacherous enemy that is more dangerous and tenacious than Franks -
unbelievers” (küffârdan eşedd-ü akvâ bir düşmen-i gayr-ı mu‟temen).  
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In the beginning, accordingly Şirvanlı Fatih Efendi claims that the ultimate reason 
behind the closure of Bektashi Order was their affiliations with the Janissaries. He spends a 
considerable amount of effort justifying the judgment of the council. The followers of the 
Order were accused of ignoring the pillars and infidel teachings. In order to support this 
claim he gives very striking examples of events. 
The author asserts that during the Greek Rebellion of 1821, the Bektashis had 
offered alliance to the rebelling Greeks to fight against the Yezids. Apart from that, Şirvanlı 
Fatih Efendi mentions the Bektashis who settled in Anatolian provinces. He asserts that 
during the war with Iran, the Bektashis, who were sympathizers of the enemy, armed 
themselves to attack the believers.535 This part is followed by author‟s opinions about 
solidarity between Bektashis and the Janissaries. When the Janissaries rebelled against the 
state, the Bektashis gathered on Et Meydanı and encouraged others to join the rebellion. 
Furthermore, he even mentioned about Bektashis‟ opposition to Kadızadelis,536 a very 
notable family in Ulema. According to him, it was fortunate that the fatwa, which 
approved the closure of Bektashi Order, had been signed by a member of Kadızadelis.537 
This part was followed by the author‟s explanations to support his claims.538 
According to the author, those who identify themselves as Bektashi pretended to follow the 
path of God. In fact, they were equal to those who had oppressed the Prophet in Mecca. 
The treacherous acts of Bektashis were no different than the betrayals which had occurred 
in the wars of Uhud and Hendek in the history of Islam.539 After this part, he mentions 
about Bektashis‟ hostile attitude towards great caliphs Ömer and Osman. He addresses the 
reader directly, to those who hated and held grievances to the great caliphs would be 
faithful.540 This part was followed by fictional story about Bektashis.541  
The part of Bektashi within treatise of Şirvanlı Fatih Efendi gives us very 
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important clues to understand his view. Apparently, Fatih Efendi was a supporter of 
mainstream Orthodox-Sunni approach of the Ottoman Ulema. Instead of illustrating 
Bektashis as a corrupt Order which was affiliated with the Janissaries, he portrays the 
Bektashis as evil natured, opposers of the state and the religion in every occasion. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to reveal the reasons behind Fatih Efendi‟s aggressive 
approach. However, Kadızadeli‟s reference signifies a very important point as the author 
also perceives the closure of the Bektashi Order as a means of revenge for the long-term 
struggle between two traditions. At certain points, a sermon-type narration of the treatise 
directly addresses the reader which may emphasise that over depiction of the infidel 
Bektashi image, the author praises closure of the Bektashi Order as a victory of his Sunni-
Orthodox affiliations. In that sense, Şirvanlı Fatih Efendi appears as a spokesman of a 
certain group who was affiliated with mainstream Orthodox-Sunni fraction within the 
Ilmiye class. 
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CONCLUSION 
As already stated at the beginning, considering the internal dynamics of the events 
it is possible to categorise the rebellions of 1703 and 1730 as one group and 1807 and 1826 
as another. The rebellions in first group have similar characteristics as both rebellions 
eliminated the dominant “faction” led by the most powerful figure of the Ottoman 
administration. Therefore, these two rebellions shall be regarded as different episodes of an 
ongoing struggle. Presumably, the consciousness of the rebels in 1730 might be related to 
the rebellion of 1703. Considering the short time frame between these two rebellions, there 
would have been some participants who witnessed both of these events. The rebel‟s main 
assertions were the same but the subtexts which articulated to the main principle for 
rebellion were different. As for the moral corruption argument, demolition of the Sadabad 
kiosks and the annulment of the tax impositions from the previous rule gives us the clues 
as to why the contemporary sources might have built such an argument.  
The same continuity can be observed between the rebellion of 1807 and 1826. The 
ongoing struggle over the imposition of the New Order policy is the key feature of the 
arguments of the contemporary authors. Assumingly, had Selim III prevailed over the 
Janissaries, the same legitimisation pattern, which was conditioned by Mahmud II in 
abolishment of the Janissaries, probably would have dominated the palace-centred view. 
By the abolishment of the Janissaries, the disposed Sultan was presented as a “martyr” and 
his role of “renovator of the religion and order” was transferred to Sultan Mahmud II. 
Hence, it is possible to claim that the origin of main the argument, which labelled the 
Janissaries as the enemy of state and religion, had developed earlier during reign of Selim 
III, and the same legitimisation pattern was inherited by the grandees of Mahmud II. 
 In addition, there was a similar pattern of procedure that the Ottoman rebellions 
followed from 1703 to 1826. The rebels were aware of these procedures as they followed 
the same steps regardless of their claim. We can observe in the rebellions of the 1703, 
1730, 1807 and 1826 there are four major steps of an Ottoman rebellion: 
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The first step is “The Announcement of the Cause” which aims to create 
awareness among the townspeople over a protest or demonstration. At this stage, the rebels 
initiate their campaign by unfurling their banners and march into the heart of the city 
centre. Their effort of bringing legitimacy to their cause, is based on various assertions 
which refer to “treason” arguments. In all cases, the rebels more or less announce their 
cause to the public and filled the pretext of their reaction as initiating an act against “the 
traitors” who surround the Sultan. They unfurl a green banner which symbolises the Holy 
Banner of the Prophet and invite “the believers” to join their cause. Through the channels 
of such symbolic demonstration of righteousness, they create awareness in the public for 
their cause. This serves three purposes: 
- Appealing the Public 
- Negotiating with the Porte 
- Catching the attention of the Ulema 
In order to achieve these purposes, they paralyse the commercial centres of 
Istanbul and either appeal or force the Esnaf and shopkeepers to join them. In the outbreak 
of 1703 rebellion, the numbers of the protestors were thirty to fifty. When they decided to 
march to Sultan Ahmed Square, their numbers increased to hundreds. Furthermore, in the 
rebellion of 1730, the rebels, who split into three bands, announced their cause and raided 
the financial districts. For the rebellion of 1807, the rebels organised themselves in the 
citadels on the Bosphorus. When they reached the city centre, they had already made 
arrangements with the Janissaries, the artillerymen and the armourers. In the city centre, 
they performed the same methods to appeal to the public. In 1826, the rebels started their 
protest at the Janissary headquarters of Et Meydanı, then they announced their cause to the 
public.  
Considering the Ottoman concepts of justice, this step of the rebellion can be 
evaluated as subjects‟ demonstration of their disapproval of the administration of the State. 
At this step, civil officers, such as the major of Istanbul, the Janissary agha or the Janissary 
agha deputy were targeted by the rebels. They freed the prisoners and let them to join 
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them. The palace-centred view might have used this statement to condemn the rebels; 
however, from the view of the rebels it indicates the “unjust” conditions of an oppressive 
regime the people were living under. At the next step, Friday prayers are suspended or at 
least the intention of suspending the Friday prayers is voiced by the rebels. Thus, this 
serves the purpose of delivering a message to the Porte by questioning the authority of the 
Sultan.  
As for the condition of the Ulema, the rebels avoid unnecessary bloodshed and 
looting. On the contrary, in all cases they took any necessary measure to maintain the order 
of the city. The public punishments of those who disobeyed the orders, was also a 
demonstration of righteousness. Consistently, the Ulema participated with the rebels after 
merging with the Janissaries. Presumably, this is a milestone for the successive steps of the 
Ottoman rebellions, as after this point the events became full scale mutiny. But at this 
level, the rebels bring a senior member among the Ulema or leading figure such as the 
judge of Istanbul to confirm their demands and write invitations to the high-ranking 
members. 
The second step of the rebellion is “The Negotiations”. In this step, the rebels seek 
ways to merge with the Janissaries in Et Meydanı. The rebel assemblage follow the route 
of Divan Yolu to reach to Et Meydanı. Traditionally, the noble cauldrons of the Janissary 
regiments are brought to the Et Meydanı. This ceremony symbolises unity of comrades 
under the same cause in a rebellion.  
Generally, the members of Ulema are either invited or forced to take their side of 
the rebel assemblage in second step. At this point it is necessary to underline that the high-
ranking members of Ulema as a whole, did not support the rebels except in the case of the 
1807 rebellion. In the rebellions of 1703 and 1730 the rebels received the support of 
“outsider” members of the Ulema who had been ousted by the ruling cadres. In the 
rebellion of 1703, the support of Ulema was a reaction against the nepotistic attitude of 
Şeyülislam Feyzullah Efendi. In 1730, the Kazasker of Rumelia and former Kadı of 
Istanbul supported the rebels. Thus, the support of the Ulema was heavily affected by their 
relationship with the ruling cadres.  
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In all cases, the Ulema appeared as a negotiator between the rebels and the Porte. 
As the legitimacy of their cause depends on the affirmation of the Ulema, the negotiations 
can be considered as the medium of the rebel assemblage for the declaration of their 
demands to the Sultan. Presumably in this stage the new cadres of the administration, 
military and Ilmiye go into discussion. Hence, the political influence and support of the 
Ulema in the negotiations actually sealed the fate of the rebels.  
 Apart from that, the rebels had their requests confirmed by the members of 
Ulema, thus the legitimacy of their cause would be officially sealed. The Ulema confirm 
the appointments of the rebels, suspend the Friday prayers, and conduct negotiations with 
the Porte in the name of rebels. After the joining of the Ulema, the rebels wait for the 
Sultan to send his representatives to hear their demands. During the negotiations, the rebels 
never reject the authority of the Sultan, rather they express loyalty and declare the names 
of those who they accuse with being guilty of treason.  
Despite the demonstration of loyalty to the Sultan, this step of the rebellion will 
be followed by “depositions”. The terms of the rebels aim to purge the Sultan‟s closest 
men and receive approval for their appointments, such as Şeyülislam, Kazasker of 
Anatolia, Kazasker of Rumelia and the Janissary agha etc. This point actually indicates, by 
accepting the terms of the rebels the Sultan becomes powerless. Thus, deposition is 
inevitable. 
The success of this step of the rebellions again depends on the approval of the 
Ulema. For the Ottoman concepts of justice, by labelling his closest man as “traitors”, the 
Sultan is considered incapable to rule as he failed to observe the corruption in his 
administration; hence, maintain his duties. Thus, the background of the deposition pretext 
is completed with a legitimate argument; dependent on various pretexts. 
In 1703 rebellion, the rebel assemblage demanded the return of the court from 
Edirne to Istanbul and the dismissal of Feyzullah Efendi. After long negotiations, the 
Sultan gave in to the rebel demands, dismissed Feyzullah Efendi but refused to return to 
imperial capital. Instead, he invited the newly appointed officers and members of the 
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Ulema to Edirne. The rebels considered the order of the Sultan as a counter-manoeuvre 
against them. They used this issue as pretext of deposition. At this point, the Ulema 
labelled the Sultan as an incapable ruler and an oppressor.  
For the 1730 rebellion, the demands of the rebels were no different. Their demand 
of the execution of the officers, including the Grand Vizier Damat Ibrahim Paşa, was 
performed and their terms were approved by the Sultan. But then the dispute over the 
authenticity of Damat Ibrahim Paşa‟s dead body resulted in the deposal of the Sultan. In 
the rebellion of 1807, after the annulment of the New Order and the execution of several 
New Order grandees, the rebels accuse the Sultan of being an “oppressor” as he forced his 
subjects to wear infidel clothes and perform infidel military training. Thus, he was 
deposed.  
After the power of the Sultan was broken by the rebels over pretext of “being 
unjust and oppressive”, the rebels appointed a new Sultan sympathetic to their cause. This 
is actually common principle of the deposition step. Under a new regime they would be 
safer. Thus, the rebels have elevate themselves to the position of “restorers of the order” as 
they defy the unjust and incapable ruler. 
The fourth step of the rebellion is the “realignment” process. The pragmatic 
relationship with the rebels and the Ulema usually results with a purge of the rebels in the 
aftermath of the rebellion. The new Sultan who struggles to consolidate power over the 
rebel affiliations is forced to seek ways to compromise with the Ulema and the new 
cabinet. Hence, the rebels who were once supported and tolerated by the state officials, the 
Ulema are painted as “traitors” who mutinied against the state. This step actually 
determines the palace-centred view on the narration of the events.   
The official chroniclers or the others who adopted the palace-centred view  
establish a pattern which condemns the rebels in all stages of the rebellion and illustrates 
them as vile people who bring disorder to the state. However, in this pattern the chroniclers 
need to find a scapegoat for the events to justify the deposed Sultan. The most 
sophisticated discussion regarding the legitimacy of the rebellion came into view in the 
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case of 1807. Firstly, there was an ongoing battle of legitimisation between the Porte and 
the antagonists over the New Order policy. The basic principle of the assertion of the Porte 
was to renovate the order by establishing a new, westernised army to protect the Muslims. 
The legitimacy of this policy is based on the “rule of reprisal” which obliges the Muslims 
to use weapon of their enemies. The counter argument labelled the outcomes of the New 
Order Policy as an infidel innovation. The first round of this battle was won by the 
antagonists and consequently the Sultan was depicted as an “oppressor”. In response, the 
affiliates of the New Army promoted the Sultan to the rank of “martyr”. The same pattern 
creates a basis for legitimising the abolishment of the Janissaries.  
The rebels use three dominant arguments to signify the legitimacy of their cause. 
Assertions over “treason”, “justice” and “oppression” concepts of legitimisation shape the 
arguments of the rebels in different stages of the rebellions. In response, the palace-centred 
view relied on “mutiny”, “betrayal of role” and “disobedience of the grand order” 
assertions in their arguments. Several subtexts were articulated to these main themes of 
legitimisation. In rebellion of 1703, “the oppression” and “injustice” were articulated by 
the argument of “treason”. The Karlowitz treaty terms consider this as a failure to protect 
the Muslim lands which was the basic duty of the Sultan. In addition to this, Şeyülislam 
Feyzullah Efendi was the scapegoat of the rebellion due to his violations of state protocols. 
 In 1730, “The moral corruption” was the subtext of the “treason” argument. 
Damat Ibrahim Paşa, as he was corrupt, he surrendered the Muslim lands to the infidel 
enemy for the sake of his own hedonistic pleasures. For the rebellion of 1807, the rebels 
articulated “the oppression” was the subtext of the “imposition of infidel innovations” 
assertion. In response, the palace-centred view labelled the Sultan as a “renovator of the 
order”; hence, those who mutinied against the Sultan were accused of defying the grand 
order of God. The illustration of Janissaries and their Bektashi affiliations in 1826 
depended on the same principle. Thus, the Porte created an image of “the enemy of the 
state and religion” by underlining the Janissaries‟ previous crimes and opposition to the 
new training methods. 
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Therefore, as was said in the first chapter, in all cases political realism prevailed 
over religious idealism in the legitimisation procedures of the rebellion. The role of 
religious legitimisation practices were interpreted by the prevailed group for the sake of 
their purposes. 
The cause of events may be organised or impulsive acts. Particularly the 
rebellions of 1703 and 1807, similar characteristics of events appeared as impulsive 
reactions from the view of the palace. Later on, both events transformed into a popular 
rebellion. Consequently, there had been some discussions among the contemporary authors 
whether there was conspiracy or not. In general, the conspiracy theories were voiced by the 
authors in all of the events, actually indicating their affiliations. According to Silahdar 
Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa the rebellion of 1703 was a plot of Rami Mehmed Paşa, who 
became the most influential figure in the early rule of Ahmed III. For Destari Salih Efendi, 
probably an affiliate of Damat Ibrahim Paşa, the rebellion of 1730 was a plot of Zülali 
Hasan Efendi who became the chief judge of Anatolia in the reign of Mahmud I. Among 
the various sources which dealt with the rebellion of 1807, there were some assertions that 
the whole event was a plot of Şeyhülislam Ataullah Efendi and the Vizier Köse Musa 
Paşa.542 Further comparative analyse on the networks of relationships, particularly in terms 
of revealing the affiliations of the contemporary authors is a necessity to uncover 
undermining plots. 
In all cases, the Porte also took the same measures to repel the rebellion. They 
invite the high ranking officers and prominent members of the Ulema to the palace. They 
arm the loyal troops for a possible armed conflict. The original Holy Banner is used to win 
public support. These steps which the rebels and the Porte followed might be considered as 
traditional methods that should be taken in a rebellion.  
Here in, it would be useful to ask; was there an reoccurring tradition in the 
Ottoman rebellions regarding the technical procedures to be followed? 
 
                                                          
542  Aysel Yıldız Danacı, “Vaka‟yı Selimiyye”, Chapter 1, p. 10-60 
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In order to answer this question, it is necessary to focus on all of the mainstream 
Ottoman rebellions from sixteenth century until the abolishment of the Janissaries. In 
addition, failed attempts of Janissary-led revolts and the reasons behind the failure are also 
needed to be studied. According to Cemal Kafadar, up until the rebellion of 1806-1807, 
there were at least ten mainstream Janissary-led or major Janissary rebellions which 
occurred in the imperial capital in 1589, 1622, 1648, 1651, 1655, 1656, 1687, 1703, 1730 
and 1740. He underlines a shared political discourse in these events.543As cited by Ali 
Yaycıoğlu, the identity of the Janissary-ship that derived from the corps‟ autonomous 
internal hierarchy, jurisdiction and political orientation with Bektashi Order might have 
provided its members and affiliations with a unique religious-political outlook and a sense 
of solidarity. Thus the group consciousness of the Janissaries might have built its own 
customs regarding the protection and well-being of the public or the old laws. From the 
scope of our study, it may be not possible to reach an ultimate judgement about a pattern or 
tradition of a successful rebellion techniques, as it requires further in depth research on the 
contemporary sources. However, assumingly within the “tradition of the dissent” of the 
Janissaries, it is possible to observe a certain degree of awareness regarding technical 
procedures of a rebellion.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
543  Cemal Kafadar,“On the Purity and Corruption of the Janissaries”., 179-190, “The Janissaries and other riffraff of 
Ottoman Istanbul: rebels without a cause?”, 133-134.  Ali Yaycıoğlu “Provincial Challange” , 312 see footnote 48. 
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